

# **URBAN PLANNING AND POLICIES**

**PERSPECTIVES IN URBAN GEOGRAPHY**





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*Concept's International Series in Geography No. 3*

**PERSPECTIVES IN URBAN GEOGRAPHY**

**VOLUME SIXTEEN**

**Urban Planning  
and Policies**

**PART-B**

**CROSS-CULTURAL URBAN POLICIES**

*Edited by*  
**C. S. YADAV**

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## PREFACE

### NATURE OF URBAN GEOGRAPHY

THERE are several studies on urban geography which reveal that, as a major sub-discipline, it has a long tail but a short body. However, the spectrum is so vast and broad that researchers are able to make general statements in defence of its conception, philosophy, nature and orientation. Urban geography today encompasses and interfaces with various disciplines which are interested in urban studies. As an introduction to this series, our task here is to make an attempt to briefly review the development of geographical interest in various aspects of cities.

There are several reviews of the early development of urban geography which have been dealt with by Berry and Harton (1970)<sup>1</sup> and Carter (1974).<sup>2</sup> Berry and Harton in their book, *Geographical Perspective on Urban System*, have made an attempt to introduce readers to its present-day status. They have clearly resolved that "the formative years of the social science in the late nineteenth century and early twentieth century were also the years in which urban studies first developed,"<sup>3</sup> thus providing the context for the geography's emerging interest in cities. However, the emergence of urban studies dates back to the writing of Greek scholars, but as a sub-discipline, it has reached its present-day status only in the past 30 years.

In their historical perspective the works on urban geography show that the pre-20th century studies primarily concerned themselves with themes of location, size and shape of the cities. The initial findings were strongly subjective, descriptive and dependent more on observation such as the works of Hassert (1907)<sup>4</sup> and Blanchard (1911).<sup>5</sup> In the succeeding years the conceptual framework of site and situation was criticized by

organic elements which involved people and their movements. The morphologist, later in 1960, truly brought the indigenous line of evolution in the sphere of urban geography and studies on the build-up fabric of cities (Conzone, 1960).<sup>8</sup> Smails (1955)<sup>9</sup> constituted the prime base of urban geography, which remained articulated without any major conceptual change till early 1960s. The studies on the morphological aspects of the urban system were influenced by external forces, consequently the methodological frameworks got impetus within the discipline. At this juncture the evolution of concepts was not based on environment but took shelter under the umbrella of economics of location, and incorporated analysis of land values and rents, and the concept of nodality and accessibility. These concepts were derived from the economic theories of Cooley (1894)<sup>10</sup>, Weber (1899),<sup>11</sup> and Hurd (1903).<sup>12</sup>

The Chicago School of Urban Ecology hastened the evolution of urban geography. In his monumental work Park (1925)<sup>13</sup> developed the idea of order and analysis of towns. Further, a powerful thrust and much of the rationale was provided to the studies of urban geography by the Central Place Theory of Christaller (1933).<sup>14</sup>

The impact of the statistical method was powerful and it brought rapid and enormous changes in the field of urban geography. It also brought new insights into the development and application of urban geography towards increased quantification. Brian J. Berry, a pioneer in the field, analysed the spatial order, size and location of towns and cities. There was widespread use of innovative techniques to explore the nature of urban problems, hypotheses were tested, new theories propounded and old theories remodelled. The statistical methods were put to a variety of uses. Smith (1965)<sup>15</sup> evaluated the classification of settlements; Berry and Garrison (1956)<sup>16</sup> examined the utility of the rank-size rule for urban populations. The models of Park and Burgess (1925),<sup>17</sup> Harris and Ullman (1945)<sup>18</sup> and Homar Hoyt (1939)<sup>19</sup> were tested and re-examined by various geographers.

A new impetus to urban geography came from social area analysis which was initially propounded by Shevky and Bell (1955)<sup>20</sup> and later on this provided a basis for factorial ecology. The collaboration of this stream in urban geography was offered

by Berry (1971),<sup>21</sup> Herbert (1972)<sup>22</sup> and Johnston (1971).<sup>23</sup> As a consequence of these thrusts in geography after 1960, the techniques of investigation were sharpened and this has provided the basis for a scientific explanation of cities. Attempts were made to introduce new theories and frame laws to make the explanation of events more rational and logical. Sophisticated models were propounded as urban geography entered a new era of rationalizing the subject matter of urban studies on the basis of new philosophies, new concepts, new theories, new methodologies and applications.

However, the status of contemporary urban geography has been elevated only recently by the behavioural approach. The studies of perception and cognition which have a long tradition in physiology were first introduced into the field of geography by Lynch (1960),<sup>24</sup> Dowson and Stea (1973)<sup>25</sup> Gould and White (1974).<sup>26</sup> At present there is a sudden spurt in the studies on the subject with a new paradigm. But the full impact of behavioural approaches upon urban geography has yet to be realized.

The aim of this series is to seek reorientation of the discipline strengthened by new philosophies, methodologies, subject matter or application. The series has been arranged in such a way that all contemporary viewpoints are covered comprehensively. Hopefully, this series will inspire researchers to appreciate the work already done by geographers in studying cities. Geography by nature seems to be a synthesizing field of inquiry. As such we have made an endeavour to combine some of the otherwise disparate facts garnered by other disciplines in such a manner that we can gain a better understanding of the urban system. The study of urban geography is essential if we are to analyse the human consequences of the settlements in which we live. It is useful to planners, decision makers in government and corporations and also to each one of us as citizens. Finally, it gives us a perspective on what may be happening to our cities and to the nature.

To achieve the above goal only those contributions with originality and contrasting viewpoints were selected for inclusion in this series. In doing so the editor does not wish to compete with the journals in the field in which innovative research and methodological aspects are presented. But he does wish to convey, and convey with conviction, that significant researches

are being undertaken in the different branches of urban geography and in other allied disciplines. The present series is an attempt to provide a selective reappraisal and rigorous examination of the assumptions and the urge to disseminate new knowledge created by the mutual interaction. Emphasis is also placed on the conceptualization and theorization of the subject matter so that general laws may emerge. A conscious effort has been to organize the series in such a way that it reflects the philosophical approach parallel to that of the behavioural school. Finally, a vigorous attempt has been made to demonstrate throughout the series how geographers are basically involved in solving the urban problems.

C.S. YADAV

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MICHAEL FAGENCE

## SETTLEMENT THEORY v THE FORCES OF PRAGMATISM

### Rural Settlement Policies and Planning in Australia

#### INTRODUCTION

IN his commentary on the performance of British local planning authorities Woodruffe<sup>1</sup> remarked on the apparent persistent disregard of modern planning theory in the preparation of policies and plans for rural areas and small country towns. Despite the mild filtration with growth point and key settlement concepts by some local authorities, for most areas the forces of pragmatism and political expediency operated to frustrate any serious attempts to formulate and then implement such space-ordering principles as would have been relevant to the particular planning context. This tendency to overwhelm genuine advances in settlement theory with expediency and pragmatism is well illustrated in the recent experience of some Australian states.<sup>2</sup>

After a period of considerable investigation and study, especially of the factors considered most influential in the pattern of settlement, the emerging policy in New South Wales seems more tuned to accommodate and persist with the existing confused pattern of townships than with the imposition of a rational, structured framework. In contrast, the Tasmanian experience is of a less encyclopaedic and profound period of investigation; rather, the settlement strategies emerged from a simple quartet of principles—to protect productive agricultural land, to consolidate existing townships, to direct growth to 'spot' villages, and to strengthen the economic viability and infrastructure of existing

service centres. The government of the state of Victoria has for long exhibited a commitment to regionalism ; however, this policy has effectively stifled progressive theory-building as it has been constrained by inter-regional competition and a resource differential which has ultimately been dealt with in the political arena. South Australia operates a strict statutory code, which is not particularly conducive to the use of innovative spatial concepts.

The experience of these four states highlights the essential pragmatism in rural planning and policy making, at the expense of genuine theory-building and theory-application. In a concluding section reference will be made to some of the opportunities which have been missed, and to some of the potentially relevant theory which has been ignored.

#### CASE STUDY 1

##### **New South Wales**

Most states in Australia have been struggling to interpret the various intertwined implications of the modern forces of social, economic, technological and organizational change. In the case of New South Wales, the struggle has been encountered on two levels—the conventional growth and decay pressures experienced in the metropolitan centre and its associated corridors of development, and the confused pattern of incompatible forces at work in the country towns and rural areas. For this state, in which the responsibility for spatially shepherding the forces of change is divided between two government departments—one concerned with land use planning, and the other with regional development—the principal problems are derived from the following matters :

- (a) the pressure for the subdivision and fragmentation of rural land, especially for housing purposes ;
- (b) the general public demand for the upgrading of infrastructure services (such as water supply, effluent disposal, electricity, education, health care) in rural areas ;
- (c) the continued support of manufacturing enterprises in established country towns, despite the economic indicators of pending decline ;
- (d) the peculiar circumstances of areas being settled by

retired people.

The independent strategic actions and aspirations of the multiplicity of local authorities effectively frustrate the pursuit of cogent and integrated rural settlement policies and plans. This is particularly so in the matter of rural subdivision and agriculture-holding fragmentation. The focus of attention on this aspect of settlement policy was forced on the various local planning authorities by the progressive growth of speculative subdivision and rural land sales which characterized the 1970s. Rather than operate within a framework of a carefully prepared spatial strategy, conceived on a regional basis within the state, the various separate local authorities tackled the matter independently of a co-ordinated framework, and of each other. As a result, the state government was able only to propose a pragmatic prospectus of considerations to guide the actions of local authorities—viz.

1. to protect viable agricultural holdings from speculative fragmentation into non-viable production units ;
2. to concentrate the spread of rural subdivision into those areas which could be economically served with appropriate infrastructure—preferably areas which were contiguous with established urban centres, or which could be aggregated into potentially viable urban concentrations ;
3. to prevent any subdivision on urban fringes if that would potentially frustrate orderly urban expansion ;
4. to prevent corridors of subdivision ;
5. to protect areas of high environmental quality and amenity.

These pragmatic yardsticks do not contribute to an integrated and viable space-ordering theory.

A separate area of policy has been concerned with regional development, as a means of relieving congestion in the principal industrial districts of the metropolitan area, and as a means of encouraging and promoting industrial development in country centres. The particular orientation of this policy has been directed at maintaining, consolidating, and where possible expanding the



commitment of industrial enterprises in country towns, especially to ensure the continuing social and economic viability of those centres. The convention of nominating 'growth centres' was adopted by the state government, aided and abetted by gestures of support from the Commonwealth government. Commonwealth support for decentralization to, and the continuing promotion of growth centres has been inconsistent (and in the late 1970s, was almost completely halted), with the result that the spatial aspects of the growth centre have been given less consideration than the more conspicuous matters of political expediency. The New South Wales framework of growth centres does not conform to a spatial pattern which would contribute to the social, economic and physical development of significant tributary areas.

Continuing studies of resources—agricultural potential, mineral deposits, manufacturing centres, service towns, demographic profiles, and so on—provide inventories of sensitivity, with which regional strategies may be developed to maximize regional strengths and to overcome regional structural deficiencies. However, no spatial framework has been superimposed on the inventories. As a result, no clear, spatially-relevant strategies are promoted for settlement location, settlement hierarchies, settlement linkages, or for the complementary facets of regional policies for national parks, nature reserves, heritage sites, and so on.

Increasing levels of personal prosperity during the decade of the 1970s contributed to the demand for retirement centres, rural retreats, second homes, hobby farms, and similar leisure-related phenomena. Market produced locational preferences have been for coastal locations, although small towns near the nation's capital, Canberra, have also attracted attention. This new form of development needs special control, particularly because of its impact on environmentally-sensitive areas, and on districts previously poorly served with basic utility and service infrastructures. Resort areas pose spatial problems of yet another kind.

Persisting in a distinct, if unco-ordinated series of settlement patterns are the many small rural centres whose origins are tied to the former pioneering movements associated with mining, forestry and basic agricultural exploitation in particular regions. The persistence of these small centres is linked inextricably to the prosperity of primary industry activity—and this is dependent on

a variety of locally-induced, nationally-induced, and internationally-induced circumstances.

In general, the rural settlement pattern of New South Wales is experiencing considerable change as

1. the traditional agriculture-based service centres lose some of their significance through changing patterns of marketing ;
2. the mining-dependent townships persist in their largely maverick locations ;
3. the most congenial conditions in small coastal resorts or inland rural enclaves are sought by those desirous of escaping from conventional urban centres and life-styles ;
4. the momentum of the policies of decentralization and industrial support fluctuates.

With the absence of any substantial co-ordination of these forces, the rural settlement 'pattern' in New South Wales is increasingly dictated by political expediency, pragmatism in local planning decisions, market forces, and accidents of history rather than by a rationalized framework derived from an assessment of compatible, pertinent spatial theory.

#### CASE STUDY 2

##### **Tasmania**

The present pattern of settlement in Tasmania is evidence of the interaction of such forces as the island's topography, the processes of land alienation and land grants, the fluctuating fortunes of the agricultural sector, and the peculiar distribution of timber and mineral reserves.

Tasmania is less dominated by a single metropolitan centre than any other Australian state. This circumstances has been both the cause and effect of a pattern of service centres conditioned by the rugged coast-line in the north and north-east, the valley systems leading from the interior to the coast zones, the historical legacy of the nineteenth century colonial plantations, the maverick locations of the mining communities. scott has regularly commented on the multiplicity of service

centres in Tasmania conforming to a tightly, largely naturally derived hierarchy. At the highest level in the hierarchy are Hobart, Launceston, Burnie and Devonport. At a population threshold above 1,000 and prominent in the second order of centres are towns which have a functional inventory which is both more sophisticated and extensive than might be expected for such small population clusters, and yet which is often inadequate for the immediate population catchment which is therefore necessarily dependent on the higher order centres in close proximity. The pattern at this second order is remarkably consistent, with the exception of the rural Huon Valley in the south-east in which there are four minor towns rather than a dominating first or second order settlement.

At the lowest order of settlement, the villages and hamlets, inconsistency of pattern and availability of services is the most conspicuous characteristic. For example, there are few such settlements which offer the full spectrum of the rudimentary services—school, general store and post office, church, public hall, petrol filling station, and carrier service. Some conformity to a hierarchical pattern has evolved, with hamlets predominating in the lowland areas of intensive farming, and hamlets predominating where pastoralism is most prevalent and where the settlements are relatively isolated and in the highlands. As levels of technology and affluence have increased, as approaches to farm management and consumer behaviour have been transformed, and as government has carefully vetted the circumstances under which financial commitment to augmenting the infrastructure services is economically as well as politically feasible and appropriate, the viability of many of these lower order centres has been prejudiced, with the result that the settlement pattern has been distorted by the circumstances of differential decline.

#### *Planning strategies in the north and north-west*

The basic planning strategy for the Tamar region has focused on the perpetuation of the regional dominance of Launceston as the highest order centre, with the other towns fulfilling such functional role in the hierarchy as could be sustained by their population.

Complementary to this basic strategic orientation are sub-policies concerned with (a) the preservation of historic hamlets,

(b) delegating for local determination the details of rural sub-division, and (c) the artificial stimulation of the natural low growth economy so as to prevent the otherwise inevitable net outmigration of people and economic activity. Particularly as a result of this third sub-policy, the region's planning machinery necessarily supports programmes of industrial and commercial promotion, which have been designed :

1. to promote those enterprises which are dependent upon local resources (rather than support massive export-oriented developments, or mobile industry) ;
2. to concentrate on secondary rather than tertiary (other than tourism) industry activities ;
3. to locate industries in existing centres where there is spare capacity rather than develop other (i.e. new) centres ;
4. to consolidate the settlement pattern into a linear corridor, with nodes accommodating industrial activities, and other townships maximizing their locational recreation and tourism potential ;
5. to maximize the opportunities for broad-acre development in the central zone, and to protect the agricultural activities of the Esk Valley ;
6. to concentrate rural residential development into low density 'spot village' centres, and to conserve those villages with a heritage value ;
7. to preserve the character of existing townships by encouraging infil development within the town's perimeter rather than allow peripheral extension.

In summary, the rural settlement strategies in Tasmania have been formulated to protect productive agricultural land, to consolidate settlement into a linear form focusing on existing townships, with some new development at 'spot villages', to broaden the economic base and infrastructure of existing towns ; thus, the basis of the strategy has been to perpetuate a pattern established in the nineteenth century as a response to physical and historico-political factors. As elsewhere in Australia, a commitment to a theory-derived integrated pattern is not particularly conspicuous.

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## CASE STUDY 3

**Victoria**

As in all other Australian states the responsibility for the detailed planning of rural settlement lies with local councils. However, to a degree not matched in other states, Victoria has embarked on a process of regional planning, a process which has faltered largely because the service-delivery and policy co-ordinating departments of the three tiers of government (federal, state, local) have pursued idiosyncratic planning and management strategies. Despite the absence of complete compatibility, co-ordination and synchronization, the Victorian experience has been of regionally-based consultative arrangements, and some decentralization of those sections of government departments whose decision-making is best tuned to respond to locale-specific problems and needs. Thus, some aspects of government responsibility in the fields of transport, family and community services, health, education, youth, sport and recreation have been 'regionalized'. In addition, the state government has attempted to improve its information base from a continuing programme of regional studies, part of which has focused on the pattern of rural settlement types, and the peculiar needs of small country towns.

One of the most developed, yet typical regional studies has been that of the Loddon-Campaspe region.

*Attempt to rationalize the settlement pattern in Loddon-Campaspe*

The population of the Loddon-Campaspe region is distributed in a distinct hierarchical pattern :

1. The Bendigo sub-region, accounting for about 43% of the region's population ;
2. three lower order 'cities'—Castlemaine, Maryborough and Echuca, with populations of the order of 7-8,000, and in aggregate accounting for about 17% of the region's population ;
3. Seven small townships (with populations in excess of 1,000)—Kyneton, St. Arnaud, Rochester, Cohuna, Charlton, Woodend, Heathcote) ;
4. twenty-four townships in the population range 200-

1,000 ;

5. and about 14% of the region's population dispersed or aggregated into clusters of less than 200 persons.

This pattern reflects the interaction of such factors as the early development of the three principal towns (Bendigo, Castlemaine, Maryborough) as gold mining centres and their subsequent consolidation as conventional sub-regional service towns, the primarily rural nature of economic activity throughout the region with its consequential dispersed pattern of service centres of various hierarchical status (somewhat similar to the traditional central place arrangement), and the nature of the evolved transport network. The pattern of economic activities is closely related to the interdependency of service towns in the region, although the higher order centres, through their base of well established manufacturing enterprises, facilitate a reduced degree of dependency on the fortunes of primary industry. In addition, for physical locational, historic and some economic reasons, the region is not dominated by its principal and largest town. Regional transport routes, the incidence of many second and third order service centres, the jealous social and economic independence of these lower order centres in their own tributary areas have contributed to less than conventional stability in the actual (rather than the theoretical and expected) hierarchical organization of the country towns.

The region has become increasingly urbanized, as the population growth has tended to concentrate at the existing higher order centres, in so doing posing particular problems for the rational delivery of public services, utility infrastructures and amenities. To cope with this situation a redrafting of the settlement hierarchy has been considered, reducing the conspicuous existing five-tier structure to a more rational and simple structure of three-tiers :

1. a regional centre (Bendigo)
2. a network of ten (10) sub-regional centres (combining the second and third tiers of the previous schema) ;
3. a supporting and complementary network of local community centres with populations generally below a threshold of 1,000 at any one location.

The selection of the regional centre follows conventional space ordering principles of the central place hierarchy, with the dominant existing 'central place' being retained, and its service capacity strengthened and augmented by policies and programmes concerned with transportation, government decentralization of some of its own activities, the encouragement of some private enterprise migration from the congestion of metropolitan Melbourne, and the expansion of the basic social delivery services already available at Bendigo.

The basic departure from convention lies in the proposed strategy for a revised second tier of service centres, all falling within the expected population range of 1,000—8,000. At this second tier in the hierarchy it would be necessary strategically to reinforce some centres with augmented services, to redefine the inter-relationships of some centres, and to pursue such space-related policies as would contribute to the development and maintenance of a suitable and viable economic base at each centre. The basic centrality, and therefore sustainable hierarchical position, of the ten towns identified as being appropriate for the second tier in the regional structure would be dependent upon the concentration at those centres of at least the following services—a secondary school (and a further education centre for trade training and adult courses), a hospital facility (with basic services only), local council offices, banking facilities.

At the third tier in the reformulated hierarchy are the small towns and villages, most of which would have a resident population of less than 500. The function of this order is the provision of convenience services, such as, the primary (or first) school, the post office (perhaps an additional service of the general store) and the petrol filling station. Articulating a planning strategy at this level may involve conscious decisions to maintain some centres at the expense of others, by recommending to government departments which locations should receive expenditure on infrastructure and amenities and which should not. The inevitable outcome of such decisions would include the demise of some small centres.

The proposal for settlement rationalization can be justified on an assessment of multiples of economic, management, and even physical/locational criteria. However, the implementation of such a strategy is dependent upon political feasibility, the co-

ordination of the operation of various government departments responsible for delivery services, and its acceptability to a diversity of entrepreneurial enterprises. In the absence of co-ordination, the existing, partially eccentric pattern of competition between centres will inevitably persist.

#### CASE STUDY 4

##### **South Australia**

The approach to the strategic planning of rural settlement in South Australia has been dictated largely by the emphasis given to statutory codes, rather than to the more flexible process of policy planning.

Most local councils have formulated their proposals for rural areas using a set of model planning regulations for country areas issued in 1978 by the department of the state government responsible for the overall co-ordination of land use planning. The intention was that the model regulations would form the basis of a code modified to suit the particular circumstances of each local council and the towns within its jurisdiction. However, in many cases, the model regulations were interpreted and adopted with scarce variation to the peculiarities of each township; the outcome has been a pedantic code comprising measures to secure the abatement of any action or development likely to impair the amenity of an area, to generally control new building and land usage, and to achieve orderly and consistent standards of the bringing into use of rural land for urban purposes (principally housing). This statutory code has been supported by land use zone restrictions, although the recommendation of the state government to the local councils was to fit the zonal types and specifications to the needs of particular townships; for example, in many cases a three-zone definition was expected to be adequate, the town being designated as 'country township zone', the immediately surrounding areas as 'rural fringe zone', and the remainder of the rural area designated as 'general farming zone'. The basic state-wide co-ordination of this approach to rural settlement planning was to be achieved through the co-operation of centrally-based geographical sector managers. However, the envisaged framework for co-ordination and oversight has not eventuated, except for the settlement system focusing on the



state capital of Adelaide, the twofold reasons usually advanced being that (a) the needs of the metropolitan area are most conspicuous and urgent, and that (b) the rural areas and small country towns have changed so little that they have scarce need of sophisticated planning direction and control. As a result, those councils who have formulated planning proposals for their areas have become enslaved by a pedantic statutory code not particularly sympathetically well-tuned to their precise needs, while many other councils have resisted the temptation to formulate coherent planning strategies of any kind.

Many of the South Australian country towns were founded on the needs of agriculture; the relative decline of those towns has become an indicator of the change in the state to an industrial and administration economy. The basic agriculture-dependent pattern of settlement was disrupted in the early 1900s by the rash of small mining towns. These two types of township have been subjected to series of conservation studies as a means of rescuing them from absolute decline and the promotion of them as centres of architectural and/or historic interest and value. Recent distortions to the established settlement pattern have been caused by the unco-ordinated processes of rural subdivision which have given rise to linear alignments of resort and retirement housing on the coastal margin and in some of the more picturesque river valleys, and large residential subdivisions on the hillslopes overlooking metropolitan Adelaide. South Australia has a heritage of considerable 'paper' subdivisions, with some complete townships subdivided on plan but no development at the site, and in other areas considerable subdivision into small urban-type residential lots on the periphery of townships experiencing decline rather than growth. As a means of curbing speculative and unwanted rural subdivision in country towns the state government has indicated it is unlikely to extend public services and utilities to such sites.

A recent review of non-urban policies sought to identify (a) the extent to which the State government should attempt to promote the continual use of rural land for primary production by excluding from that land other competing uses, (b) the extent to which the prevailing policies towards servicing rural areas contributed to the continuing attractiveness of those areas for subdivisional development, (c) a rational approach towards

residential development in rural areas, (d) an appropriate approach towards the control and promotion of development in stagnant and declining townships in rural areas, and (e) an appropriate prospectus of measures to promote economic development, particularly tourism, in rural areas. The review was concerned to identify which government departments should be responsible for particular aspects of what could become a co-ordinated policy of the management of rural land, in recognition that conventional planning policies and controls in operation in the rural areas had failed to accurately reflect the changing economic and social conditions of those areas. As a contribution to a statewide strategy for rural settlement the review hypothesized that the matters of most concern would be :

1. to compose a rational hierarchical structure of settlement, within a balanced spectrum of town types ;
2. to promote planning codes idiosyncratically sympathetic to particular towns, rather than adopt a state-wide omnibus code of generalized planning controls ;
3. to prepare settlement strategies in recognition of the cost implications of public services and infrastructure systems.

The general intention of the proposed formula was to provide a stimulus for a state-wide strategy for rural settlement which avoided the development and enforcement of a pedantic statutory code.

#### INTERPRETATION AND CONCLUSION

From this brief review of performance in four Australian states it is evident that, for the most part, the forces of pragmatism prevail over the forces of settlement theory. Although, ultimately, a pragmatic determination of the inputs to settlement policy-making is appropriate, if for no other reason than the unreasonableness of treating the real-life circumstances as a laboratory for experimentation and the advancement of theory, a substantial case can be made that the pragmatism (or political realism) should form a step in the policy-making process after the judicious application of appropriate theory and concepts ; no rational case

can be composed for the complete replacement of the theory inputs by the various facets of pragmatism.

The literature in settlement theory is littered with concepts and theories formulated in the circumstances of the conventional undifferentiated geographical plane, or composed from an examination from the evolved spatial patterns in Europe or North America. Apart from the many variants of central place theory<sup>3</sup> there is an increasing literature on the abstract geometrical formulations which may form the basis of settlement patterns.<sup>4</sup> Such formulations have been designed to describe and explain spatial patterns; few are useful for predictions, although they have considerable utility for describing normative patterns to which a regional settlement system may be 'encouraged' to conform. However, it should be recognised that cultural, governmental, and physical-location specific idiosyncracies render much of the generalised theory of scarce direct relevance. Rose<sup>5</sup> has drawn attention to some of the hierarchical peculiarities in the Australian urban system. Despite the idiosyncratic nature of each settlement pattern, and the various forces which have generated that pattern, in every situation there should be some conformity with conventional theory; any apparent disregard of the corpus of appropriate theory and concept may be expected to contribute to the formulation of an under-optimized settlement pattern in any region. Elsewhere this author has argued the need for a filter of relevance tests to be applied to the gamut of theory applicable to the circumstances of the planning of small country towns, and has postulated that a judicious amalgum of such concepts and theories as are concerned with central places, growth centres, growth poles, key settlements might be the composite planning tool with which to defeat the forces of pragmatism.<sup>6</sup>

In the four case studies the weight of evidence points to the development of settlement policies from a variable set of considerations which includes the following:

1. the unquestioning acceptance of the existing settlement pattern;
2. the commitment to the rationalization of the geographical distribution of the basic public utilities and services conditioned more by political than social and economic

- judgement ;
3. the simplistic interpretation of the settlement pattern as if composed of 'natural' nodes ;
  4. the attainable degree of compatibility in the standards of provision, and the phasing of developments (such as school-building, road construction, hospital-building, post office establishment, and so on) between the various government departments, and across the three levels of government ;
  5. the prevailing statutory codes and regulations ;
  6. the parochialism of planning decisions within each region ;
  7. the dictates of political expediency (and the status of the elected representatives) ;
  8. the potential contribution of particular settlements to the architectural or historic heritage of the state ;
  9. the localized market demands for progressive fragmentation of agricultural holdings for residential purposes (i.e. rural-residential subdivision) ;
  10. the relative attractiveness of areas for second homes, rural retreats, hobby farms ;
  11. the maverick siting of mining towns (both in earlier periods and in the modern period).

In addition to these, and other particular considerations and factors, most states have fluctuating political commitments to policies concerned with service and employment decentralization, to industrial support, to transport freight rates to environmental conservation, and so on. Although there are some exceptions in degree, possibly the only matter of consistency is the comparative lack of commitment to the development of policies for the control of settlement, especially in rural areas, from a substantive basis of theory concerned with such matters as (a) regional form, (b) settlement complementarity (key settlement theory), (c) hierarchical ordering in a settlement network (central place theory), and (d) modal dominance (growth centre and growth pole theory).

# FOOTNOTES

1. Woodruffe, B. (1976) *Rural Settlement Policies and Plans*, Oxford University Press, London.
2. The information on which this paper is based is derived largely from correspondence, and from a number of internal reports of departments responsible for settlement policies in the various state governments.
3. Beavon, K. (1977) *Central Place Theory : A Reinterpretation*, Longman, London.
4. Getis, A., Boots, B. (1978) *Models of Spatial Processes*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
5. Rose, A.J. (1967) *Pattern of Cities*, Nelson, Melbourne.
6. See other papers in this series as follows :
  - (a) Prolegomena to theory for settlement in Rural areas—some relevance tests.
  - (b) Central places, growth centres, growth poles, key settlements—towards a reconciliation in the context of small urban centres.

DAVID TURNOCK

## RESTRUCTURING THE SETTLEMENT PATTERN OF ROMANIA

It is generally understood that the process of modernisation involves major changes in the settlement pattern. The greater prominence of the secondary and tertiary sectors in the economy encourages concentration while rising living standards tend to reduce the attractiveness of small settlements if they are remote and poorly serviced. At the same time contact with service centres increases, either by improvements in transport or by a development of the central place system. Some research has therefore approached the study of historical geography through the evaluation of the network of market centres.<sup>1</sup> Although the changes in the settlement pattern comprise a great many separate decisions, made by individual families in the light of changing circumstances, national and local government tends to exert a powerful influence through the provision of many employments and services. In some countries indeed it may be appropriate to develop a comprehensive national urbanisation policy.<sup>2</sup> This is particularly evident in the centrally-planned economies of Eastern Europe where political initiative is provided by communist parties which claim the right to play a leading role in society.<sup>3</sup> Although in most of these countries the inherited settlement pattern has been perpetuated with relatively few changes, through provision of new towns and depopulation of outlying hamlets, Romania has over the last decade begun to implement a comprehensive programme to modernise the whole settlement system through the creation of many more towns (by developing existing villages)

and the elimination of non-viable rural settlements. Romania is one of the more backward countries of Eastern Europe and the potential for change is therefore particularly great.<sup>4</sup> This paper outlines the radical Romanian programme of *sistematizare* and traces its development to date.<sup>5</sup>

#### THE PRESENT SETTLEMENT PATTERN

The present settlement pattern reflects a complex settlement history with several significant initiatives in restructuring on top of the long history of colonisation with its numerous unrecorded adjustments to changing circumstances. The base for further change is therefore extremely variable, a point which can be readily demonstrated through a tabulation of vital statistics for the principal sub-regions (Figure 17.1).<sup>6</sup> As might be expected the overall density of population is higher in the Lowlands (94.2 persons per square kilometer) than in the Carpathians (60.2), although the Eastern part of the Lowlands comes out with a lower density than most of the Carpathian districts (Table 17.1). There are at present 236 towns in Romania and the number has risen




FIG. 17.1 : *Statistical area*

TABLE 17.1 : Settlement profiles of natural regions 1966

	a.	b.	c.	d.	e.	f.	g.
<i>Carpathians</i>	96.1	5.78	60.2	2.40	178.7	41.4	122
Inner—East	17.8	0.91	51.3	0.31	91.0	33.9	21
Inner—South	11.1	0.82	73.6	0.47	223.8	57.6	17
Inner—West	16.8	1.25	74.4	0.68	212.9	54.5	26
Outer—East	16.0	0.86	53.8	0.24	216.4	27.6	14
Outer—South	15.5	0.94	60.7	0.32	176.5	33.7	24
Outer—West	18.9	1.00	52.9	0.62	210.4	37.9	20
<i>Lowlands</i>	141.4	13.32	94.2	4.31	489.3	32.3	114
Centre	17.9	1.40	78.5	0.30	373.0	21.2	15
East	26.4	1.41	53.2	0.51	253.1	36.0	20
North East	30.2	3.11	102.9	0.78	431.4	25.0	26
South	49.7	6.07	122.1	2.24	801.8	37.0	39
West	17.2	1.34	77.5	0.48	343.0	35.9	13
Romania	237.5	19.10	80.4	6.70	301.9	35.1	236



h.	j.	k.	l.	m.	n.	o.	p.	q.
19.6	0.79	3.39	40.9	850	4487	3.98	0.75	18.4
14.7	0.85	0.60	41.9	148	545	4.07	1.11	26.4
27.6	0.65	0.35	38.5	95	299	3.65	1.16	30.1
26.2	0.65	0.57	41.8	151	1215	3.77	0.47	11.2
17.0	1.14	0.62	41.9	128	657	4.87	0.95	22.7
13.2	0.65	0.62	45.5	158	914	3.95	0.68	14.9
18.9	0.94	0.62	36.3	170	857	3.65	0.72	20.0
37.8	1.25	9.02	68.0	1856	8322	4.86	1.08	15.9
19.9	1.19	1.11	64.7	255	1322	4.34	0.84	12.9
25.5	1.39	0.90	36.9	188	622	4.78	1.45	39.2
29.9	1.16	2.33	82.1	452	2274	5.16	1.02	12.5
57.4	1.21	3.82	81.5	787	3478	4.86	1.10	13.5
36.9	1.32	0.86	54.2	174	626	4.92	1.37	25.2
28.5	1.01	12.40	57.6	2706	12809	4.58	0.97	16.8

a. Area—'000 sq. km.

b. Population—millions

c. Density—per sq. km.

d. Urban population—m.

e. Density—per sq. km.

- f. Proportion of population urban—per cent
- g. Number of towns
- h. Average population per town—thousands
- j. Area per town : '000 sq. km. national territory
- k. Rural population—m.
- l. Density—per sq. km.
- m. Number of communes
- n. Number of localities
- o. Population per commune—thousands
- p. Population per locality—thousands
- q. Area per locality—'000 sq. km. national territory

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*Source* : Romanian Census and Statistical Year Books.

very considerably during this century. 106 towns were recognised in 1910 but by 1948 the number had grown to 134. Urbanisation has been particularly rapid over the last three decades with an additional 132 towns created and a slight increase in the average size (27.7 thousands in 1948 ; 28.5 in 1966 and 43.1 today). As regards the level of urbanisation which is 35.1 per cent for Romania as a whole there is a striking contrast between the Carpathians and the Lowlands (41.4 per cent against 15.9), but this is exaggerated by the allocation of the many 'contact' towns to the mountain zone. The same factor is largely responsible for the denser packing of towns in the mountain zone (one town for every 0.79 thousand square kilometers of territory, as against 1.25). However it is worth noting that the spacing of towns is relatively unsatisfactory in the Eastern-Outer section of the Carpathians and in the Western and Eastern Lowlands districts and that the level of urbanisation is low not only in the Lowland-Central area (where the figure of 21.2 per cent results from the allocation of Baia Mare, Brasov, Cluj and Sibiu to the Carpathian districts) but also in Lowland-North East (25.0%) where such distortion is not so evident. Densities within the urban areas are also very variable with a high density in the capital city, Bucharest, on the one hand, and, at the other extreme, low densities in certain Carpathian towns where significant tracts of rugged country are included within the official limits.

The rural densities are predictably lowest in the Carpathians with the exception of the Eastern Lowlands where the colonisation of the steppes was long delayed and where the extensive Danube delta is particularly lightly settled. Table 17.1 also investigates the density of rural settlements and their grouping into administrative units (communes). The variations in the average commune population (4.0 thousand in the Carpathians and 4.9 in the Lowlands) reflect the ease of administration which follows from more highly nucleated settlement and the closer proximity of villages to each other: the 8,300 villages in the Lowlands have an average population of 1,100 and a distribution of one village per 15.9 square kilometers of national territory while the 4,500 villages in the Carpathians return figures of 750 and 18.4 respectively. However the Central Lowland areas has a lower average village population than half the Carpathian areas and a lower figure for territory than all the Carpathian areas but

one. On the other hand two of the Carpathian areas have average village populations of well over 1,000 (exceeded by only two of the five Lowland regions) and the highest territorial figures for the country (apart from the sparsely-settled Eastern Lowland area). No really satisfactory explanation has been advanced for these variations, but the main purpose here is to present a simple profile showing that rural planning strategies will have to take account of the variable conditions and, in particular, of the poorer grouping of population in the Western Carpathians (both Inner and Outer), Outer Southern Carpathians and Central Lowlands. In the lowlands villages are generally quite large in population terms, between 1,500 and 3,000 with a compact structure and wide spacing between individual settlements (one village per 75 square kilometers of area) but in the hills and particularly the Subcarpathians the villages are smaller (often below 500 in population and rarely above 1,500) with linear structure and closer spacing (with one village to as little as ten square kilometers).<sup>7</sup>

Change continues however at a particularly rapid rate. Mechanization in agriculture along with the emergence of large farms (cooperative or state-owned) has greatly reduced the need for a rural population that is both very large and highly dispersed. At the same time industrialization, emphasising the major cities, has stimulated powerful migration flows which are not simply confined to each city region but which operate over longer distances, partly because of the special attractive force of the capital city and partly because of the impressive contrast in rates of natural increase between the relatively backward province of Moldavia and the more advanced regions of Banat and Crisana. Changes for the last ten years are summarised in Table 3.2 which distinguishes between urban and rural areas and also between six categories of region, reflecting different development levels. The intra-regional transfers between towns and country are overshadowed by the inter-regional component between advanced and backward regions.<sup>8</sup> However a 'trickling-down' process has given more prominence to the weaker regions during the past decade. It is therefore eminently logical that planners should think in terms of a unitary settlement system and concentrate attention on those elements where integration is least perfect.<sup>9</sup> Where there is a great distance between village and towns there

TABLE 17.2 : Population change 1966-1977

Region	1977 Population		1966-1977 Change							
	a.	b.	c.	d.	e.	f.	g.	h.	j.	
Bucharest	1.93	1.93	100.0	+0.09	+0.48	n.a.	n.a.	+0.39	5.02	
Group I	3.47	2.59	74.6	+0.26	+0.70	+0.18	-0.08	+1.18	1.41	
Group II	4.71	2.37	50.3	+0.25	+0.69	+0.33	-0.10	+0.01	1.03	
Group III	4.56	16.3	35.7	+0.21	+0.47	+0.29	-0.06	-0.09	0.82	
Group IV	4.04	1.08	26.7	+0.15	+0.33	+0.34	-0.03	-0.19	0.61	
Group V	2.85	0.63	22.1	+0.09	+0.18	+0.25	-0.14	-0.30	0.13	
Romania	21.56	10.24	47.5	+1.05	+2.85	+1.39	-0.41	0.00	1.00	

a. Total population—millions

b. Urban population—millions

c. Urban share—per cent

d. Urban natural change—m.

e. Urban total change—e

f. Rural natural change—m.

g. Rural total change—m.

h. Net migration—m.

j. Total change related to natural change (=1.0)

Source : Romania Census. County groupings from I. Blaga 1974. *Repartizarea teritoriala a fortelor de productie in Romania* (Bucharest : Ed. Stiintifica).

will have to be better access. Improved communications may sometimes help but the two most obvious measures involve the designation of additional towns and the consolidation of village settlements. 'The traditional settlement networks was determined by the prevailing agricultural character of the Romanian economy but industrialization. . . . is not compatible with the network of dispersed settlements; it calls for a concentrated one'.<sup>10</sup> Consolidation seems all the more appropriate in view of the fall in population in most villages. 4.55 million people reside in 10.3 thousand villages with populations below 1,000, while 7.25 million reside in 3.9 thousand villages with populations of more than 1,000.<sup>11</sup> Furthermore the depopulation results in a fall in density. At present the 13.15 thousand villages in Romania occupy an area of 0.95 million ha. which means a population density of only 14.5 persons per hectare, a figure which is low in comparison with other European countries and inefficient both in terms of the optimum use of land by agriculture and the installation of local authority services.<sup>12</sup> But equally improved services and employment opportunities are needed in each locality. Hence the view that 'semi-urban centres are a very important category of settlement in the Romanian regional policy. They are at present rural settlements that will become increasingly important in the region from the socio-economic point of view and will gradually receive urban status'.<sup>13</sup> Modernisation of all rural districts seems crucial to greater efficiency in agriculture and continued employment in that industry of qualified male workers.

#### EVOLUTION OF POLICY

The first steps in the process of planning the settlement system (*sistematizare*) were taken during the 1960s.<sup>14</sup> A committee was appointed in 1960 and a few years later a series of publications emerged dealing with general principles and with empirical studies in three areas; Brasov, Slatina (Olt) and Vaslui.<sup>15</sup> During a plenum of the R.C.P. Central Committee in 1965 the party leader made a strong plea for rural modernisation, with control of development so that the settlement pattern could be consolidated and further losses of agricultural land avoided.<sup>16</sup> An important foundation measure was the implementation of a radical administrative reform in 1968 which created stronger units of local admini-

nistration through an increase in the average size of the commune and a reorganisation of the higher order administrative units so that sixteen regions (regiune) were replaced by 40 counties (judetele) of which one covered the Municipality of Bucharest alone.<sup>17</sup> In 1971 the party leader forecast 300 new towns, each acting as an urban centre for four or five communes, and he also argued that the villages required 'powerful concentration': the policy of merging settlements within restricted perimeters was seen as economically essential to install services at reasonable cost.<sup>18</sup> By 1972 a thorough review of the settlement system had been completed and at a national conference in that year the strategy of upgrading 300-350 rural communes into towns by 1990 was formally put forward. The majority of communes would experience relatively little change with the existing settlements retained and gradually endowed with better services and perhaps small apartment blocks. Where extensive rebuilding and consolidation was necessary then a 'model village' might emerge with a revitalised central square and improved facilities, but only a hundred such villages were envisaged in all. However all rational settlements would be subject to consolidation with new building (with houses of at least two storeys) confined to a building perimeter smaller than the present area of the village. Almost invariably house plots would be restricted to 250 square meters, with any excess liable to expropriation. Irrational settlements, with small populations (certainly those with fewer than 200 inhabitants) and no growth prospects would be left to die: they would be phased-out or, as the Romanians say 'disaffected' (dezafectat).

Relevant legislation was put into effect in 1974 and a draft national programme of systematisation was worked out by 1976. At this stage it was expected that restrictive building perimeters and the elimination of irrational settlements would release three million hectares for agriculture. 120 new towns were indicated of which thirty-seven already had populations over 5,000, fifty had hospitals or clinics and eighty had secondary schools. The overall rate of non-agricultural employment was stated as fifty-two per cent. compared with thirty in all rural areas. But progress has inevitably been very gradual. Movement away from 'irrational' settlements has been slow in view of local agricultural interest and lack of accommodation in the proposed new towns. It has

been found unrealistic to prevent repairs being carried out to old houses in villages due for eventual elimination and the initially-radical approach to such settlements has been moderated with assurances given that people will not be forcibly disturbed during their lifetime. Progress over building perimeters in rational settlements has also been modest with little immediate readiness on the part of families on the margins of villages to build new houses within the perimeter. In some areas of private farming where families naturally wish to remain in residence on their own holdings local authorities may agree to fragment the building perimeter so that a dispersed settlement pattern can officially be perpetuated.

The greatest efforts have been made in the communes that will become towns with the production of plans and the submission of these for approval at the commune, country and national levels. In the planning process the principal roles are played by the local authorities at the level of country (judet) particularly the departments for architecture and planning and by the central government where the Committee for the People's Councils Problems plays a key role. As both levels research work may be done through contracts with various institutes including the universities. Plans must of course be displayed and approved locally and considerable scrutiny is possible through public meeting and representations to local officials. At the local level there is general support for the conversion of villages into towns since any restriction of agriculture will be compensated for by better services (including low prices for foodstuffs) and wider employment opportunities. It is probable therefore that many local leaders have tried to advance the cause of their own communes. The scope for local initiative has been increased by the powers given to local councils since 1971 to take state loans for agricultural and industrial developments. Where local leaders have good contacts and suitable expertise it has been possible to establish small textile and engineering industries, normally through the utilisation of second-hand machinery that is being discarded by large units controlled by the ministries of central government. The selection of communes has sometimes been a protracted business with changes made continually during the late 1970s, despite attempts to complete the exercise in time for the start of the 1976-80 Five Year Plan. And possibly because



of severe economic problems in Romania at the present time the first group of new towns has not yet been officially declared although the formal change to urban status was anticipated by the end of 1980 (Figure 17.2).

Overall there is a remarkable unity of conception which applies to the whole country. It establishes contact with pre-war research and possibly reacts to earlier years of the communist regime in Romania when, despite central directives, there were considerable variations in the way that policies were implemented by local authorities.<sup>19</sup> It is a strong feature of the Ceausescu style of leadership—that a campaign mentality should be adopted. To make progress laws are passed quickly and without lengthy consideration of all the implications—modifications can always be made at a later stage if accommodations are found to be necessary. This gives rise to some conflict in approach between academics and administrators. For the most part there is a spirit of gradualism among the former : building perimeters are considered a guide for the provision of services, and morphology will only change long term. However the view has been put forward that the flow of professional advice into the government machine tends to be somewhat biased because of the status of architects and economists who are broadly sympathetic to a radical restructuring of settlement in relation to sociologists and geographers who are more impressed by the diseconomies that may result from excessive haste. There are considerable misgivings in such quarters over the classification of settlements which has been carried out without sufficiently rigorous methods.<sup>20</sup> Geographers have however been prominent in two significant ways. First the urbanisation process has been examined by V. Cucu and others and the fundamental significance of an efficient settlement system brought out, with village modernisation required to complete the urbanization of the country and increase the frequency of towns from the present average spacing of some twenty kilometers.<sup>21</sup> A further paper has placed the proposed new towns at the bottom level of an urban hierarchy labelled "Agroindustrial centres of zonal coordination".<sup>22</sup> It is also emphasised that the distribution of industry will have to be modified. Greater encouragement of small scale industry would be appropriate. Significantly the 12th Congress of the R.C.P. called for all possibilities to be investi-




FIG. 17.2 : Urban development to 1981 and proposed new towns

FIG. 17.2 : (Contd.) *Key to New Towns*

- |                       |                     |
|-----------------------|---------------------|
| 1. Aghiresu           | 47. Girbovi         |
| 2. Arbud              | 48. Gugesti         |
| 3. Avrig              | 49. Gurahont        |
| 4. Baia de Aries      | 50. Gurghiu         |
| 5. Bala               | 51. Hoghiz          |
| 6. Babeni             | 52. Iacobeni        |
| 7. Balcesti           | 53. Ianca           |
| 8. Baltatesti         | 54. Iernut          |
| 9. Baneasa            | 55. Ilia            |
| 10. Beceni            | 56. Insuratei       |
| 11. Bechets           | 57. Jurilovca       |
| 12. Belcesti          | 58. Lehliu Cara     |
| 13. Berca             | 59. Liesti-Ivesti   |
| 14. Birca             | 60. Livada          |
| 15. Birla             | 61. Lorvin          |
| 16. Bolintin Vale     | 62. Mahmudia        |
| 17. Bozovici          | 63. Maicanesti      |
| 18. Bretcu            | 64. Manastirea      |
| 19. Brosteni          | 65. Maneciu         |
| 20. Bucecea           | 66. Miercurea Sib.  |
| 21. Budesti           | 67. Movila Miresii  |
| 22. Bumbesti-Jiu      | 68. Murgani         |
| 23. Cazanesti         | 69. Nadrag          |
| 24. Cetateni          | 70. Naruja          |
| 25. Ciresu            | 71. Nehoiu          |
| 26. Cobadin           | 72. Nagru Voda      |
| 27. Codaesti          | 73. Ocna Sugatag    |
| 28. Colibasi          | 74. Odorau          |
| 29. Crasna            | 75. Ostra           |
| 30. Cudalbi           | 76. Olteni          |
| 31. Cujmir            | 77. Ozun            |
| 32. Ditrau            | 78. Patulele        |
| 33. Dolhasea          | 79. Patirlagele     |
| 34. Domnesti          | 80. Pachea          |
| 35. Dragalina         | 81. Pecica          |
| 36. Draganesti Vlasca | 82. Piatra          |
| 37. Dumitresti        | 83. Planita         |
| 38. Faget             | 84. Podul Iloaiei   |
| 39. Falcu             | 85. Podul Turcului  |
| 40. Feldioara         | 86. Poiana Codrului |
| 41. Filipestii        | 87. Poiana Mare     |
| 42. Flaminzi          | 88. Poieni          |
| 43. Fundulea          | 89. Pogoanele       |
| 44. Geoagiu           | 90. Popesti         |
| 45. Ghelar            | 91. Potlogi         |
| 46. Gilau             | 92. Praid           |

93. Prejmer	112. Stefanesti
94. Prundul Birgaului	113. Talmaciu
95. Putineiu	114. Tatarastii de Jos
96. Radomiresti	115. Teius
97. Racar	116. Telciu
98. Raducaneni	117. Tinca
99. Recas	118. Tismana
100. Rodna	119. Topleț
101. Roznov	120. Turceni
102. Rucar	121. Tibanesti
103. Sascut	122. Ulmeni
104. Sacuieni	123. Valea lui Mihai
105. Sarmasu	124. Vadastra
106. Scornicești	125. Veresti
107. Seini	126. Vidra
108. Sintana	127. Vladeni
109. Snagov	128. Voineasa
110. Sarmasag	129. Voinesti
111. Somcuta Mare	

gated and legislation was passed in 1980.<sup>23</sup> The second type of geographical contribution lies in field studies to clarify current migration and commuting patterns and investigate physical constraints on development in individual communes.<sup>24</sup> But there is no evidence to suggest that geographers have had any real voice in the selection of villages for development and in decisions over the optimum number of new towns that should be created.

#### THE SELECTION OF NEW TOWNS


Villages suitable for upgrading into towns may be recognised by various indicators. An established position as central place for a district may have been achieved through administrative functions discharged in the context of regions intermediate in size between commune and county prior to the 1968 reform. There may be significant industries already established and an inter-cooperative association, perhaps linked with some food processing. The village may have a relatively large and stable population and suitable sites for new industrial developments. It may be remote from existing towns and in a good position to fill a gap in the urban network. But villages with all these attributes may be hard to find. A leading researcher on

planning matters in Bucharest declared that centres selected for urban status should have a population of at least 5,000 (for the commune as a whole) and that non-agricultural employment should constitute at least twenty per cent of the total.<sup>25</sup> But on these criteria the strongest candidates are often close to existing towns while remote districts which have little non-agricultural employment tend to lack centres that can be quickly urbanised.<sup>26</sup> There are some straightforward choices of course but where the various criteria are in conflict there is no clear set of priorities for resolving them, despite considerable literature on the subject.<sup>27</sup> So there is some variation in approach from one county to another. Discussions with the planners in Buzau provided some useful insights. It was stated that following an initial decision to create thirteen new towns a short list of twenty was drawn up and a final selection made. The successful candidates were then further scrutinised to see which could be most rapidly brought up to the minimum urban standard and five were then slated for development in the 1976-80 period, with the rest requiring investment over the longer term. However one change was subsequently made because of significant progress made in the development of its local industries, following legislation allowing communal authorities to borrow money for local projects.

To check the level of consistency across the country, it was decided to carry out a detailed analysis of all rural communes. Four criteria were selected, three of them capable of qualification from the Romanian National Atlas and the other dependent on population data collected in Romania. Accessibility was reckoned on terms of the distance separating the principal village in each commune from the nearest town and higher scores were awarded for the greater distances, on the assumption that villages would be most suitable for designation as towns when they were relatively far-removed from the influence of existing towns. Communications were considered in relation to national roads or railways running through the commune or along the boundary. Population size was assessed in relation to thresholds of 5,000 and 7,500 while employment was considered in terms of the presence or absence of significant secondary and tertiary sectors, scoring one, two or three points for each criterion gave a minimum score of four and a maximum of twelve. These scores

were then used to produce three classes : low (scoring four, five or six points) medium (with seven, eight or nine points) high (ten, eleven or twelve). For the whole country 1,264 communes (46.7%) are in the lowest category Class III, 1,255 (46.4) in the middle Class II and only 186 (6.9%) are in the highest Class I (Figure 17.3). The average value is 6.9, the lowest county score being 5.8 (Mehedinti) and the highest 7.7 (Suceava)—standard deviation 4.1. The communes selected for eventual urban status, 129 in all, have an average score of 9.1. and fall into the categories as follows : 7 in Class III (5.4%), 65 in Class II (50.4) and 57 in Class I (44.2) In other words 0.6 0.16 per cent of the Class III communes, 5.2 per cent of Class II and 30.6 per cent of Class I have been selected.

Thus the deviation from the 'ideal' situation, where the 129 communes of highest potential irrespective of location is quite considerable, for the points score of the actual selection is 12.0 per cent below the ideal. However if it is assumed that the allocation between counties must remain unchanged then the deviation from the ideal is reduced to 9.6 per cent, since several counties have no Class 3 communes and others have only one. The deviations vary considerably between counties however. While only two counties (Constanta and Galati) show no deviation at all there are eight counties with a deviation of 15.0 per cent or greater. But the highest deviation is only 20.0 per cent and this relates to Caras-Severin where only two communes have been scheduled : any suboptimalisation in just a single case is going to be magnified considerably. It must be pointed out that while the survey of commune potential is an objective assessment showing a strong level of correlation with the official selection, there are some methodological inadequacies.<sup>28</sup> But it is doubtful if all the discrepancies can be explained in terms of the shortcomings of the survey. It is clear, for example, that political factors in connection with the 1907 peasant revolt account for the preference given to Flaminzi in Botosani county over its better placed neighbour of Copalau while in Satu Mare county it is likely that Odoreu was selected, despite its low potential, because of the considerable investments made there since the floods of 1970. The administrative tradition at Bechet (Dolj) and the existence of a state farm and irrigation complex there explains why the higher potential of neighbouring Sadova has



been overlooked. And in the counties of Arges and Tulcea the selections are particularly anomalous, with the Arges selection of five communes including the suburban commune of Colibasi near Pitesti and Tulcea having only two candidates, despite a below average level of urbanisation overall, and then preferring Jurilovca and Mahmudia to Cerna and Topolog.

#### **Access to towns by rural dwellers**

A fundamental consideration involving the urban network concerns its ability to offer services for the rural population. In this connection an even distribution of towns is desirable and it might be expected that a planned development of network but give particular consideration to areas presently remote from towns. Analysis could follow several courses involving different critical distances, travel time rather than straight line distance and different categories of towns. However limited data prevent sophisticated analysis and calculations are restricted to areas lying more than twenty kilometers from a town. In 1948 almost half the country (49.3%) remained more than twenty kilometers from a town. This is the figure already quoted in respect of the average spacing between towns.<sup>29</sup> Thus any settlement at a greater distance than 20 km. from a town is already twice as remote as the national average. By 1968, when the number of towns has increased from 134 to 236 the proportion had fallen to 27.4 per cent. The establishment of the proposed 129 additional towns will then reduce the proportion still further to only 9.2 per cent. However while the towns actually established since 1948 or projected for the future clearly do help to open up the remoter rural districts this factor is clearly not the dominant one. For, after allowing for inevitable overlapping arising from circular hinterlands, it emerges that some 210 towns are needed to bring all areas within twenty kilometers of an urban centre. It therefore follows that ideally the urban system of 1948, 1968 and the projected one should serve respectively 64, 112 and 173 per cent of the country. The actual proportions are 51, 73 and 91 percentage, yielding deviations from the ideal of 20, 36 and 47 respectively. In other words the tendency to pack towns into areas already well served is not only continuing but is proceeding at an increasing rate. Another way of looking at this is through the nearest neighbour index: the values of 1.18, 1.23 and 1.25



all show much greater affinity to a random distribution (index 1.00) than to one of perfectly regular spacing (2.15) and while the trend is towards greater regularity the change that would be brought about by the creation of the new towns is too modest for optimum spacing to have been the principal selection criterion.

There are good reasons why this situation should arise. Even if the links between town and country are accepted as the main consideration the progressive fragmentation of the remote rural areas will make it inevitable that new towns established to serve each residual will involve considerable overlapping of hinterlands. And in view of the topographical and infrastructural constraints it will become increasingly different for new towns to be located centrally in relation to the remote districts that they may be intended to serve. Nevertheless there are twelve counties where the area still lying beyond twenty kilometers from the nearest town will, after the declaration of proposed new towns, still exceed ten per cent of the county. In the case of Tulcea the figure is thirty per cent (Figure 17.3). Together they account for 13.9 of the 21.8 thousand square kilometers of territory remaining so isolated. Some areas comprise sparsely-populated mountain country but it is difficult to understand why the selection process overlooked a large section of western Dobrogea, falling to Constanta, and Tulcea counties, part of the Moldavian Plateau affecting Bacau and Vaslui counties and part of the Somes Plateau shared by Cluj and Salaj counties. Even in the Carpathian districts that remain relatively isolated there are villages of high potential in Bacău, Caras-Severin and Suceava counties which could have been chosen. When it is further noted that some counties (such as Bihor, Galati, Iasi and Satu Mare) have seriously considered the remote areas in their selection and when some of the counties which have not done so have settled for new towns within a short distance of each other (such as Fălciu and Murgeni in Vaslui ; Mahmudia and Jurilovca in Tulcea ; Cobadin and Negru Vodă in Constanta) there is further justification for suggesting that selection has taken place according to different criteria in the various counties. It is only fair to add that the later stages of the town development programme will overcome many of the cases of continued isolation. No official list of all proposed towns has been issued but there is one publication which maps some 160 future urban centres in

addition to the 129 involved in the first phase.<sup>30</sup> It is evident that the additional development would account for virtually all communes within twenty kilometers of a town, the only remaining anomaly being the Zarand district in Arad county. However the overall distribution of towns proposed for 1990 shows clustering, even among the new towns, which undermines the notion that each town will support four or five rural communes.

### **Containment of large cities**

It is important to bear in mind that the process of new town selection has been influenced by the importance attached to the containment of major cities. In the formation of a development plan for Cluj county it was decided that high priority should also be given to the containment of the city for Cluj and that this objective could best be served by the creation of new towns in the vicinity, aligned along the growth axis of the Somes Corridor and its extensions as the Aries and Cris corridors. By contrast three zones of higher ground were seen as areas where population levels could not be maintained in the long run even with new towns (Iara for the Apuseni Mountains, Panticu for the Somes Plateau and Mociu for the Transylvanian Plateau). The superior growth prospects for the corridor zones is brought out by recent trends. While the loss of population by migration between 1966 and 1977 has been heavy in all rural districts the percentage is much higher in the hill and mountain country (—27.5) than in the corridor zones (—10.8) (Table 17.3). A village classification is also revealing in showing that exactly 50.0 per cent of the villages in the corridor zones have good potential for development (Class A and Class B) whereas the proportion is only 27.1 per cent in the hill and mountain country. The shares for the villages with low potential (Class D and Class E) are 25.9 and 53.8 respectively.

In the case of the Apuseni Mountains in the south-west of the country there is a strong feeling that the depopulation of the area should be actively encouraged on the basis that agriculture can only employ a small proportion of the population and industrial installations are best located on the lower ground. Policies have hitherto been contradictory, as in the case of Belis where a hydro-electric scheme displaced the village to a new site (albeit one that was exposed to strong winds and remote from

TABLE 17.3 : Rural planning in Cluj county

District	Population Total		'000s Rural		Population change 1966-77 '000s		
	1966	1977	1966	1977	a.	b.	c.
Apuseni Mountains	48.0	40.6	48.0	40.6	-7.4	+5.1	-12.5
Aries Valley	106.0	121.1	44.2	43.6	-0.6	+4.5	-5.1
Cris Valley	27.6	27.5	21.1	20.0	-1.1	+0.8	-1.9
Somes Plateau	46.1	37.2	46.1	37.2	-8.9	+6.4	-15.3
Somes Valley	334.5	428.0	117.5	119.9	+2.4	+15.1	-12.7
Transylvanian Plateau	67.5	61.0	67.4	61.0	-6.4	+10.2	-16.6
Total	629.7	715.4	344.3	322.2	-22.0	+42.1	-64.1

a. Total change

b. Natural increase

c. Inferred migration

Settlement size groups : I below 1000 ; II 1000-1499 ; III 1500-1999 ; IV 2000 and above

Source : County Planning Office.

Distribution by settlement size groups								Village potential				
I		II		III		IV		A	B	C	D	E
1900	1977	1900	1977	1900	1977	1900	1977					
55.1	58.3	15.1	19.3	18.8	15.4	11.1	6.8	6	13	18	22	16
33.6	24.4	34.2	33.9	18.9	11.7	13.3	30.0	8	13	7	5	3
56.9	38.0	14.4	26.0	17.7	26.0	11.0	10.5	6	3	8	3	1
72.1	72.1	16.8	21.8	.	.	11.1	6.1	8	13	16	33	12
44.4	35.2	28.2	18.3	12.2	16.9	15.4	30.2	28	23	24	20	10
51.9	37.4	14.4	26.6	11.4	11.4	22.2	24.2	9	15	12	19	24
50.8	41.2	22.1	22.8	12.3	13.6	14.7	22.0	65	80	85	102	66

the better agricultural land) just at the time when the local sawmill was being relocated in the corridor zones well to the north. The present attitude to the mountain region is deplored by those who see a future for tourism in the area and others who value the rich ethnographic heritage.<sup>31</sup> Some depopulation is inevitable as people take advantage of opportunities elsewhere in the Cluj county and other districts (such as Banat where agricultural land is being vacated by German families who are leaving the country) but it is questionable how far this should be encouraged by the first phase of new town development which concentrates on flanks of the Apuseni Mountains. The three candidates for Cluj—Aghiresu, Gilău and Poieni—all lie in the corridor zones. Information has been collected on all the eleven new towns envisaged over the long term and it is quite evident that the first three proposed for promotion are not the most highly urbanised at the moment. Aghiresu, with its brown coal field, power station and local industries, is in first place but Gilău is fifth and Poieni eighth. The radical restructuring of settlements in the district may be economically desirable but it is curious that the same strategy is not being followed in other city regions. Thus in Iasi county, where the chief town has a population of 271.4 thousand (compared with 283.6 for Cluj) and accounts for 86.3 per cent of the county's urban population (compared with 65.9 for Cluj) the new towns are being established much further out. The fourteen proposed new towns for Iasi county are on average 42.0 kilometers from the city compared with 31.4 for eleven candidates for Cluj county. The nearest new town to Iasi city is Podul Iloaiei which is 25 km. away whereas four new towns in Cluj county are nearer than that to Cluj city. If existing towns are included the average distances are 45.8 and 33.5, with Iasi having only three towns out of seventeen within thirty kilometers compared with eight out of sixteen for Cluj. Once again therefore important differences in approach are revealed. Further research along these lines is unfortunately prevented by the lack of definitive listings of all proposed new towns.

#### CONCLUSION

The creation of new towns is part of a radical policy of 'sistematzare' which seeks the overhaul of the entire settlement

pattern to create a rational system for the country's further modernisation, or, in official jargon, the construction of the 'multilaterally developed socialist society'. The whole strategy is extremely ambitious and conspicuously more so than in any of the other East European countries.<sup>32</sup> Its comprehensive nature may well be due primarily to the outlook of the party leader who is well-known for his underwriting of 'grand designs' because they are impressive indications of leadership asserted by the Communist Party and provide formulae for the country's modernisation of a unified basis. At the same time the Romanians want to avoid creating a 'French Desert' by channelling the flow of migrants as far as possible into small towns with population below 25,000. A network of such towns would bring all rural districts within daily commuting range of urban jobs and services. The current physical plan for economic and social development therefore envisages a rapid slowing down in the numbers of people leaving the rural areas, from 250,000 per annum reached in the 1970s to just 50,000.

It is however quite clear that the programme has not been implemented as initially expected. Inevitably the simplistic notion of a nation working together for its betterment has been overshadowed by local conflicts. Since the state pays compensation to property owners whose houses must make room for apartment blocks at thoroughly unrealistic levels it is not surprising that for many people their main interest in a plan concerns the fate of their own home. The more influential people will have vested interests in trying to get changes made so that their own properties are rendered less vulnerable. But more fundamentally three have been reservations expressed by geographers and sociologists about the feasibility of rapid change: the elimination of 'irrational' settlements may not only create short term distress but introduce diseconomies through the reduction of interest in agriculture in the remoter areas, to say nothing of the possibility that a future generation might perceive a rationality in these settlements which evidently eludes the present elite.<sup>33</sup> The potential role of some of the smaller settlements for tourism and recreation is worthy of more consideration.<sup>34</sup> It is therefore very much to be welcomed that an element of pragmatism and gradualism has been injected into the exercise since the heady years of 1974-6 when the blueprint was first uncovered.

However this study has been concerned primarily with the conversion of villages into towns and here too there have been changes, most notably in the failure to declare the 129 new towns by the end of 1980. Findings in this research programme support a reappraisal, because the number of new towns seems excessive and the selection process apparently involves substantial inconsistencies, particularly with regard to the main city regions and the remotest rural districts. Within Romania however it is widely stated that the country's economic difficulties have prevented the intended progress being made. But it is also the belief of some experts that current difficulties with industry, given the world recession, have led to some reappraisal of the future scope for manufacturing on a scale that would justify more than 300 new towns. It should be recalled that the programme rests heavily on the belief that there are many industries of intermediate scale which could be located in small towns. It is also possible that an economic climate more sympathetic to agriculture should see the dangers of selective urban development and indicate greater emphasis on the 'Key village' concept. This would provide services and employment opportunities for each district without exaggerating the contrast between town and country to the point where rural-urban migration might be intensified through further withdrawals from agricultural work. While planners have seen the elimination of irrational settlements as a process of 'self-destruction' (*autodesfintare*) as villagers succumb to the pull of the better endowed communities it is not inconceivable that the same process between rural commune and new town could undermine even rational settlements. New towns may still be created but at a slower rate and with more discrimination. If this trend emerges then it will mark the relaxation of the planning ideology of 'urbanisation' in favour of one which takes cognisance of the virtues of 'rurality' with a more equitable distribution of investment funds between communes instead of concentration of resources of those communes envisaged as future towns.

#### FOOTNOTES

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  13. V. Ianovici and M. Popescu, *op. cit.* (note 10) 13 ; V. Tufescu 1980, Sur L'urbanisation des villages de Roumainie *Revue roumaine : geographie* 24, 139-46. I. Velcea 1980, Changes in the rural space of Romania *Revue roumaine : geographie* 24, 147-153, 1977.
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  15. I. Bold et al., *Sistematizarea rurala* (Bucharest : Ed. Tehnica), 1974. See also : T. Bogdan et al. *Procesul de urbanizare in Romania : zona Brasov* (Bucharest : Ed. : Politica), 1970 ; M. Brescan et al. *Procesul de urbanizare in R.S. Romania : zona Vaslui* (Bucharest : Ed. Academiei R.S.R.), 1973 ; A. Cazacu et al. 1970, *Procesul de urbanizare in RS Romania : Zona Slatina—Olt* (Bucharest : Ed. Academiei R.S.R.).
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25. T. Chitulescu writing in *Romania libera* and quoted in *Radio Free Europe Situation Report : Rumania*/3 (1975), p. 5.
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28. There are different levels of commitment to the secondary and tertiary sectors which the classification does not take account of. Population size may arguably be more significant at the level of the single village rather than the whole commune. The generous interpretation of what constitutes would processing gives some mountain communes a spurious potential because wood-cutting is regarded as wood processing whereas in the lowlands the harvesting of crops is a primary activity. Furthermore, future plans for industrial development, recognising the potential of certain communes with good sites or newly-discovered raw materials cannot be taken into account in the survey, though they may affect the official selection. And no allowance has been made for the clustering of high potential communes in districts where only one new town could reasonably be created.
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GEORGE GORDON

## URBAN DEPRIVATION IN WEST CENTRAL SCOTLAND

### Patterns and Policies

SUBSEQUENT to the re-organisation of Scottish local government in 1973, West Central Scotland effectively became the urbanised industrial heartland of Strathclyde Region which focused upon the area previously known as the Clydeside conurbation. The industrial city of Glasgow, a city which Victorians had proudly acclaimed the 'Second City of the Empire' (Oakley 1946), dominated both the conurbation and the whole widely spread region of Strathclyde. In addition to the heartland around the River Clyde, Strathclyde Region incorporates predominantly rural communities, notably in Kyle and Carrick District in the south and Argyll and Bute District on the north-western periphery (Fig. 18.1). This study is principally concerned with the urban areas within the Region, particularly those within, and in the environs of, the Clydeside conurbation although brief reference will be made to the patterns of deprivation in other parts of the Region.

#### Historical background

The medieval ecclesiastical burgh of Glasgow occupied a site on the north bank of the shallow, silt-laden River Clyde. At that time the centre of gravity of Scotland's population was on the eastern lowlands reflecting the physical attributes of these areas and the significance of trading links with countries neighbouring the North Sea. Royal burghs had the greatest trading privileges and there were five in West Central Scotland: Dumbarton, Hamilton, Paisley, Renfrew and Rutherglen. Additionally the ports




FIG. 18.1 : *Districts of Strathclyde region*

of Ayr and Irvine functioned as royal burghs and in the seven-teenth century as outports for the post-Reformation royal burgh of Glasgow (Adams 1978). Glasgow flourished with the develop-ment in the eighteenth century of the tobacco trade (Stevenson 1973) with America, especially after engineering works on the Clyde created a navigable channel to the quays less than a kilo-metre from the centre of the growing city. On the return journey ships carried a variety of linen goods and other products of Scottish industries. The tobacco trade collapsed after American Independence but it was quickly succeeded by cotton textiles as

the industrial leader in the period 1780 to 1830 (Gordon 1983). Contemporaneously, the population of Glasgow increased fivefold from 40,000 to 202,000 (Cunnison and Gilfillan 1958). Numerous water-powered cotton mills were built in and around Glasgow and Paisley but local coal reserves were soon utilised to fire steam-driven machinery. The Carboniferous sedimentary rocks of Central Scotland supplied coal, iron and limestone, the three basic raw materials of the age of industrialisation. Small pioneering iron works were founded south-east of Glasgow at Wilsontown and Shotts on bleak moorland but after 1830 Monklands parish in North Lanarkshire became the centre of the iron industry in West Central Scotland. The commercial application of the hot blast method of iron-making permitted the use of local iron and coal deposits and the consequent industrial boom had a profound effect upon industrial and urban development in the area east and south-east of Glasgow. The pace of industrialisation was maintained as transport innovations overcome the problem of the movement of large quantities of bulky materials and goods. A brief phase of canal construction, initiated in the later decades of the eighteenth century, linked Glasgow with the River Forth, the coal-producing parish of Monklands and the textile centres of Paisley and Johnstone. The maze of railway routes constructed by a plethora of companies after 1840 transformed spatial relationships, in time and cost, and furthered the processes of urbanisation and industrialisation. Apart from the demand for construction, labour and subsequent operative staff, the railway boom stimulated new demands for coal, iron and engineering products and created the locomotive construction and repair industries of Springburn district of Glasgow. Kellett (1969) also attributed primary importance to the role of the railways in shaping the morphology of the Victorian city. Glasgow had a host of industries making engines, boilers, pumps, tools and other items for the expanding manufacturing sector.

In the last quarter of the nineteenth century, shipbuilding, steel-making and engineering assumed the role of leadership in manufacturing. Engineering displayed the most dispersed locational pattern. By contrast the other two activities were clustered in space. Steel-making was focused upon a corridor between eastern Glasgow and Motherwell, whilst shipbuilding developed on the western flank of the city at Scotstoun, Partick and Govan

and further downstream at Clydebank, Port Glasgow and Greenock. By 1910 one-third of the British output of shipping was built on the Clyde and the local shipyards and a labour force of 60,000 men. Since shipbuilding was the principal customer of the Scottish steel industries and a major purchaser of engineering products, the indirect effects upon employment and industrial demand were clearly substantial. The Clyde was the catalytic industrial artery of a burgeoning urban-industrial region of more than one million people. Massive increases in the scale of trade and the size of ships necessitated two phases of dock-building to the west of the old central quays.

During the nineteenth century the spiralling demands for labour were satisfied by a massive influx of migrants from other parts of Scotland, particularly the Highlands, and from Ireland. The latter introduced the religious schism between Ulster Protestants and Irish Catholics. Increasingly the migrants were accommodated in four-storey sandstone blocks of tenement housing in which individual houses often consisted of a single room. Overcrowding was common-place and health standards were endangered by the inadequacy of the level of sanitary provision and the poor standards of ventilation and light in these residences. Social segregation became pronounced with the middle class seeking refuge in the western suburbs of Glasgow and other outlying districts. This process was aided, in the second half of the century, by the construction of suburban railways and other improvements to intra-urban transportation such as the development of a system of tramways. Commuting was not confined to the middle-class occupants of suburban villas. Special reductions were offered for workmen on early morning rail and tramway services. Continued population and economic growth stimulated residential and industrial accretion into the urban fringe. The rate of invasion was uneven, correlating with oscillations in trade cycles (Whitehand 1972). Competition for space within the central area of settlements added to the centrifugal forces. Residential and industrial activities were replaced by office and retail uses. The scale of transformation ranged from tracts of land or blocks to individual plots. Early examples of redevelopment at Saltmarket and Gorbals in Glasgow in the 1870s involved tracts of land occupied by poor quality housing being cleared. At Gorbals redevelopment produced fewer better-quality houses

but at Saltmarket much of the space was consumed by a new railway line. Nonetheless, with high residential densities in inner districts, often in excess of 500 persons per acre, localised work-place-residence systems were prevalent. Urban growth had corroded the intervening space between settlements leading to the continuous urbanised industrial zone which Geddes named a conurbation but sub-regional industrial specialisms persisted and the various communities retained distinctive social identities and loyalties.

Prior to 1919, the provision of houses was almost entirely the product of private investment. The desire for an attractive and reliable return on investment restricted willingness to invest in housing for families with low or unreliable incomes. Legislation had defined more stringent minimum standards for housing but mounting concern about the supply and standard of low rent housing led to the appointment in 1912 of a Royal Commission on the Housing of the Industrial Population of Scotland. Data from the census of 1911 illustrated the problem of overcrowding with 55.7 per cent of the houses in Glasgow having occupancy levels in excess of two persons per room. The substantial number of one-room dwellings was a major cause of concern. Many witnesses to the Commission argued that these houses were a threat to morals and health and the cause of disease, a high death rate and infant mortality rate. Before the Commission reported, militant action occurred with a rent strike in 1915 in Glasgow. Inflationary pressures precipitated battles over wages, conditions and rents and to defuse the situation the Rent and Mortgage Restriction Act 1915 was passed. By seeking control over the price of housing, government affected the interplay of market forces and the State was inexorably pushed towards intervention in the supply of housing (Butt 1983). That situation materialised with the introduction of State funded housing subsidies in the Housing Act 1919 to enable local authorities to build low rent housing. Thereafter the public sector assumed a monopolistic role in the provision for that sector of demand. In order to minimise costs, local authorities were encouraged to seek sites in the urban fringe. Government argued that the policy would also ease the acquisition of land, thereby hastening the progress of house-building (Gordon 1979). Ensuing Acts altered the scale of, and criteria for, subsidy and directed attention



towards pressing needs and problems. Cumulatively over a period of six decades the combined processes of the demolition of the nineteenth century private rented stock and the construction of public sector houses transformed the tenurial structure of the housing market in West Central Scotland. In Glasgow between the wars the peak output from the public sector occurred in 1929 when 6,367 houses were built. The rate of demolition lagged behind the pace of construction. In 1935 a national survey revealed that overcrowding remained an acute problem in Scotland involving 22.6 per cent of all working class houses compared with 3.8 per cent in England and Wales (Butt 1983). Attention was focused upon slum clearance with the displaced families relocated in comparatively high-density estates such as Blackhill and Possil in Glasgow and Ferguslie Park in Paisley. There was a contemporaneous spread of privately-owned middle class suburban housing but pronounced social segregation continued with the different developments occurring at separate locations.

In 1913-14 West Central Scotland had the lowest rate of unemployment in Britain but in the following decades the winds of economic change affected the area. The local specialisation in shipbuilding, heavy engineering and textiles suffered from the twin forces of recurrent phases of economic recession and mounting competition in world markets. Government intervened by building industrial estates which were designed to restructure the mix of manufacturing by introducing light-industry.

The Clyde Valley Plan of 1946 proposed a massive decentralisation of population and industry from Glasgow, redevelopment of the inner city areas and the adoption of measures to curb urban sprawl. The process was inaugurated by the designation of East Kilbride some twelve kilometres south-east of Glasgow, as Scotland's first new town. The Corporation of Glasgow disagreed with the planned transfer of population but many of the citizens were attracted by the quality of life in the new town. In 1955, a further new town, Cumbernauld, was started and from the outset it was planned that 80 per cent of the houses would be allocated to people moving from Glasgow. In addition the city reached overspill agreements with numerous authorities throughout Scotland. Within West Central Scotland the principal receiving areas were Johnstone and Kirkintilloch. The Corpora-

tion of Glasgow developed large peripheral housing estates at Drumchapel, Easterhouse, Castlemilk, Pollok and Priesthill (Fig. 18.2). Similar estates were built on the outskirts of other towns in the conurbation as authorities grappled with the backlog of unmet housing demand. A massive programme was implemented at Clydebank where much of the existing stock had been destroyed or damaged by wartime bombing.




FIG. 18.2 : *Glasgow : Housing regions 1971*

In the mid-1950s the Corporation of Glasgow produced plans for 29 Comprehensive Development Areas involving some 1,200 acres and 120,000 people (Miller 1970). This process meant the virtual demolition of the total built environment of these inner city areas, rebuilding at lower densities and decanting of the excess population to local authority estates, new towns or other settlements by means of overspill agreements. Massive demolition in seven areas near the city centre would provide the opportunity for major road improvements in the shape of an Inner Ring Road. Only the northern flank of the road has been completed along with a new bridge over the Clyde at Kingston but urban

extensions of a motorway (M8) have affected other areas on both sides of the river. Comprehensive redevelopment was implemented in several areas but the proposed programme was subsequently modified as rehabilitation gained planning support and clearance was criticised on social and economic grounds. The C.D.A. programme coincided with a period during which high-rise residential blocks were sponsored by government through the vehicle of a higher level of subsidy. At Red Road, Glasgow Corporation erected five 31 storey blocks which housed 4,000 people at a density of 180 persons per acre (Miller 1970). Reaction to the high building costs and severe social problems associated with these multi-storey buildings culminated in the cessation of the programme of high-rise housing and a progressive shift in opinion towards rehabilitation of structurally-sound old properties and limited renewal. By 1973 only 9 of the 29 C.D.A.'s had been approved when the proposals were overtaken by the shift towards action areas. Rehabilitation became a major instrument of policy although total commitment to it was impracticable because the city had thousands of houses which were beyond repair. Action areas were expected to be smaller than C.D.As and the process was intended to minimise the degree of disruption of existing communities.

In 1967 Irvine was designated a new town, partly to accommodate further dispersal from Glasgow but also to act as a local growth pole in an area of unemployment and industrial decline. Situated 40 kilometres from Glasgow the existing settlements within the designated area had more than 35,000 inhabitants. Subsequently, a further new town was proposed at Stonehouse but the project was abandoned in 1976 when government decided to focus attention upon the problems of multiple deprivation in the east end of Glasgow (Pacione 1979).

Between 1921 and 1961 Glasgow was a millionaire city in terms of population size but the outward migration of population became marked by 1971 when the figure had fallen to 897,000 inhabitants. The trend was maintained in the ensuing decade and in 1981 there were approximately 750,000 people living in the city. Apart from the growth of the new towns and expanded towns in the penumbra of the city, there was also substantial growth of existing middle class suburbs and emergence of new foci based upon small rural villages. Additionally the city spon-

sored the formation of a new community at Erskine between Renfrew and Port Glasgow. Population movements emanated from other places within West Central Scotland. For example, just over one-third of the people living in East Kilbride in the early 1960s had moved from other centres in Lanarkshire (Paci-one 1979).

After 1950 decline of employment was an endemic characteristic of the heavy industries resulting in a persistent above-average rate of unemployment in West Central Scotland. Many new light industries were developed, including the recently-closed car factory at Linwood, but a high percentage of the new jobs were in branch plants of multi-national companies. Economic recession has caused closures and redundancies in many of these plants although growth has occurred in sections of the electronics industry. There has been a progressive suburbanisation of the location of industry with the emergence of major foci in the new towns. Several shipbuilding and steel-making settlements have experienced the eclipse of the traditional industrial base of the community whilst the recent closures of the car factory at Linwood and the sewing-maching plant at Clydebank resulted in particularly high levels of unemployment in the respective local catchment areas.

### **Patterns of deprivation**

In 1961 34.3 per cent of households in Glasgow were overcrowded (more than 1.5 persons per room), an appalling situation when compared to the figures of 6.4 per cent and 11.5 per cent for Manchester and London respectively (Miller 1970). Medical Officer of Health in Victorian times had catalogued the association between substandard housing, overcrowding, disease and high rates of mortality. After 1919 the provision of new homes with better standards of amenity and more rooms combined with a policy of demolitions of dilapidated properties became the principal priority of local authorities. Whilst inter-relationships between problems were recognised there was a general belief that improved housing would cure most conditions and create a just, contented and healthy society. The persistence of various deprivations and of associations of deprivations undermined the credence of that policy and caused a re-appraisal both of the conditions and of ameliorative strategies.

Berthoud (1976) defined deprivation as lacking something which other people have. Deprivation has commonly been defined with reference either to agreed minimum standards or by high levels of deficiency on various criteria. It is neither a single nor a simple concept.

Holtermann (1975) used 18 indicators in a study of urban deprivation in Britain. Eleven indicators referred to housing in terms of amenity, density and tenurial class. There were three economic measures, namely: male and female unemployment and percentage of unskilled manual workers. The remaining variables measured car-ownership, life-cycle characteristics and ethnic status. Eleven indicators were used in a comparative analysis of the distribution by conurbation of the worst five per cent of enumeration districts (Table 18.1). Clydeside had a disproportionate share on each indicator, recording the highest levels of deprivation on six indicators and the second largest proportion for three others. For nine dimensions the conurbation had more severe levels of deprivation than the remainder of Scotland. Whilst poor housing conditions and above average rates of unemployment were prevalent in Scotland there was a marked concentration in Clydeside of deprived areas. For example Strathclyde Region had 87 per cent of the worst five per cent of enumeration districts with overcrowded households in Scotland. The spatial distribution was uneven with a massive concentration of disadvantaged areas within the conurbation and, more specifically, in Glasgow (Table 18.2). An analysis of household data (Scottish Office 1980) revealed that Strathclyde had the highest proportion of multiply deprived households in Scotland with a very high proportion in Glasgow District, although Inverclyde, Clydebank and Hamilton also had above average proportions. In contrast the commuter suburbs (Bearsden and Milngavie and Eastwood Districts), the New Towns (East Kilbride, Cumbernauld and Irvine) and several rural districts had small proportions.

By mapping the scores of enumeration districts for specific social indicators a series of geographical patterns emerge reflecting the varied spatial importance of factors such as housing amenities, rates of economic activity, overcrowding, household congestion, health, education, poverty, social conditions and social problems. Three examples (Figs. 18.3, 18.4 and 18.5) illustrate

TABLE 18.1 : Conurbation shares of the worst 5 per cent of British enumeration districts for eleven indicators 1971

Conurbations	Households sharing or lacking hot water	Households sharing or lacking bath	Households lacking inside W.C.	Households without exclusive use of all basic amenities	Households living at beyond 1.5 person per room	Economically active males unemployed	Economically active females unemployed	Households with no car	Economically active and retired males in S.E.G. II (unskilled)	Population aged 0-14	Pensioner households	Per cent share of EDs in Great Britain
Tyneside	2.7	3.1	6.0	4.2	1.3	6.7	2.9	7.2	4.4	1.9	1.4	2.0
London Group A	27.7	28.2	7.0	21.7	21.8	2.9	6.3	12.9	9.9	3.5	4.3	8.6
London Group B	3.9	2.6	2.1	1.9	5.5	0.4	1.9	0.4	3.2	3.3	3.3	10.4
West Yorkshire	1.7	1.9	3.6	2.6	3.0	4.2	3.5	8.6	3.9	3.3	5.3	4.3
Merseyside	5.2	5.0	6.8	5.4	1.5	9.0	6.2	5.0	6.0	3.4	0.9	2.7
S.E. Lancashire	4.8	6.0	13.6	9.6	1.9	6.1	5.4	8.9	8.1	4.3	3.8	5.8
West Midlands	7.5	3.9	6.2	4.7	5.6	2.8	3.8	2.9	4.1	5.5	1.4	4.8
Clydeside	15.5	15.6	5.9	13.5	37.3	23.1	13.7	25.7	11.7	12.8	4.8	4.3
Scotland (Excl. Clydeside)	6.9	11.9	2.6	8.3	16.3	11.4	11.7	10.2	10.2	13.4	12.2	6.8

*Note* : London Group A Inner London Education Authority Boroughs excluding Haringey and Newham but including Greenwich, London Group B Remainder of Greater London Council area.  
*Source* : Holtermann (1975).

TABLE 18.2 : Percentage share of the worst 5 per cent of Enumeration Districts in Scotland 1971

Districts of Strathclyde Region	Male unemployment	Households without excl. use of hot water	Unskilled male workers	Seriously over-crowded households
Argyll and Bute	1.10	1.22	1.71	0
Bearsden and Milngavie	0.12	0	0	0
Clydebank	0.49	0.85	1.87	1.58
Cumbernauld and Kilsyth	0	0	0.36	0.12
Cumnock and Doon Valley	0	0	0.12	0
Cunninghame	0.12	0.12	1.71	0
Dumbarton	0.97	0.24	1.83	0.73
East Kilbride	0	0	0	0.24
Eastwood	0	0	0.12	0
Glasgow	56.83	65.61	31.34	71.58
Hamilton	1.58	0.24	2.07	1.34
Inverclyde	1.46	1.46	2.32	5.36
Kilmarnock and Loudoun	0.85	0.24	0.49	0.12
Kyle and Carrick	0.12	0.12	0.73	0.12
Lanark	0	0	0.73	0.12
Monklands	0.97	0	2.80	1.58
Motherwell	1.34	0.24	5.00	1.70
Renfrew	2.93	4.02	3.90	2.07
Strathkelvin	0	0	0.36	0
Strathclyde	68.88	74.36	56.56	86.70
Scotland	100	100	100	100

*Source* : Strathclyde Regional Council 1976 Urban Deprivation.

different patterns of inequality in Glasgow. Small houses (Fig. 18.3) were associated with the old inner city areas awaiting renewal or rehabilitation. Whilst the highest scores of households with no car also occurred in the areas (Fig. 18.4), the majority of households in the large suburban local authority estates shared that deprivation. Indeed the low levels of car ownership in Glasgow District in 1971 raised serious questions about the priorities in the allocation of resources to road developments and the provision of public transport. High scores on overcrowding (Fig. 18.5) were associated with certain inner areas and local authority estates, notably Easterhouse, whereas values were generally low in the owner-occupied areas of Kelvinside and Hillhead, Pollokshields,





FIG. 18.3 : *Percentage households in Glasgow with one or two rooms 1971*

Source : Based upon Millar, A.R. *Glasgow : Analysis of Change 1966-71*. C.R.U. Discussion Paper Map 31a.

Cathcart and Kings Park. The complexity of the pattern was reflected in the fact that different parts of Drumchapel, a post 1950 local authority estate, displayed low, medium and comparatively high levels of overcrowding respectively.

A study of multiple deprivation areas in Glasgow (Scottish Office 1973) found clustering in inner city districts and in many inter-war and post-war local authority estates. Particularly poor environmental conditions were associated with the inner city districts. The incorporation of census and non-census data, including crime, truancy and social work statistics, broadened the analytical base and facilitated the examination of social and physical stress. The worst social problem areas coincided with the areas of greatest physical stress in the inner city but the study





GLASGOW PERCENTAGE HOUSEHOLDS WITH NO CAR 1971

FIG. 18.4 : *Percentage households in Glasgow with no car 1971*

*Source :* Based upon Millar, A.R. Map 28a.

also revealed that the areas of potential social stress included many local authority estates. Additionally, the areas of lowest environmental quality were found to be much greater than the spatial extent of the scheduled CDAs. The study concluded that problem environments accounted for about one third of the area of the city.

Morbidity and mortality statistics provide further evidence of spatial inequalities in environmental conditions. The highest rates of infant mortality (1966-68) in Glasgow occurred in inner city districts (Howe 1972). For ischaemic heart disease, the principal cause of male deaths in Britain, Glasgow had a Standardised Mortality Rate for males aged 15-65 years, 1970-72 of 134. The comparable statistic for London was 89 (Howe 1982). Only three wards in Glasgow (Kelvinside, Partick East and Exchange) had S.M.R.s below the national average. Particularly




FIG. 18.5 : *Overcrowding in Glasgow 1971*

*Source* : Based upon Millar, A.R. Map 30a.

high levels of mortality, S.M.R.s of over 133, occurred in two NW-SE aligned sectors to the north of the river and in three central wards (Anderston, Kingston, Kinning Park). The sectors included the eastern inner city districts of Dalmarnock, Parkhead, Shettleston, Tollcross and Mile End and the northern and western suburban local authority estates of Drumchapel, Yoker and Ruchill (Howe 1982).

The National Children's Bureau published the results of a survey (1973) of factors affecting levels of educational attainment which showed a strong correlation between disadvantaged children and single parent families, large families, low income and poor housing. Nationally one child in fourteen suffered from the combination of these conditions but in Strathclyde the ratio was one in six.

The accumulated evidence of the various studies influenced

the development of national and local government policies aimed at combating deprivation in Glasgow, Clydeside and Strathclyde Region.

### **Development of deprivation policies**

A major review of inner city policy was announced in 1976 and the following year government published a policy statement in a White Paper. The need for the regeneration of the inner areas was emphasised and the document stressed that both central and local government had to play a part in this process. Whilst recognising that measures must relate to local circumstances and that some solutions would be outside the inner areas as well as within them, four policy goals were stated :

- (1) strengthening of the economies of inner areas ;
- (2) improving the physical fabric and the environment of inner areas ;
- (3) alleviating social problems ;
- (4) securing a new balance between inner areas and the rest of the city region in terms of population and jobs (DOE 1977).

Within the Scottish Office, an Urban Renewal Unit was established in 1975 to ensure that Scottish Office policies had regard for the needs of deprived areas and of those authorities where there was a high incidence of social deprivation. Additionally, the Unit assisted authorities by providing statistical data and offering technical advice in the establishment of area-based initiatives. The 1977 White Paper redefined the role of the Urban Renewal Unit as that of co-ordinating the interface between central government and its agencies (SDD 1978). The Scottish Office was entrusted with the role of assisting local authorities in dealing with urban problems. Particular assistance could be offered by designation under the Inner Urban Areas Act 1978 and the expanded allocation of resources to the Urban Programme.

Four features have been identified as fundamental to an effective areal approach to deprivation :

1. Positive discrimination ;
2. Comprehensive assessment of problems

3. Co-ordinated response ;
4. Public participation (SDD 1978).

Since 1966 numerous reports, memoranda and advisory documents have been issued relating to structure plans, local plans, housing, social work, education, health, crime and employment and collectively they outline the statutory framework for any area-based approach to urban deprivation. In general policy development was evolutionary and additive although on occasion research findings resulted in a major re-assessment, and re-alignment, e.g. the abandonment of CDAs in favour of a wider variety of renewal policies.

The reformed two-tier system of local government which became operational in 1975 allotted the development of strategic planning and the provision of transport, education, social work and environmental health services to the regional authorities, although housing remained the responsibility of the districts. The regional councils were required to submit a strategic plan, or Regional Report, to the Secretary of State in 1976. Strathclyde stated two guiding principles : the need to increase the number of jobs and tackle urban deprivation. Concurrently Strathclyde adopted proposals for tackling deprivation which involved positive discrimination, a review of policies and practice, staff training and changing traditional attitudes, co-ordination with central government and agencies such as Health Boards and the cultivation of community participation. Area and client based policies were formulated. The former resulted in the definition of 45 Areas for Priority Treatment in which the council sought to improve the provision of services and the quality of life in deprived areas. Extra social work and education staff were deployed in APTs. The council sought to overcome managerial deficiencies in the co-ordination of service provision and develop sympathetic responses to the needs of the disadvantaged. The solution to some problems, such as employment and housing, were primarily outside the powers of the authority but these featured in the overall strategy of the co-ordination of responses and actions with other authorities and agencies and the promotion of concerted and pressure about the problems of economic regeneration and poverty.

In 1976 the Glasgow Eastern Area Renewal project was established involving a partnership between the Scottish Development

Agency, Strathclyde Regional Council, Glasgow District Council, the Scottish Special Housing Association, Central Government, the Greater Glasgow Health Board, the Housing Corporation and the Manpower Services Commission. The designated area covered 4,000 acres. By 1980 there were 17,000 houses and 45,000 people in the area, but over 85,000 people had left during the preceding three decades because of the unattractive housing conditions and the severity of the manifestations of economic and social malaise. The project comprises five local plan areas (Calton, Camlachie, Dalmarnock, Parkhead, Shettleston-Tollcross), the Bridgeton-Dalmarnock CDA and the Cambuslang recovery area. An extensive programme of environmental improvement, housing renovation and rehabilitation, community development and industrial regeneration has been launched although there has been criticism of the slow rate of progress (Pacione 1980). The task of economic revival is daunting given the November 1982 Scottish unemployment rate of 17 per cent, the much higher figures in parts of the GEAR area and the continuing erosion of the existing industrial base through closures and redundancies.

In 1978 Strathclyde Regional Council developed seven area initiatives located both within Glasgow, e.g. Priesthill and Maryhill, and in other parts of the Region, e.g. Don Valley and Greenend-Sykeside in Coatbridge. Until 1980 the financial resources of the Urban Programme were primarily directed toward these area initiatives and GEAR. Subsequently, greater emphasis has been placed upon the total pool of Areas of Priority Treatment and on client based activities.

District Councils have confronted the task of finding solutions to the problem of 'difficult to let' houses in certain stigmatised local authority estates. The Morris Report (1975) advocated a strategy for these schemes based upon the tenets of community participation, positive discrimination and a comprehensive approach to the problems and the rehabilitation of depressed council estates. The Report argued that a successful rehabilitation strategy required a concerted and continuing attack on the manifestations of physical and social problems and a more precise and responsive definition of the housing needs of neglected client groups. Since the early 1970s there have been several attempts at community participation in housing within West

Central Scotland but with varying levels of success. Recently Glasgow District implemented a policy of decentralisation of some decision-making powers to housing areas committees in an attempt to improve the delivery of services and activate a greater degree of community participation (Gordon 1982). The problem estate of Ferguslie Park in Renfrew District provides an illustration of the emergence of a local strategy. Most of the 3,500 houses in the estate were built between 1927 and 1958 although 220 dated from 1965. In general the oldest and newest houses are in reasonable condition but many of the blocks of flats dating from the 1930s are 'difficult to let' (English 1976). For many years the local authority allocated these houses to anti-social and problem tenants. The policy furthered the stigmatisation of the area and produced the situation where, in 1971, the levels of deprivation in Ferguslie Park were substantially higher than those in the severely deprived Clydeside conurbation. More than 5,000 people have left the estate and nearly a thousand houses have been demolished. The first attempt at a comprehensive strategy (1977-79) proposed the modernisation of nearly 2,400 houses phased over 14 years. In 1981 a revised strategy was adopted by Renfrew District which placed the greatest priority on the treatment of the worst areas with a minimal amount of demolition. Whilst empty houses featured in the programme of rehabilitation greater importance was attached to the improvement of occupied properties in order to boost the morale of the community. In essence the plan seeks an expansion of good or intermediate areas and a contraction of poor areas through the mechanism of rehabilitation. Physical improvement is only part of a two-pronged attack on stigmatisation, with the other thrust using greater public participation to raise the level of satisfaction of tenants with the social environment of the estate.

Some districts are experimenting with the homesteading of unlettable properties. Vacant vandalised houses are returned to minimal occupancy standards by the authorities and then sold cheaply to homesteaders who face the task of completing the renovation. Other experiments include allocating small portions of maintenance and environmental monies to tenant management co-operatives which then decide upon the priorities for the finance. The various schemes are united by the common desire

to sponsor local participation and devolve decision-making in order to counter the feelings of hopelessness and impotence which can dominate multiply deprived communities.

Strathclyde Regional Council is now seeking to staunch the flow of population from Glasgow by restricting further suburbanisation and regenerating the physical, economic and social environment of the city. Private housebuilders are being




FIG. 18.6 : Available Scottish development agency industrial premises in west central Scotland in November 1982

encouraged to develop gap sites in order to offer potential middle class migrants the prospect of inner city locations. The Scottish Development Agency is engaged in an extensive programme of reclamation and landscaping of derelict sites in Glasgow and other parts of West Central Scotland. It is also responsible for the building of advance factories which are designed to ease the process of economic revival (Fig. 18.6). In recent decades substantial improvements have occurred in the quality of life of many people in the Region. A crude indicator of physical improvement is the fact that in 1951, 55.9 per cent of the households in Glasgow did not have exclusive use of a bath whereas by 1971 the figure had fallen to 24 per cent and a further reduction has occurred. It will be at least 1991 before the impact of the deprivation policies of the 1970s can be measured in census data, although the various agencies appreciate the need to monitor the efficacy of policies and various detailed studies are in operation. In an absolute sense deprivation is insoluble since it is primarily a relative state. However, the severity of deprivation in West Central Scotland demanded massive and sustained corrective action to produce even a tolerable measure of spatial and social justice.

If, as many studies suggest (Chape 1982), poverty is a crucial component of deprivation then the current persistently high rates of unemployment must endanger the prospects of a speedy reduction in levels of economic and social stress, the basic ingredients of many social problems. It is accepted now that authorities must operate a continuous programme of modernisation of the housing stock. Perhaps a similar strategy should be applied to the treatment of deprivation thereby recognising that escalating societal aspirations redefine minimal standards in a potentially unending cycle which is only curbed by the scale of available resources and the political willingness to grapple with the problem.

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
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RICCARDO MAZZANTI

## URBAN POLICY AND MUNICIPAL ZONING DECISION

### The Consequences of the "Fair Rent Act" in Italy

(1) *The space division of urban tissue in areas with homogeneous functional structures is one of the most fertile and stimulating fields in all geographic knowledge.* Indeed, geographers and town planners have helped to keep alive the debate on the problem of an internal differentiation of urban centres. Considering the different degrees of concentration of certain urban activities (retail and wholesale businesses, financial services, public offices, residential housing, industry, etc.) in urban areas, some scholars, most of them British and American, have elaborated theoretical/mathematical models of location essentially based on the accessibility and value of urban land. From a static point of view these studies represent an attempt to explain the diversity of the uses of the land and the distribution of functional areas within the urban tissue; from a dynamic point of view they aim at generalizing and synthesizing the directions of expansion of the individual areas of the town as a whole.

Although it was not ignored, this line of research did not find, at least at the beginning, much favour among European scholars, especially the French and Italians, who preferred to engage themselves in a series of detailed monographs on single towns, giving particular attention to economic, social and political aspects (Greppi 1979). Many of the causes of these differences in the choice of research subjects and methods are to be sought in the historical and structural differences existing between Anglo-Saxon towns, especially North American ones.

and those of the European continent. In other words, North American towns better lend themselves to a rather clear and plain zoning, since they add to origins which are usually *more recent, an orderly and regular development which hinges on the classic chequerboard structure along the main communication axes branching off from the original nucleus*. On the contrary most European towns had a more irregular and tormented development with alternating periods of strong demographic expansion, during which instances of massive urbanization of rural populations took place,<sup>1</sup> and others of stagnation and reflux. The internal structures of these towns thus represent the result of a centuries long historical process, which caused the continuous readaptation and the gradual functional reconversion of entire urban neighbourhoods, so that different and contrasting architectonic forms and land uses were interwoven with and superimposed on each other in a chaotic and disorderly fashion. Hence, any attempt to divide urban tissue into functional areas marked by specific land uses comes up against an extremely diverse and multiform reality which creates theoretical as well as practical difficulties.

As regards Italian towns in particular, at least three inter-related basic motives can be singled out which contribute to the preservation of a complex and articulate internal structure: (1) hinder regular and orderly urban development of the North American type, (2) make internal space division difficult, and (3) obstruct the delineation and application of theoretical models for land use.

The first of them is the aforementioned historical and urban problem, which in Italy is particularly exasperating. It is well known, many Italian towns were founded as far back as Roman times and often have their origins in the pre-existing Italic civilizations or in the Greek colonies established along the southern coasts. The prevalently chess-board-type structure of these centres was in part adopted and reorganized by the Romans, who, however preferred a type of town with a plan marked by the central crossing of two main axes at right angles as in the layout of military camps. The magnificence of the Roman period was followed by late imperial and high mediaeval decay, during which the urban population, convulsed by wars and the raids of the barbarians, sought refuge in the country to escape from danger

and to ensure a supply of food.<sup>2</sup> While many Roman towns were getting significantly smaller and descending to the rank of small villages, others were beginning their development and ascent in this period.

The central nucleus of these new agglomerates was in some cases the castle, the building of which had rapidly spread in this period. Also in towns of Roman origin, however, urban tissue and forms were radically reorganized and transformed to suit the needs of the moment. The old, convenient quadrilateral plan with orthogonal street axes was replaced by the circular plan, which adapted itself better to the layout of the new walls. These in fact often took on a circular shape to reduce the use of building materials and to make the most of internal space. Moreover, the population tended to concentrate itself in the best preserved and more easily defendable areas, while the remaining green space inside the walls served as a possible refuge for the rural populations and could also be cultivated. In the inhabited part, therefore, buildings overlapped and leaned up against each other for requirements of defence and to economize on building materials. In such an urban situation the network of streets also lost its regular and rectilinear layout; the streets in fact became narrow and meandering, sometimes also to skirt the heaps of ruins produced by wars and natural calamities. In mediaeval towns, and also in communals ones, the vertical dimension (towers and tower-houses) took on special importance both for the requirements of defence against outside enemies, above all against political rivals, and for the lack of building space inside the walls.

It was only around 1000 A.D. that the new political and social stability produced a great demographic and—especially—economic revival, which restored to the towns their role of control and hegemony over the surrounding rural territory. Soon many towns had to expand their walls to defend the new suburbs outside them where a large part of the economic activity took place. In this period urban centres had a polycentric and polyfunctional structure, because of the coincidence of dwelling and working place and the concentration of arts and crafts in streets and districts imposed by the guilds, with the aim of controlling production and the market. Moreover, nobles and rich merchants, at the time the leading class, also tended to concentrate their own residences together and to excluding the

lower-ranking classes.

Around the 16th century some wide green spaces, often contained within the walls, contrasted with a high-density central nucleus. The latter was composed of a chaotic and compact body of houses and other buildings, scarcely separated from each other by dark, narrow lanes, churning with economic activity. In the period that followed, up to the unification of Italy in the 19th century, Italian towns experienced a relatively steady demographic development (with the exception of wars and such natural disasters as famines and epidemics). In particular, the capitals of the small states into which the Italian peninsula was subdivided had a few moments of remarkable economic and cultural magnificence. From the urban point of view the expansion of inhabited areas usually took place by occupying free spaces inside the new mighty Renaissance walls, built to resist cannonry. Urban centres thus became more and more crowded and congested, so that an initial demolition had to be carried out, together with a readaptation of some mediaeval quarters, which also served the purpose of making space for public buildings and mansions, and for the new artistic and celebration requirements (Mancuso 1978, p. 108).

Even before Italian industrial development, a great increase in population began to take shape, mainly owing to the decline of mortality rates and a real revolution in technical skills and agricultural exploitation. Progress in medicine and the improvement of sanitary conditions in fact greatly reduced infant mortality and the danger of recurrent epidemics, which until then had restrained demographic growth. The improvement in farming techniques, coupled with a new interest of the middle-class in the exploitation of the land, led to an increase in agricultural production and hence to the elimination of famines. The increase in population, mainly the rural population, and the consequent increase in unemployed people in rural areas gave rise to a substantial migratory flow to the towns (Mioni 1978, pp. 130-132).

This massive urbanization significantly accelerated the process of urban expansion, which took up a frenetic and chaotic rhythm, especially in the towns which were already the most dynamic. The heavy traffic and administrative problems that derived from this situation caused the first serious urban space

planning and management projects to be taken into consideration, with the aim of putting some order into the chaotic and degraded tissue of the oldest wards, and of regulating the expansion of the towns by putting an end to their uncontrolled, haphazard mushrooming.<sup>3</sup>

It was only in 1865, with the law on expropriation for reasons of public utility, that the rules were defined for applying town plans and one could first speak of a global land management policy. Around the end of the 19th century it was already possible to draw up a balance sheet on intervention on urban tissue. Unfortunately it must be said that the regulatory plans applied resulted in more damage than benefit, since they limited their action to splitting up the most overcrowded districts of historical centres (which from an economic point of view obstructed traffic and productive activities and from a political point of view were a constant danger to the ruling classes as a potential hotbeds of rebellion sheltered from massive police action). The unification of territorial and urban planning criteria and the introduction of the concept of zoning was achieved only with the town-planning Act of 1942. Besides having a remarkable delay in comparison with legislation in this regard in other European countries, this law made its first practical effects felt only several years after its promulgation, when the urban growth had already reached dizzying and uncontrolled rhythms, thus leading to the deterioration of human and environmental conditions. This is why Italian towns today exhibit very complex and chaotic conditions, which, together with the growth of phenomena such as impropriety in constructing buildings and favouritism in drawing up town plans, weigh heavily on urban tissue and its functional organization.<sup>4</sup>

*The second group of motives, mainly of an economic and social nature, derives to a great extent from the delay of Italian economic growth and from the contradictory way in which it took place. This growth in fact affected the sectors of production to a varying extent and took place in several stages, separated by periods of stagnation. Indeed, there are still present in Italy some systems of production, social and economic relationships, and certain mental habits of pre-industrial origin that influence people's opinions and have heavy repercussions on an economy that is fragile and exposed to the speculative manoeuvring of the*



domestic and foreign politico-economic context. As regards the economic use of urban land, for instance, the Italian capitalistic system has not yet attained such a degree of efficiency and organization as to encourage competition for the ownership of central areas in order to derive the maximum benefit from location. The consequence of this is a rather undynamic market which restricts the mobility of the population and the functional specialization of the different urban areas.

Hence, the shifts and reconversions of social and economic urban tissue take place at a comparatively slow pace and are also influenced by such prejudices and mental habits as the aim of living in the town-centre, considered a sign of high social standing, and the refusal to change one's own residence for reasons of affection for one's home, location, and social context.<sup>5</sup> The situation also seems to be conditioned by the chronic scarcity of apartment buildings (which is in turn due to phenomena such as the increase in population, the rural-to-urban migration, and the change in housing customs and needs) and by the lack of a free rent market, which often brings about the poor utilization of dwellings and of urban land (Magnani 1980, p. 37).

Indeed, a glance at the statistics on the housing situation of Italian families is sufficient to realize how badly housing is used and distributed. As a matter of fact, the census of 1981 shows that more than 18.5 million families live in approximately 17.5 million dwellings (with a cohabitation index of 1.06). But the statistical information is not able to give a clear and definitive idea of the complexity of the situation, which in reality is quite paradoxical. On one side there is the extreme case of a sole tenant who can make use of a whole flat, sometimes even with a great number of rooms; while at the same time many people have to live together in flats that are sometimes composed of a single room. Parenthetically, the conditions for architectonic deterioration of flats can easily arise in the case of both overcrowding and underutilization. But that is not all: the problem might seem less serious if one considered that meanwhile there are in Italy more than 4.3 million dwellings not regularly inhabited and which would thus seem available for use; but in reality a large part of these lodgings must be attributed to the phenomenon of the "second home", usually used during holidays and free time for touristic purposes, and consequently cannot be

used immediately for other-purpose.

So, a remarkable socio-economic difference emerges from these data between those families that have two or more dwellings at their disposal and those forced to share a dwelling with others.

The lack of a free rent market is, however, connected to a third group of elements, of a mainly socio-political and legal nature. For a long time, a few governmental measures have in fact aimed at restricting the elasticity of the housing market for politico-social purposes, leading to the present functional disorder in the field of residential building construction. We are particularly referring to rent control, which went into force back in 1947 and was extended to newly built apartment buildings in 1963. Though adopted to protect users of flats from the owners' greedy demands and from the potential competition of prospective tenants willing to offer more, in the long run rent control has led to the end of market selection, has resulted in an excess in demand which has restricted the mobility of the population by tying tenants to their flats, and has accentuated the aforementioned poor utilization of existing housing. Furthermore, this forced limitation of rent income has reduced the construction of new housing for rent (which, as we have already seen, the country greatly lacks), encouraging on the contrary the sale of flats at the expense of letting them out. So, rent control has harmed the lower social classes, which were to be helped by the measure in question. Obviously, this precarious and punitive situation with respect to the population's need for mobility also affects the functional specialization of urban areas.

In short, it can be said that the urban disorder, connected with the historical evolution of the towns and the relative immobility of the population, as well as the insufficient exploitation of ground space (tied to the only partial development of the Italian economic system) create serious difficulties when it comes to laying out homogeneous and functional areas. If one also considers the rather complex morphology of the national territory, which causes alterations to the network of streets and the expansion of settlements, and also the different degrees of development of towns and urban functions according to their location (see, for example, the debated difference between small, well-organized and functional northern centres and large southern rural agglomer-

ations lacking in services and infrastructure), it appears evident that the possibilities of isolating a method of study capable of synthesizing and generalizing a global model of exploitation of urban land are very few. In other words, the main problem for urban geographers has always remained that of partitioning the internal tissue of Italian towns according to a criterion which is valid both theoretically and practically.

(2) A solution to this problem came, involuntarily but quite efficaciously, from the zone division suggested by the Fair Rent Act (law no. 392 of 27 July 1978, "Norme sulla disciplina delle locazioni degli immobili urbani"—Regulatory standards on the renting of urban immovables). This law was adopted to obviate the disadvantages of rent control (further restricting the free play of market forces) and to regulate the rent prices of urban buildings in such a way as to standardize the criteria of rent valuation over the whole national territory. Rent is thus made up of a fixed percentage of the rent value (i.e., the value of the inhabited building), which is derived from the basic cost of production, established by convention<sup>6</sup> and corrected with certain coefficients that take into account the possible objective conditions: the type of building,<sup>7</sup> its floor-level, age, the state of preservation and maintenance, the demographic class of the municipality, and location. This last variable is the most important from a geographic point of view because it proposes a division of municipal territory into four zones for municipalities with more than 20,000 inhabitants, and into three zones for those with smaller populations. In the first case are distinguished: (a) the agricultural zone (coefficient 0.85); (b) the built-up suburban zone (coeff. 1.00); (c) the transition zone (coeff. 1.20); (d) the historical centre (coeff. 1.30). The three zones of municipalities with less than 20,000 inhabitants are defined as follows: (a) the agricultural zone (coeff. 0.85); (b) the built-up centre (coeff. 1.00); and (c) the historical centre (coeff. 1.10). This second division is obviously a simplification of the first one, which for this reason will be taken into greater consideration. Besides, the mere 421 municipalities with more than 20,000 inhabitants (5.2% of the total) account for more than 53.5% (about 30.5 million people) of the Italian population.

Even at a glance one can see that the proposed coefficients are inversely proportional to the distance from the centre. This

is based on the obvious consideration that central areas are naturally privileged with respect to the others. They in fact enjoy the advantages of accessibility and centrality, directly linked to a favourable situation and a great availability of services.

As a further corrective to the division that was adopted, this law introduces the two notions of "worth" (coeff. 1.20) and "deterioration" (coeff. 0.90). The first category concerns areas particularly well-equipped with services or a favourable site located within agricultural or suburban zones ; the second category includes areas, buildings or parts of them that are particularly deteriorated and located anywhere in urban territory with the exception of the agricultural area (which has a lower coefficient anyhow). Because of the various combinations of "worth" and "deterioration" correctives, municipal territory is thus subdivided into 9 zones, that is, in a sufficient articulated way.<sup>8</sup>

The kind of division and the distribution of the individual areas can be efficaciously illustrated using the case of Pisa (see map), since it is a medium-sized town (with a population of about 100,000 inhabitants) essentially characterized by a considerable development of tertiary activities (transports, business, tourism, cultural activities). In defining the requisites and characteristics of the individual zones, this act leaves a good deal of latitude to the decisions of the municipal administrations charged with tracing out the boundaries. Indeed, the text of the act usually refers somewhat vaguely to the definitions adopted in the municipal townplanning regulations or, when lacking (a case which is now rare, especially for municipalities with more than 5,000 inhabitants), makes a division of the urban structure in accordance with the procedure normally followed in elaborating the above-mentioned town-planning regulations. In practice this means that the problem of specifying a valid and generalizable criterion for drawing the boundaries of the individual areas on the basis of the specific residential functions and of the diversity of the actual situations re-presents itself at both the theoretical and practical levels.<sup>9</sup>

Determining the "historical centre" is particularly complex, because the level of development and the degree of concentration of services as a typical function of the area in question have not yet been established for it. Broadly speaking, however, the

"historical centre" should coincide with the areas conforming with the centrality qualifications laid down in the ministerial circular no. 261 of 20 Sept. 1978. According to this directive the fundamental features of "historical centre" are : a higher qualification as regards site, the level of primary urbanization, optimal conditions of the communications system and a privileged position with respect to the main town services and recreational and cultural facilities. Such an area therefore also includes buildings of recent construction that have no historical character (the definition "historical centre" thus appears rather vague and gappy), but which enjoy the advantages of a central location. To sum up, the town centre is not understood in merely physical and geometrical terms, but tends to be identified on the basis of two main criteria : that of accessibility and that of the availability of services.

The so-called "semicentral area" is better characterized by its opposition to others than by its own internal features, and thus seems better defined as the "transitional zone". Here the main feature is once again the presence of a rather well-developed tertiary sector, which is, however, less specialized and more scattered than in the centre itself. Another important aspect of this zone is the abundance of works of primary urbanization which distinguish it from the suburbs. But it is the criterion of accessibility to the centre that unequivocally characterizes this belt : from it, one can reach the centre and its superior services easily enough, thanks to a combination of propitious circumstances : from the relatively short distance to the ease of access, from the frequently passing means of public transport to the presence, on the outer boundary of this area, of large parking lots for private vehicles and of terminuses of extra-urban transportation systems. The most important phenomena of decentralization of commercial activities, even at the highest levels, and of reconversion and functional reorganization of the built-up area take place very near the inner boundary of this area ; notwithstanding the relative immobility of urban tissue previously mentioned, the historical centres of Italian towns, too, are affected by the double process of internal reorganization and of expansion towards the outside (Smailes 1964, p. 83). The zone boundaries of the map of the Fair Rent Act, besides often being questionable in their practical application, are indeed subject to

the changes produced by the internal activity of the town. For this reason the above-mentioned ministerial circular took care to request municipal administrations to make periodical revisions to ensure that the boundaries reflect the actual state of affairs.

The built-up area situated outside the transitional zone constitutes the "suburban zone". It is formed of an unbroken ring of recently built well-organized housing complexes, but the services supplied to it are significantly less than those of the transitional zone. Despite the fact that on the site the boundary often seems quite nuanced, affecting an inhabited belt more or less wide, the law seems to aim at a clear-cut differentiation between the two zones since the disparity between the two coefficients (from 1.20 to 1.00) is the greatest on the scale of the location parameters (Ministerial Circular, p. 177).

This very clear-cut division probably derives from the very application of the centrality criterion, which gives considerable weight to the distance from and accessibility to the centre. For this reason the delimitation of the two zones must be very careful and precise, in spite of the diversity of real and environmental conditions. The most serious problems arise, in fact, when town growth takes place polycentrically, or along extended axes. In this case it would be absurd to refer exclusively to the criterion of centrality in geometrical terms. As a matter of fact the separating line between the two zones usually coincides, as it should, with physical or artificial barriers of some consistence (rivers, canals, railways and so on) that restrict accessibility, channelling traffic to a limited number of transit points. In the figure showing zone division in Pisa, it can be seen that the aforementioned boundary often coincides (to the west, south and north-west) with the railway tracks, which indeed constitute a real obstacle to circulation and to the expansion of the most highly urbanized area.

As regards the boundary between the suburbs and the agricultural area, in addition to the "centrality" criterion, the outward appearance of the landscape also seems to be fundamental. In this regard the ministerial circular cited above expressly refers to the boundary tracing provided for by the law no. 865 (1971) on expropriation, which clearly delineates urbanized areas. It reads in part: "The built-up centre (which logically also includes the suburban zone) is delimited, for

each centre or inhabited nucleus, by the unbroken perimeter that encloses all the contiguous built-up areas and the lots contained therein. Outer areas and scattered settlements cannot be included inside the perimeter of the built-up centre, even if they are affected by the process of urbanization." It is obvious that the so-called "outer areas" at the perimeter of the built-up centre form part of the agricultural zone, which should thus include only the buildings defined as "urban" by the land office<sup>10</sup> and situated on land that the town-planning regulations call "agricultural green space." In spite of this apparent clearness in practical application by the various municipal administrations, some remarkable differences of interpretation have come to light with respect to the boundaries of the suburban zone, especially regarding the marginal areas of the larger cities which extend their influence over the surrounding agricultural land. Furthermore, as specialists well know, the boundary of the suburban area and the concept itself represent one of the most controversial and debated geographical problems, so that ideas and definitions do not always agree (Toschi 1947, p. 167 ; 1966, p. 431).

"Worth" and "deterioration" zones usually seem to be isolated inside the principal areas, from which they distinguish themselves by their lesser surface area and by their objective structural and environmental conditions. The corrective coefficient "worth" has normally been applied to areas of the suburban or agricultural zones that have favourable locations with respect to the characteristics of the site, low population density, a great amount of green space, a qualitatively comfortable and prestigious type of architecture, sufficient neighbourhood services and commercial activities, and lastly, the presence of means and lines of communication that permit reasonably good access to the centre.

"Deterioration" zones, on the contrary, can be found in any zone, except the agricultural one and that of "worth", and they concern buildings and residential complexes that are greatly disadvantaged from environment and economic points of view, which exhibit architectonically antiquated or otherwise inadequate structures (permanent dampness, crumbling walls, bad maintenance, etc.), lack of sanitary infrastructure (sewers, aqueducts) and of public or private canalization (electricity, gas, telephone), and finally an inadequate street system with poor accessibility and

practicability. At this point one might note that the Fair Rent Act exclusively applies to buildings used as dwellings and occupied in a permanent fashion. In practice, this means it applies to the buildings that seem to be tenants' real residences. This clause categorically excludes not only part of the particularly precarious dwellings, which are sometimes inhabited only temporarily while awaiting better accommodations, but also omits the great mass of flats used as a "second home". In view of the remarkable growth of this phenomenon in Italy, as described above, it is easy to see how this often gives rise to rather paradoxical situations, and to particularly aggravating problems in the biggest tourist centres such as Rimini, Viareggio and the towns of the Ligurian Riviera. In these towns, apparently well-furnished with housing, there are great difficulties in finding apartments to rent, since their owners prefer to leave them vacant for part of the year in order to enjoy the higher rents guaranteed by the free market during the holiday season and to avoid the laws that protect tenants.

(3) From a geographical point of view, the division into zones adopted by the Fair Rent Act seems to comport a whole series of practical consequences and of theoretical implications, especially with respect to the urban structure.

First of all we must underline that the law itself, beyond the relative zoning, inevitably has repercussions both on the mobility of the population of the town, through rent control, and on any eventual expansion of the urban organism because of its influence on the building industry and on the construction of new housing.

Among the practical consequences deriving from division into zones, particular attention has to be devoted to the probable variation of land values. Indeed, the fact that it is possible to realize a higher rent in some areas than in other ones leads to a proportional variation of the value of buildings and building lots, which influences the siting of new buildings (compatible with the restraints imposed by town-planning regulations and the availability of space). In particular the law recognizes and definitively institutionalizes the difference between land values in central and outlying areas, attributing, albeit indirectly, a higher value to the former. In the long run such differences of valuation may have direct repercussions on land use. For instance, the increasing of rents in the "historical centre", owing to the



relevant location coefficient, might constitute a further step towards the expulsion from this zone of lower social classes, which cannot afford excessively high rents.

Moreover, since the Fair Rent Act is applicable only to residential housing, once the owners are again able to dispose of flats as they wish, they will try to rent them out for purposes other than residential (offices, for example); on the open market they will thus be able to get a higher rent thanks to the competition of demand for a central location. On the other hand, the most ruined residential areas of town centres do not supply a profitable rent income, given their relatively low rental values deriving from the "deterioration" coefficient. This fact should induce owners to sell their buildings (perhaps after a period of vacancy, as usually happens) or at least to try to improve them. Because of the high land value, deriving from the central location, potential buyers are not likely to be private citizens, but rather financial companies, building societies, banks, public bodies and big firms which can bear heavy financial burdens to benefit from the advantages of the location, and which can restructure or reconstruct the buildings.

By comparison with the situation produced by rent control, the process of specialization of central areas for tertiary activities, and an enlargement of them with reabsorption and improvement of deteriorated zones, should be favoured, at least in theory.<sup>11</sup> After all, as we have already seen, it is precisely the differing development of the tertiary sector in the various urban areas that is in large part at the base of the zone division introduced by the Fair Rent Act. In this respect the zone divisions adopted in Italian towns falls into line with most of the zone divisions proposed by scholars, especially Americans and British. In particular, the vast literature on the CBD reveals some of the elements taken into consideration even by Italian legislators. According to the definition of the U.S. Bureau of the Census, which gathers the most important theories on the use of urban land, the CBD "is an area of very high land valuation, an area characterized by a high concentration of retail business, offices, theatres, hotels and service business, an area of high traffic flow" (Murphy 1960, pp. 477-478). The only significant difference between this definition of the CBD and the "historical centre" as defined in the Fair Rent Act seems to consist in such a lack of

a concentration of residential buildings in the Central Business District as to suggest a specific characterization of this area in terms of residential function (though with a lower density than in the surrounding zones). Thus, the "historical centre" specified in the town division of the Fair Rent Act includes the CBD, but it also lays stress on the so-called "central area" with a residential function (Johnson 1972, pp. 111-113). This difference probably derives from two basic facts: (1) that the process of concentration of services occurs more slowly in Italian towns, because of the historical, social and economic problems described above; (2) that the Fair Rent Act applies to centres of any rank and size, while the definition of the CBD essentially concerns big and medium-sized towns. Indeed, in Italy too there seems to be a greater specialization in specific functions of superior tertiary in the centres of the biggest urban concentrations (Rome, for example; Faccioli et al. 1980).

In practice, however, if the discussion is to be extended to the whole of Italian urban tissue, a part of what is defined in the British and American literature as the "transitional zones" (T.Z.) (not to be confused with the homonymous zone of the Fair Rent Act) could also be inserted in the historical centre". The "transitional zone" in fact include commercial and non-commercial wards situated between the centre and the surrounding residential neighbourhoods (Preston and Griffin 1966, pp. 339-350). It is subject to the expansion of the central functions and therefore appears assimilable to the areas of the historical centre and in some cases to the homonymous transitional zone or semi-central zone as well. It is evident that a comparison between the two different zonings appears to be complicated not only by the diversity of the objective situations, but also by the difference of the parameters considered. While the Italian law explicitly addresses itself to the use of land for residential purposes, American theoretical models focus attention on the variations of value and on the competition between the various uses of urban land, particularly with reference to the tertiary activities. However, since the coefficients at the base of zoning also consider the socio-economic substratum and, above all, services, centrality and accessibility, thus indirectly taking into consideration the existence of non-residential functions, one cannot refuse to acknowledge a certain analogy, at least formal,




FIG. 19.1

The Commune of Pisa : zone division according to the law no. 392 of 27 July 1978 (The Fair Rent Act).

(A) Municipal Boundaries ; (B) Zonal Boundaries ; (C) Railway

0.85—1.00—1.20—1.30 usual coefficients ; 0.90 Deterioration coefficient.

with some of the zone divisions proposed by scholars. The concentric form itself of the various zones<sup>12</sup> recalls to mind the organization of the internal tissue of towns on a circular base

proposed by Burgess (1925), which represents the prototype of all the models on the use of urban land. Indeed, this theory was the first attempt to synthesize the distribution of functions, and it has been probably taken into consideration by the Italian lawmakers.

Further extending the comparison to the model of development by sectors provided by Hoyt (1939) and to that for multiple nuclei of Harris-Ullman (1945), both of which in a certain sense seem elaborations and refinements of Burgess' model, one can but refer to the correctives introduced in the Italian law. On careful examination, the "worth" and "deterioration" coefficients make it possible to single out areas with particular residential and environmental characteristics, which are often directly related to functions differing from those of the surrounding urban tissue and to a different use and value of the land. Take, for example, the "deterioration" coefficient often assigned to industrial areas, where the various forms of pollution and the handicap of proximity to the factories restrict residential settlement of a higher level.

Even some of the major criticisms raised against the urban boundary tracing adopted in Italy are a mere copy of those directed at American models. One cannot resist referring to the criticism suggested by Davie (1961, pp. 177-179) with regard to Burgess' model according to which one cannot speak of lines but only of gradients. Indeed, the various zones, whose characteristics are by their very nature quite hard to define, blend into each other without solution of continuity. For this reason the application of the law despite its general directives, gave rise to a series of different and sometimes opposing interpretations, which can easily be explained by the variety of local situations and the wide-spread character of the urban phenomenon in Italy.

Burgess' model has also been accused of "drawing lines that don't exist around areas that don't matter" in one of the most burning criticisms directed more generally against the whole of regional geography (Kimble 1951). At least in part, this criticism can be coherently extended to Italian zoning division: one of the biggest problems that faced the legislators and the administrations involved was precisely the delimitation of the different areas. But this manifest analogy (rather obvious when it comes

to drawing lines that are bound to appear arbitrary and simplistic) does not, however, justify underestimating the practical and immediate importance of Italian zoning, beyond all theorization. One certainly cannot affirm that the zones of the Fair Rent Act are "areas that don't matter".

(4) Apart from the above-mentioned socio-economic implications, it is indeed clear that even at the theoretical level it will be impossible from now on to disregard the division introduced by the law. No urban geographical study on Italian towns will be able to avoid taking zonal boundaries and the relative areas into consideration, even if only to criticize them. Like it or not, not only does there exist a zonal division of urban tissue with all its implications, but it is even established and institutionalized by law.

If one then considers that, despite appearance, this zone division does not restrict itself to considering only the residential features of the individual areas but, indirectly, also refers to such elements as urban land value and use, service facilities, accessibility and centrality, the possibility of comparison and verification with any other type of functional division of urban tissue based on parameters other than utilization for residential purpose is evident. See for instance the studies of P. Barozzi on Genoa and M. Faccioli et al. on Rome. In both of these studies a clear analogy emerges between urban functional areas, as they can be individuated by urban geography, and the zoning of the Fair Rent Act. The partitioning adopted by the law is thus of great immediate utility since, besides giving very significant information on urban land use and valuation, it constitutes a valid tool for the analysis of the distribution, within the town, of such phenomena as the availability of services, the social stratification and economic level of the inhabitants, the quality of building structures, town-planning, and the efficiency of street facilities in direct correlation with the flow of traffic to and from the central area of the town.

On the other hand it is just as evident that this kind of zone division, since it is essentially based on residential housing, does not fully deal with the subject of functional division of urban tissue, but it does provide a first response to the problem. Indeed, it does not take into account other possible subdivision suggested by parameters other than the residential one and, indirectly, by

the development of the tertiary sector. It is therefore clear that the existence of a ready-made zone division certainly does not exclude or limit the job of the urban geography scholar, who finds *de facto* part of the work already done (at least in what concerns the fixing of area boundaries and zone mapping). On the contrary, the zoning of the Fair Rent Act is in itself an important factor of intra-urban area division, of extreme interest to geographers since it fixes some boundaries inside the town that greatly affect the development, differentiation and organization of the individual zones through variations of land value and use ; some important evolutive processes involving not only the internal structure of towns but even the social composition of the population are thus created. It therefore opens some important prospects for the analysis of such phenomena in the individual local situations, for the on-site verification of the correspondence existing between the zones established by the law and the functional areas that emerge from the examination of urban tissue, and for any suggestions and modifications which might be made with respect to the actual division.

The law itself, as we have already seen, provides for a continual revision of the zones of the Fair Rent Act in the individual towns to adapt it and keep it anchored to the evolution of reality and the urban structure. This interesting field of study will make it possible to pass from a geographic activity, at times sterile, an end in itself, of a typical academic stamp, to a concrete form of analysis and intervention on the scene by the geographer, who will be able to play in Italy as well the active role in land management which is his due.

#### FOOTNOTES

1. These demographic explosions usually accompanied periods of economic and cultural splendour and of political stability, linked with the development of secondary and commercial activity.
2. The huge administrative, commercial and street systems built by the Romans broke up and the towns, finding themselves practically isolated, were forced to organize themselves on the local level, controlling little more than those parts of the land from which they got the essential agricultural products.
3. Moreover, as early as Roman times there had been instances of

"urban renewal" in parts of some town wards. It is likewise absurd to speak of urban planning for the "created towns" of the Renaissance, whose typically regular plans responded to purely defensive and military criteria and which in fact never filled the role of real towns, despite their being valid examples of urban engineering.

4. The last post-war period was characterized by two events of great urban importance, which, however, did not produce the hoped-for results : (1) the putting into effect of the reconstruction plans of the centres destroyed by the war, which, instead of using the occasion to apply a correct and coherent policy of planned development, limited themselves to regenerating, point by point, the pre-existent urban tissue ; (2) the development of the low-cost housing sector, which (and this is limited to the 50's and 60's) contributed to reducing the Italian housing deficit with the construction of suburban nuclei which were later absorbed by the expanding towns.
5. The emotional considerations are joined by economic ones, such as the expediency of living in the centre to enjoy the use of municipal services, or in the suburbs to ensure oneself an additional source of income by means of part-time farming, and the relative ease of getting about with public and private means of transport, which further increases the flow of traffic to and from the centre.
6. The basic cost of production per square metre has been fixed at higher rates in northern Italy than in southern Italy, where there is a lower degree of development, a disadvantageous economic situation, and lower per capita income.
7. The eight types of dwellings considered by the law are very interesting : luxury dwellings (coeff. 2.00) ; "comfortable" dwellings (coeff. 1.25) ; "economical" dwellings (coeff. 1.05) ; "working-class" dwellings (coeff. 0.80) ; sub-working class" dwellings (coeff. 0.50) ; dwellings of the rural type (coeff. 0.70) ; dwellings of the cottage type (coeff. 1.40) ; non-modernized "traditional" dwellings (coeff. 0.80). They outline rather clearly all the possible structural and socio-economic levels on the basis of the land-office categories.
8. In some cases, however, a few zones may be lacking, in particular the "worth", "deterioration" and agricultural areas. This last possibility is rather frequent in highly urbanized municipalities.
9. To simplify singling out the individual areas in relation to accessibility, for example, an isochrone map was made for Genoa showing the times necessary to reach the centre.
10. Indeed only "urban" buildings are subject to the Fair Rent Act, while buildings used to manage rural estates have different regulation.
11. In practice it is probable that this reconversion will once again comp up against the relatively poor mobility of people inside urban areas mentioned previously. Indeed, the law itself contains the limits to such an action in that it obstructs the freedom of rent market.

12. See, for example, the zone division adopted by the municipality of Pisa, with the various areas arranged more or less concentrically starting with the internal nucleus of the historical centre.

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HELLMUT WOLLMANN

## POLICY ANALYSIS AND POLITICAL SCIENCE IN WEST-GERMANY

### 1. SOME DEFINITIONS, TO BEGIN WITH

In order to clarify some definitional ground on which the further arguments of this paper will step, some remarks should be made on what I am going to mean by "policy analysis" and "political science".

#### **Policy analysis**

To start with the more difficult part of it. To find out whether there is an empirical correspondent in the real world of research in West-Germany pre-supposes an agreement of what the definition or concept of "policy analysis" embraces and excludes. From the literature I consulted I gather that even the American research community whence this definitional construct started to go around the globe appears not to be in complete consensus. So the best one can do is probably grope for some kind of "contextual" or "phenomenological" definition.

There seems to be general agreement on that, in order to grasp the philosophy behind *policy analysis*, one should turn to the *policy science* message that was formulated by *Harold D. Lasswell* first in 1951 and restated in 1970 (*H.D. Lasswell 1951, 1970*) demanding that science perform a double task: on the one hand it should analyse politically relevant subject matters to the best of its conceptual and methodological powers, and on the other, it should explicitly aim at assisting and consulting

decision-makers by rounding up the best theoretical and empirical knowledge available for improving the information of decision-makers about causal relations in the past and predictable developments and alternatives in the future. In the writings, particularly those appearing in the periodical *Policy Sciences* founded in 1970 as verbal standard-bearer of this drive towards policy analysis, in addition to the dual task the interdisciplinary and highly technical orientation was spelt out; interdisciplinary in terms of arraying and integrating the skills and bodies of knowledge of as many disciplines as possible, highly technical in terms of drawing on the most advanced sophisticated decision-making techniques (cost-benefit analyses, simulation, systems analysis etc.) the computer age offers (see *Y. Dror 1970*). Of course, a great breakthrough for policy analysis came (but also its "Water loo" doomed) when PPB was introduced into non-military federal ministries in Washington since 1965. In order to ascertain where the *differentia specifica* of "policy analysis" lies one should remember that "becoming relevant" for political (and societal) purposes and interests was not restricted to the advocates of "policy analysis" at all, but, talking about the sixties, became part and parcel of an increasingly large segment of the American political science community, not only comprising the "Caucus for a New Political Science" within APSA (see *Ph. Green/S. Levison eds. 1969*, for a similar "secession" within Public Administration see *F. Marini ed. 1971*), but also "main stream scholars" increasingly alarmed about the lack of sensitivity the research agenda of social scientists had shown vis-a-vis the social unrest since the mid-sixties and the causes underlying it. Starting research on *substantive* policies, on their formulation, their implementation and on the outcomes thereof appeared to many a way out to overcome the rather formal *process* orientation (asking for instance: *who* governs instead of *with which effects*, see *T.N. Clark 1968*) and become politically and socially more "relevant" by producing informations about *contents*, that is *substantive* policies (see the still enlightening reader by *A. Ranney ed. 1968*). It is from this (*inner-disciplinary*) concern and from the growing demand from outside (government) for *ex post evaluation* research that set in since the early sixties (see *W. Williams 1971*) that (applied) public policy research received decisive prodding.

Now juxtaposed on that background, "policy analysis" and

(applied) public policy research can hardly be told apart as far as their claim and pursuit of politically and socially relevant research is concerned. The difference lies, rather, first in the clear option of the former that "consulting" research be addressed to, and done for government and, second, in the highly technical gear to which economists rather than social scientists may be up to. Yet again it should be remembered that, after economist-laden policy analysis ran into difficult waters after PPB's failure became evident, policy analysis was explicitly opened to social science concepts and social science personell to get in implementation, "micro"-analytical research tools and all that (see *R.R. Nelson 1974*, p. 385 ; *St. E. Rhoads 1978*, p. 114), this blurring again the borderline between technically highly armored policy analysis and "ordinary" applied public policy research.

For the purposes of this paper I would like to conclude from this development that a *broad definition* of policy analysis should be workable that is something of a scale at the one end of which is the technical version (with an attempt at applying highly sophisticated decision-making methods, e.g. simulation cost-benefit analysis, which one might, then, call "policy analysis" in the strict sense) and which for the most part accommodates applied public policy research as a generic term within which implementation and (ex post) evaluation research are twins.

### Political Science

As in other countries, to tell political science by contents clearly from other social science disciplines is difficult, as the borderline is thin and "tresspassing" by members of the social science community frequent. It seems easier to work with a "Pragmatic" definition resorting to the "self-definition" and "self-selection" of those "doing political science" by, for instance, using as indicators attending professional conferences and writing in professional journals. If one uses such yardsticks, it becomes evident that there is some sort of continuous focus of each discipline which in the case of political science is centering around the political system and its functioning (pressure groups, parties, parliament, policy-making, the political process and so forth), whereas sociology appears to pivot on social structure, social groups, social problems, including individual needs (see similarly *R. Mayntz 1976*, p. 328 f.).

But even if, thus, a differentiation between "political scientists" and "sociologists" were feasible, it does not seem advisable to do so in the further argumentation, as it would artificially break up a process and a development to which both "political scientists" and "sociologists" in some cases in close co-operation and "joint ventures", have contributed. So I shall take the liberty to extend the question posed to the Hofferbert panel make it encompass all empirical social science research, inserting reservations regarding any one of the subdisciplines if and where necessary.

*A developmental sketch : German applied public policy research has come of age*

In order to set the stage for explaining why and how applied public policy research took such a dramatic upsurge in the early seventies various arenas should be looked at separately.<sup>1</sup>

Starting with the university arena : In the course of the "Educational Reform" which was kicked off in the early sixties as the German version of the Sputnik shock and which aimed also at enlarging the number of university graduates that, at that time, was conspicuously low compared to other Western industrial nations, the universities, during the sixties, lived through a dramatic expansion both in university staff and student body. The social sciences were part of this development, building up a considerable research potential.<sup>2</sup>

Amidst this development "exploded" the student rebellion in 1968 that threw the universities into a "fundamentalist" debate on the social function of science, especially social science also as a potential carrier and base for possibly "radical" social change. For a period it seemed that neo-marxist theory and analysis became a dominant paradigm within social science shaping the outlook on the limits of reforms within the present (capitalist) system. It was this "fundamental criticism of the present system" ("Systemkritik") and the wish to turn the results of such critical analyses, deciphering the "bias of the system", into an enlightening, if not mass-mobilizing weapon that prompted a line of *substantive policy research* what resembles in motivation and in intention the development in the USA which, as mentioned, took place almost at the same time, also leading to substantive policy research in that country. As an example may serve the work of a

research group on local politics initiated by *Rolf Richard Grauhan* (who died much too early) tackling pieces of substantive policy research (see *R.R. Grauhan ed. 1975a*; *H. Wollmann 1982*) yet making it explicitly clear that "appliedness" cannot be seen in serving as "consulting research" (*Beratungsforschung*) for the ruling political and economic elites, but in its possible assets for emancipatory strategies (see *R.R. Grauhan 1975b*, p. 14).

Whereas substantive policy analysis as prompted by "Systemkritik" remained, in the last resort, marginal and an intra-university matter and also the seeding money offered by the Volkswagen-Foundation explicitly to social scientists to open up research on public administration (see *R. Mayntz 1976*, p. 338 f.) proved to have only limited effects, perhaps because of its novelty and the then still underdeveloped ability of university social scientists to respond to it properly, the research agenda of main stream social science started to become markedly influenced when the Social-Liberal Coalition came into power in Bonn in 1969 and, promulgating an allout drive towards *Policies of Domestic Reforms*, ("Politik der Inneren Reformen"), created an excitingly new setting for scientists, particularly social scientists, by inviting or pulling them into consulting and "applied" research activities in an unprecedented scale.

In order to "modernize" the governmental and administrative machinery institutional changes were sought at various fronts: Institutional reform of the Federal Government particularly by building up planning and information capacities (a little of the PPBS sort, see *R.A. Levine 1981*, p. 47 f.), Civil Service reform, constitutional reform, to name only the major ones (see *G.M. Hellstern*; *H. Wollmann 1981*, p. 71 ff.). Task groups and Commissions were established in goodly numbers, recruiting and attracting cohorts of social scientists. In addition, new policies and programs were formulated, financed and put into operation. For a brief span of time this reform mood and movement appeared to be, and actually was, carried by a widespread majority support in the electorate, as the clear electoral victory by Willy Brandt's SPD in 1972 showed. For a short period of time, West-Germany appeared to be even at the threshold to an *experimenting society* of the Campbellian sort, as in various controversial issues (such as integrated school system, integrated legal training) there was an all party (!) consensus on solving such

issues by conducting "social experiments" (see *G.M. Hellstern ; H. Wollmann 1982a*).

In terms of actors carrying this reformist drive, a true reformers' coalition shaped up, combining reformist politicians and administrators on the one hand and reform-minded scientists on the other, similar to the one that sprang up in the USA in the sixties when the "Great Society" Programs were conceived and implemented under the Johnson Administration. Conceptually the German social scientists who became part of this reformist thrust, partly master-minding it, were determined advocates of an "applied" social science, all the more as the reform strategies and policies of the day largely coincided with their own normative and political options. But an explicit reference to "policy science" or "policy analysis" is markedly absent in the writings of these scholars, apart from some side-remarks (see *F.W. Scharpf et al. 1976*, p. 17). It is more via "nick-naming" by critics (see *G. Schmid ; H. Treiber 1976*, p. 37 ff.)<sup>3</sup> than by self-nomination that this approach dominant in the reform activities was called a "policy science" one.

But the reformers' "honeymoon" proved to be short-lived. In 1973 the energy crisis marked the end of stable economic growth that is the precondition of financially expensive reform policies. At the same time, the resistance of the "old" administrative and social structures and "vested interests" against change became palpable. While the task groups and commissions all came out with far-ranging proposals, hardly any of them was noticeably realized.

Although the "reform period" was comparatively short and seemingly without much tangible gain, its lasting effects of the development on "applied public policy research", even with some "policy analysis" overtones, are striking. This can be interpreted particularly in terms of establishing an "informal community" of researchers and practitioners (see *R.A. Levine 1981*, p. 48) adhering to the usefulness of applied social science and taking steps for increasing the analytical capacities of such research. Indeed the task groups and working groups which were formed in various contexts, particularly the "Working group on governmental and administrative reform" (*Projektgruppe Regierungs- und Verwaltungsreform*) with their intensive cooperation between (mostly young) administrators and (mostly young) scientists have

turned to be quiet helpful for administrative and academic careers, indicated by the considerable number of former task force members who now hold teaching positions on public administration at universities.

Inducing universitarian social science research to do more applied research and to develop appropriate "infrastructure" became an explicit objective of research funding policies, particularly on the part of the federal government, in the course of the seventies. The reasoning behind these funding policies was explicitly spelt out in the Federal Government Report on Research of 1975 in which a still existing discrepancy between the dominant research fields and patterns of (Universitarian) social science and the pressing research needs of policy-makers and administrators was deplored and in which particularly poor research performance was found fault with, the reason for which was mainly seen in the prevailing professorial "one man show" kind of research and the inadequate "infrastructural" underpinning (see *BMFT 1975*, for a good account see *F.X. Kaufmann, R. Lohan 1977*).

As a concept for combining the traditional "basic" orientation of disciplinary social science with the political and societal need for "relevant" research the Government Report of 1975 explicitly coined the hybrid of *applied basic research* (see *BMFT 1975*, for a biting criticism of traditional professorial research, pointing out its idiosyncrasy, reputation-orientation and inability to in time "deliver readable prose" see *R. Bartholomai 1977* who as a senior official has had to do both with universitarian and with commercial research). Despite these reservations against its hitherto prevailing performance, the analytical potential of social science *as such* became desirable for policy-makers and administrators all the more as implementing the reform policies and programs inaugurated in the early seventies turned out to be a complicated hurdle-race facing a host of political, administrative and social barriers with the result that the final impacts and outcomes and also the amount of unintended consequences were hardly predictable; for analytically digging into the details of the implementation process and for finding out the impacts and outcomes at the very individual levels of the addressees and "victims" of such policies and programs social science with its conceptual and methodologi-



cal repertoire for "micro-analytical" research and also with its "critical" tradition seemed to be an almost "natural candidate" for carry out such research (see *F.X. Kaufmann ; R. Lohan 1977*, p. 277 ff.).

The flow of public money has various institutional outlets. *Contractual research money* at the disposal of federal ministries has expanded dramatically during the seventies. The procurement process works partly through "closed shop" mechanism, partly through a competitive research money market (less competitive than in the USA, as a versed observer remarked, see *St. Fitzsimmons 1981*, p. 120 ff.). It is true, the lion's share of the pie has gone and stills goes to commercial research firms that in the beginning had strong economist orientation, but in the course of extended empirical research have developed remarkable social science qualification, albeit in the survey and quantitative research vein rather than in a "micro-analytical" case approach. But also social scientists have appeared on the contractual pay roll in growing numbers, all the more as the research questions asked and research strategies required on the "demand side" have increasingly become of the kind that could be answered and met quite "naturally" by universitarian social science research. In responding to such financial resources university researcher have shown a growing tendency, though, to establish separate research units, be it in the "gray zone" of a quasi or para-university setting or be it, organisationally, geographically and financially completely separated from the university proper, yet remaining in the wider interaction field and reputational mechanisms of the university particularly via senior researchers who "double-barrelledly" do research both at the university and outside.

Another flux of research money originating from the federal budget (administered by the federal ministry for research and technology, *BMFT*) has the explicit objective to foster "applied social science" research (of the "applied basic research" type, as the *BMFT* expressly called it) by granting research money (only) to such groups that are ready to cooperate among several institutes and "subdisciplines" in "joint ventures" and in new "production patterns", thus promising to cause those "structural effects" in the social science research community (inter-institute cooperation, team research etc.) that should contribute to overcome the traditional deficiencies of social science (at least, as

BMFT sees them). In a major funding program BMFT has helped to establish and funded half a dozen of such "joint research ventures" ("Verbundforschung"), among these e.g. a "project family" on a *Citizen-orientated Shaping of the Social Environment* ("Burgernahe Gestaltung der sozialen Umwelt", see F.X. Kaufmann ed. 1977). Another grant program of BMFT has been funnelled through the "Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft" (the German equivalent of a National Research Foundation) and has among others enabled, in 1977, to establish a "joint research venture" ("Forschungsverbund"), on implementation research which, coordinated by Renate Mayntz, provided a financial platform and an intellectual and cooperative forum for about ten projects on substantive public policy in various policy fields with a common paradigmatic focus on implementation. This "joint venture" (for project reports and findings see R. Mayntz ed. 1981, 1982) has noticeably influenced the conceptual and methodological development of implementation research also as an *applied* public policy research.

In order to illustrate the development in the following paragraph a few policy areas shall be named, making the point that the present remarkably broad current of applied public policy research has actually been fed by different tributaries from (also conceptually partly) different sources and that such a development is highly intertwined with the biographies of the specific research projects and researchers.

*Intergovernmental relations in the West German federal system*: In the early 70's Fritz Scharpf and his research crew started conceptually and empirically to investigate the functions and disfunctions of the multi-layers and multi-actors interactions typical of a federal system with the intention of pursuing a "problem-and practice-oriented policy science", as was expressly put, using the American word (see F.W. Scharpf et al. 1976, p. 17). The enfolding research on "Politikverflechtung" ("interwovenness of policy-making") aroused widespread attention which, in fact, made the research concept "Politikverflechtung" an almost paradigmatic and "common word" in the general political discussion. (Lately Scharpf, a director at the Science Center Berlin, undertakes public policy research of the evaluation type in the field of labor market policies, see F.W. Scharpf et al. 1982.)

*Environment Protection Policies* : In 1974 the Advisory Council on Environmental Problems formulated the suspicion that there were "implementation deficits" in enforcing environmental protection law and contracted *Renate Mayntz* and her research team to look into it. In terms both of research focus and of personell research this project proved to be a major "kickoff" for implementation research to become a dominant paradigmatic concept in current social science policy research and finally to gain, through *DFG*, *BMFT* funds for establishing the aforementioned "joint research venture" (*Forschungsverbund*) on implementation research running from 1977 to 1981 (see *R. Mayntz 1981, 1982*).

*Social and Family Policies* : In 1974 the Federal Ministry of Youth, Family and Health Affairs (*BMJFG*) contracted *Franz X. Kaufmann* and a research team at Bielefeld University to start a project on the effects certain public programs have upon the socialization process in the family (see *F.X. Kaufmann, K.P. Strohmeier 1981* p. 156ff.). This project and ensuing projects established the Bielefeld group as a nucleus for empirical research in the field of social policies both of the contractual and the genuinely universitarian sort.

*Urban and Housing Policies* : After having started to tackle substantive policy research within the "system critical" approach of the early seventies in the field of urban renewal, *Hellmut Wollmann* and a Berlin research group, in 1975, started to do contractual research for the federal ministry for housing and urban development (*BMBau*) conceptually and empirically, establishing a research focus on implementation and evaluation research both of the contractual and the universitarian kind (see *H. Wollmann 1969, G.M. Hellstern ; H. Wollmann 1981, 1982a, 1982b*).

It should be mentioned that all four research groups—together with others—became members of the "joint research venture" on implementation research.

*To sum up* : The development applied public policy research has gone through in the seventies may be summarized like this :

- (1) On the part of government and administration, particularly on the federal level, the ambitious attempt of the early seventies to install a high caliber planning and analytical "intelligence" function in federal government,

particularly in the Chancellor's Office, has left few traces in terms of full-fledged analytical units in departments or agencies (quite in contrast with the US federal government where, when PBBS was given up, the analytical staff remained, doing analytical work, often of the ex post evaluation kind (see *R.A. Levine 1981*, p. 38 f.). In fact, it was only in two federal ministries that, in the heyday of reform, analytical units were installed, namely in the federal ministry for foreign aid where an "evaluation unit" was created to "inspect" foreign aid projects, and in the federal ministry for agriculture where administrative unit for "cost-benefit analyses" was installed (see *H.U. Derlien 1978*).

In most other ministries research units were created in charge of coordinating, and partly also deciding on contractual research funded by the respective ministry. But out of all that has come little in terms of concentrated, continuous analytical work by such units on their own. At best, they "digest" findings and results of contractual research reports delivered to the ministry, if even that is not largely left to the operating units.

Even though there are hardly any analytical units in their own right and at least in a rigorous meaning of "policy analysis", such "analysis" is certainly not happening, one should bear in mind that the reform period and drive brought many talented and highly motivated junior officials into federal ministries and agencies that, by now, have reached influential positions and form an "informal analytical community" (see *R.A. Levine 1981*, p. 48 f.), embracing both practitioners and researchers, thus contributing to a process of "mutual interpenetration" of administration and science that probably was inconceivable both to bureaucrats and scientists prior to the seventies. Of course, this is no substitute for "analysis" proper but establishes "bridge-heads" in administration who are interested and also able to use social science informations.

Yet, there seem to be different and counteracting trends at work. There is empirical evidence that the more an administrator is imbued with traditional legal training and the longer he has been in administration, the lesser his receptivity towards social science research and information becomes or is. As the higher

and highest ranks in ministries are still pretty much the domain of legally trained civil servants, an "administrative culture" is being fostered which tends to be, at best, indifferent to social science informations and also impinges upon the administrative "novice" to follow suit (see *B. Badura 1981*).

- (2) As far as *university social science research* is concerned, its research agenda has been greatly influenced by governmental incentives meant to move it in an 'applied' research direction. Paralleling this development, university researchers have gained and are holding access to the contractual money market.
- (a) There has been little discussion about the question whether and to which degree social science may lose its autonomy as a "truth seeking" community and sub-system vis-a-vis the practical and political demands and possible dependencies going with public funding, particularly of the contractual sort. This absence of discussion is all the more remarkable as in the late sixties and early seventies, as mentioned, social science at the universities was literally torn to pieces by heated "fundamentalist" debates on the social function of social science. Still in the mid-seventies there was a new wave of debate under the heading of "finalization" ("Finalisierung"), a neologism trying to grasp, the process of instrumentalization and functionalization of science by outside demands, pressures and bribes. The fact that, during the last years, there has been practically no or at best a minimal debate along this line may have various reasons.

First, to those social scientists who do participate in applied public policy research, particularly of the contractual sort, the "reform consensus" may still be working which makes them assume that this kind of research has its societal legitimacy in terms of contributing to "societal progress and reform", although, as politics has taken much of a reformist, if not non-anti-reformist turn giving in to neo-conservative trend also in this country, this "reform nexus" as a (self-) legitimizing underpinning and formula for contractual researchers is rapidly losing ground and

hold. *Second*, as universalist social science has had a strong influence on developing the paradigm of applied public policy research and as there has been constant "trespassing" from basic to applied research and vice versa the two research foci have not drifted apart in a manner that would make *James Coleman's* "two-worlds" model of a science for knowledge and a science for action appear to be a meaningful description of the real world of research both basic and applied in Germany. Thus applied social science, in reality, does not offer the provocatively sharp edges of an "ideatype-like pure" "science for action".—The fact that university research has holding a relatively strong grip on the paradigmatic development of applied social science may *thirdly* have to do with the specificity that there is very little circulation in terms of people moving to and fro between academia and administration. While in the US this circulation is prompted by (and has a function for) the change of top officials whenever a new Administration comes in (government-close or funded research institutes serve the function of providing comfortable shelter for such "purgees" who are—"parking" in the research institute—waiting for the next round of the "spoils system"), this political mechanism applies only to civil servants at the very top of a ministry in Germany. For the research scene this means that in the USA there is a good deal of research going on that is performed by such ex-administrators whose orientation is not, at least not primarily so, recognition and reputation in the academic arena, but who produce research with a downright, unadulteratedly practical purpose, establishing a kind of separate body of such research prose. In Germany there is not such "rivalling" source of research production. *Fourthly*, in the actual procurement and bidding procedures in contractual research it has turned out to be the rule rather than the exception that the administrative unit or agency in writing out the contract, exerts little steering, leave alone an "octroi" as far as defining the research question and outlining the research strategy is concerned. (Comparing the procurement procedures and ways of federal ministries in the USA and in Germany, it was noted that German officials tend to wield comparatively little "definitional power" for prestructuring contractual research, see. St. Fitzsimmons 1981, p. 120 ff.) So the suspicion that the contractual researcher may be "finalized" that is instrumentalized

appears to have little empirical evidence, at least in a *prima facie* way to look at it. *Fifthly* (and quite trivially) there may be mechanisms of financial and reputational attractions at work sort of "buying off" and "coopting in" critical scholarship, be it intentionally or unintentionally. Just an "atmospheric" note: Whereas in the early seventies, contractual research ranked almost among the four-letter words in academic quarters, it now conveys even recognition and prestige. Should the university as an autonomous "truth-seeking" system have been thrown out of its essential balance more than is good for it (and in the long run also for society as a whole)?

- (b) In terms of *methodologies* neither basic nor applied social science (again quite in contrast with the US) have experienced conspicuous fighting along the battle-line quantitative versus qualitative research. The reason may be that as quantitative research has never become such a dominant segment of social science research in Germany as in the US, on the one hand, and qualitative research, strongly rooted in the tradition of "Verstehenssoziologie", has never found itself in such a downright "diaspora" situation, the two "camps" have probably been too equal-positioned and equal-minded and also too intimately versed with the complexity of the real situation of research as to enter into an almost ideological debate in a dichotomizing either/or version. Instead it is almost conventional wisdom that the methods you choose depend very much on the object or subject-matter you wish to investigate, and that it is the principle of *problem adequacy* that should steer the choice and the employment of an adequate *methodological mix* (see e.g. F.X. Kaufmann, H.P. Strohmeier 1981; G.M. Hellstern, H. Wollmann 1977; J. Hucke, H. Wollmann 1980).

In regard to choosing and applying the adequate "methodological mix" the specific features of "public policies" as research objects appear to call for *process-oriented* and *micro analytical* research strategies all the more as the implementation process and the impacts and outcomes at the very individual level of addresses

and "victims" of policies have become of utmost political and social relevance. The more "process" research and "case-study" approaches appear to be most apt to meet these analytical challenges, the more important, however, it becomes to *discipline* these approaches by methodologically sophisticated strategies of *comparative research*. In scheming such strategies the permanent *research dilemma* has to be handled of *either* simplifying the research design, cutting the number of "interesting" variables to small numbers and, thus, reaching general statements that tend to be abstract to the point of becoming trite *or* using complex research designs, letting the number of "interesting" variables explode and gaining statements that tend to be, at best ad hoc explanations, if not descriptions "tailored to the case".

In the current methodological discussion within applied public policy research, thus, developing and applying such strategies of comparative research loom large. Among others *Fritz Scharpf* has advocated such comparative research (see *F.W. Scharpf* 1978, 1977 ; also *J. Hucke, H. Wollmann* 1980), particularly of the "cross-policies" and "cross policy-instruments" sort based on typologies of the kind *Theodore Lowi* conceptually developed and, partly, worked with (see *Th. Lowi* 1964, 1972). Although there has been a good deal of research and discussion along this line (for instance, in the aforementioned "joint research venture" on implementation research it was tried to make such "cross-policies" and "cross-instruments" comparisons via typologies an essential point of analytical departure and common work, see *R. Mayntz* 1981 with an "interim balance"), but there remains much ground to be covered, because, as *Fritz Scharpf* remarked, "if we go beyond behaviour regularities and ask for systematic inter-relationships between public structures and processes on the one hand and substantive public policy outcomes on the other the state of our knowledge is woefully inadequate" (*F.W. Scharpf* 1977, p. 345 f.).<sup>4</sup>

- (c) As vis-à-vis the practically not existing job opportunities for "policy analysts" of some sort in German administration can hardly be expected otherwise, *university training* has, so far, not responded to nor anticipated such a career. It is true, since the early seventies in a number of universities, particularly those explicitly

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founded with reform intentions ("reform universities"), curricula have been written up and also operated that offer courses especially to non-legal students meant to prepare them for seeking entry to administrative careers (where the legally trained graduate, traditionally, is a formidable competitor, all the more, as for legal trainees there is an established career provision as the regular entry, whereas the non-legal graduate has to seek an exception). When in the early seventies the question was discussed what should be the contents and the goal of such curricula, most options were voiced for developing "managerial skills" (see *F.W. Scharpf 1971b*). Training "analytical" skills was at least not made a separate and specialized qualification profile, apart from the "analysis generalist" that was advocated by *R.R. Grauhan, W.D. Narr 1973*, but certainly not in the sense of "policy analysis", but on the very contrary, aiming at developing abilities of a "critical analysis", laying bare the complex social causes of political and administrative problems and thus enhancing complexity instead of analytically reducing it.

Whereas administrations, thus, offer hardly any job opportunities for analytically trained graduates, there could be such openings at least in institutes and firms doing research in the public policy field. Particularly during the seventies when public policy research dramatically expanded there actually was such a job market. However, the training programs of the universities proved to be only partly capable of meeting these needs. An American researcher trying to recruit research manpower in Germany for doing research here describes his experience as follows: "To the extent that public policy research requires recent doctoral graduates who can move quickly into empirical research activities, there is a proportionately smaller pool of candidates to draw from in Germany (than in the USA), and the training time required to get up to Minimum proficiency is greater" (*St. Fitzsimmons 1981*, p. 118. f.).

- (3) Considering finally policy analysis as a potential and possible *profession*, it goes after what has been said, almost

without further saying that *professionalization* in terms of establishing professional codes and standards, perhaps through a professional organization trying to make such standards a "trademark" and an entry prerequisite for jobs and so forth, is not in sight (as it seems to be not far advanced even in the USA, see *P. Rossi 1981*). It is true that in 1979 an "Association on Program Research" was founded (see *H.U. Derlien 1981*), but not in an attempt at "professionalization" policy analysis or at least evaluation research, but rather as a forum of the "informal analytical community" for meeting once a year in a workshop format.

### 3. Some Concluding Speculations About : Applied Public Policy Research, Quo Vadis in the Eighties ?

While the reformist policies in the seventies provided vital preconditions for applied public policy research to grow and to "grow up", the stage of the eighties has changed conspicuously. Reform policies have come to an end, partly due to the shortcomings they have been breeding out, partly because of the "fiscal crisis", partly due to new ("neo-conservative") political majorities and options. What about applied public policy research vis-a-vis all that ?

- (1) No matter what the actual political majorities and dominant political creeds and options are, it is safe to predict that *information* about the functioning of policies and programs will continue to be needed, if not increasingly so, particularly in order to find out *micropositive* chances for political and administrative action and that *applied public policy* research, due to its repertoire of *micro-analytical* research strategies and experiences, will have a, probably growing, role in it. The *budgetary cuts* that are being taken at present in rather a haphazard way are likely to serve as a case in point. It is evident that taking such budgetary cuts without political concept and simply following the "way of the least (political, social and also analytical) resistance" is self-defeating already in the short run, leave alone *à la longue*. It is safe to predict that this "system rationa-

lity" will be quickly realized by the political and administrative budget-makers and cutters with the consequence that *further and more detailed research will be called in.*

- (2) It is true, the research setting and "climate" has been changing. While in the seventies there was a (reformist) consensus between administrators and researchers on that research be carried out with the (normative) understanding that "bad results" will be used to *improve the program not to kill it.* The changed political times and tides may mean that the results of applied research will be increasingly used as a "killer" of policies. Between government and at least some of the social scientists who have hitherto carried and shaped applied policy research there will probably be a widening *dissensus* instead of a consensus on what *good policies* are. Thus, the "critical" function (and tradition) of social science will probably come again stronger to the fore. A crucial test for such research may offer the increasingly important problems of *overregulation* and *overbureaucratization.* Whereas in the by now apparently majoritarian political discussion the glaring shortcomings and dysfunctional "costs" of the welfare state in terms of such phenomena are used as argument and weapon to abolish essential achievements of the modern "Social State" altogether, empirical and normatively engaged applied public policy research on the shortcomings and distortions of overregulation and overbureaucratization will contribute to make up an informed "balance sheet" of the assets and liabilities of this development and thus to "rationalize" decisions which have a tremendous political and social bearing.

#### FOOTNOTES

1. For a detailed account of the development of applied public policy research as evaluation research in West-Germany see *G.M. Hellstern/H. Wollmann 1981, 1982b*, for that of implementation research *H. Wollmann 1979*. For an instructive report on the development of the research on public administration (leading on to public policy

- research) in West-Germany see R. Mayntz 1976, for an account on the development of research on public administration as a political science endeavour (getting away from the legal orientation and preoccupation of former public administration research) see F.W. Scharpf 1971. For a recent attempt at analysing the state and development of evaluation as part of policy analysis (comprising eight European countries, USA and Canada) see R.A. Levine 1981.
2. It was calculated that in the late seventies about 1,500 academics held teaching jobs in the social science field compared to about 100 in the early sixties (see R. Wildenmann 1978, p. 6 f.).
  3. See J. Hirsch, St. Leibfried 1971 in one of the earliest critical pieces on "policy science" catching roots in Germany at that time. Parting from a neomarxist position they view "policy science" as a "sophisticated and refined discipline for political consulting" limiting itself to the "administrative central posts of the postcapitalistic ruling apparatus" (ibid., p. 261) and thus prove to do vis-a-vis the non-elites potentially uprising against such domination—some kind of "counter insurgent research" (ibid., 261).
  4. For a very interesting piece of research most recently finished see R. Mayntz et al. 1982. The research team departs from D. Ashford's hypothesis that "there is probably more similarity across policies for one country in how policies are formed and implemented than there is for the same policy across several countries" (D. Ashford 1978, p. 82). Hypothetically assuming that the "political-administrative culture" of a country is an explanatory variable in regard to the pattern of intervention chosen in the specific country, they investigate four policy programs (in terms of their specific instrumentality) in five countries. They came to the qualified conclusion that there is such a correlation between the "political-administrative culture" and specific intervention patterns.

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FRANCOISE BRUN

## FRENCH URBAN POLICIES SINCE 1945

FRANCE's urban hierarchy is acknowledged as a harmonious one ; a number of small towns (namely Mende, Digne) of 2,000 to 20,000 inhabitants, are followed by the middle size towns (Rennes, Avignon, Orléans) under 200,000 inhabitants, several big cities (Strasbourg, Lyon), and also a multimillionaire capital city whose importance must be emphasized.

Despite the fact that since 1931 the urban population stood for 50% of the total population, 1945 France remained profoundly rural. But the post-war years initiated a veritable demographic explosion, particularly in the urban area. In 1954, France was urbanized by 56%, in 1962 the toll rose to 62%, to 70% in 1968 and up to 73% in 1976. With 42 millions, the 1975 urban population was equivalent to the total population of 1954. This sudden and irreversible wave of urbanization most definitely revealed some rapid economical mutations : modernization of agriculture and rural drift, industrial expansion, stunning growth of the tertiary sector. However, the question that remains is to know whether this results from uncontrolled dynamism or from a consistent planning policy.

### EMERGENCY MEASURES

#### **The dramatical housing crisis**

All cities experienced this phenomena at the end of the war, reaching its peak in 1953. Housing provisions did not accommodate



the needs which were drastically increased as a result of the "baby boom" and the rural drift, both unexpected and striking. The need also became more exigent as no considerable development had been undertaken in France between the two wars. The crisis of 1930 provoked a collapse of the social housing structure, and thereafter a fifth of the country's patrimony in 1939 was destructed or damaged during the war. The landlords' lack of interest was accentuated by the 1948 rent freeze, so that the already timeworn real estate grew increasingly insalubrious. The enormous task of both building up and demolishing therefore became indispensable. The government assessed the need to 300,000 lodgings per year, a number which meant that between 1950 and 2000, the lapse of one or two generations, the amount of building was to be equivalent to the entire building ever undertaken since the beginning of our history.

Who could shoulder this financial effort while the obsolescence of both transportation and key-industries were an added handicap to an economy already broken down by war? The difficulty also lied in the architects' lack of preparation as they were first confronted with mass production in the construction of at least 500 lodgings at a time. The unsophisticated structure of the building trade was little adapted to the undertaking of large construction. But above all the problem was the cost of land: while increasing considerably as one passed from outskirts to centre, it averaged 25% of the cost of lodgings and often as much as 50%; it will rise to 70% in 1990.

### **Stimulation of construction business through the "aid to the building" (*aide a la pierre*)**

Even though the financial priority was placed upon both the economic boost and the war of Indochina, and despite the slow progress of general awareness, the state was obliged to take things into control since it should normally support the "Reconstruction", and particularly since the large financial organisms gave preference to more profitable sectors of industry. A procedure concerning *public financing* of housing was therefore conducted, to be directed at several markets.

First was social housing, with the creation of HLM (Council House) which quickly became an important real estate organism covering all of the various dealings including the conception and

the management of apartment rental in most cases. This organism was privileged on the financial plan : on the condition of respecting State's norms, they were granted a profitable major loan which covered 90%, then 85% of the maximum cost price ; moreover, complementary financing came from the savings banks' interesting loans, from the land banks' premiums and loans, from the employers' 1% (1953) concerning the salary's percentage which is automatically allotted to construction. This same intention to help finance the construction of more comfortable lodgings was revealed in the rent allowance system. Representing the difference between normal charge (fair cost of lodgings) and the means of the household, it allowed modest families to gain access to correct lodgings. The market economy therefore converted itself into a service economy. Despite the fact that construction of HLM projects slackened, the aid to the person remained feeble compared to the "aid to the building", since the maximum price did not follow the evolving cost of construction.

The fact is that from 1950 onwards, the State undertook the development of an other sector : private but aided. It was financed massively through the intermediary of land banks. There was a double aim. Firstly to stimulate the trend towards home-ownership in the upper and middle class categories since low interest premiums and loans had reduced considerably the personal contribution (which could even have been supplied with complementary loans. Secondly, through this secure and interesting investment, to favour the creation and development of a private real estate business who's absence slackened the vital development of the construction trade. The creation of Societies of Mixed Economy (1963) was going to open new spheres of activity to the property developers, reinforcing their power and making them one of the essential participants in the field of urbanization.

The State's initiative had previously been determining. In assuming the major financial effort, it launched and supported the large wave of construction which took place in the fifties and sixties.

### **The large housing schemes and the "ZUP"**

While the State financed, both private and social promoters took the decisions, and they drastically changed the appearance

of the cities. The building industry was transformed in such that allowed to choose, according to the law of profit, a style of construction closest to the legal minimum. The centralisation of the building industry and the use of new industrial techniques such as standardisation and prefabrication of material, now permitted to reduce the costs and to accelerate the production.

The cities were suburbanized brutally and unsystematically, at first in the form of individual houses or small and medium size housing developments, and from the sixties onwards with large housing schemes and apartment buildings. There were no more blocks, streets or squares. Those were replaced with totally open areas where buildings were towers and complexes 15 to 18 floors high and three to four hundred meters long, stretched shapes being accounted for by the money-saving process of the longest and straightest craneways. Europe's longest complex is recorded in Nancy. In the outskirts, that is 7 to 8 kilometers away from the center in the province and 10 to 30 in Paris, accumulations of concrete of banalized architecture sprouted up, standing on inexpensive land next to cereal or vegetable plots. In fact the investment Act of 1951 anticipated clusters of more than a thousand accommodations. Officially large housing schemes implied eight to ten thousand accommodations yet built at the same time.

To this spontaneous urbanization, materialization of the new post-war capitalism, the State countered with the ZUP (Urbanized Area in Priority). The aim was to favour large deals of at least 500 lodgings, while avoiding land speculation and centralizing both substructures and equipments. The resulting contrast is that of Sarcelles in North Paris (425 acres, 8,377 persons in 1954 and 51,807 in 1968), a prototype of the dormitory-town, so under-equipped and inhuman as to give its name "sarcellite" to psychosomatic troubles affecting its inhabitants ; as opposed, for example, to Villeneuve de Grenoble (13, 000 lodgings) or Toulouse-le-Mirail (23,000) which are model-ZUP where equipment is concerned. However, those are nothing like the luxury schemes located out of the ZUP, such as Parly II in the Parisian suburbs (5,163 accommodations, 21, 000 persons) with its roomy apartments, large shopping center and entertainment grounds.

Representing the first large measure of urban development since the war ended, the ZUP marked an important step.

Moreover, it was the beginning of the zoning policy on which all urban planning was to be based. A main line was set. Today's measures prescribing the ZUP appear not to have been a long term policy but basically as brought about by circumstances of economic growth. Zoning of the ZUP, as that of large housing schemes, merely corresponded to a carving up of the land into price-brackets which determined building—and hence segregation—according to inhabitants' solvency.

Building was therefore done quickly and in great number : 1.6 lodging per day in Strasbourg in 1952, that is an average of 60,000 per year, up to 500,000 in 1972 ; the production increased sixfold from 1952 to 1959. Nowadays there are 200 large housing developments over 1,000 accommodations (95 of them in the Paris area) and 200 ZUP (50 of them over 5,000 lodgings). In 1975, the ZUP comprised 43,000 acres and 570,000 lodgings, that is nearly three million people. Could the housing problem be considered as solved with the end of shortage in the early seventies ?

#### **A disappointing balance**

The authorities were satisfied with scheduling a number of so-called protected areas (Malraux Act) in districts of historic interest, and as they ignored down town areas the latter's maladjustment to modern life became apparent. From the past were inherited uncomfortable and often decrepit houses ; monuments and private mansions that were difficult to maintain, narrow and winding streets. Thus automobile speed was often reduced to that of horsecars. Centre areas being unable to meet the sudden increase in tertiary sector's demand, the latter could either drive away small tradespeople and the poorer population, or desert the center on behalf of the suburbs. Downtown areas therefore tended to lose both their population and major functions, such as small trade (with the creation of large outlying shopping centres), cultural and entertainment activities, and universities.

Spatial discrimination became more acute, revealing the real estate pressure : blocks and areas housing aged or often immigrant populations turned into slums, or on the contrary a number of other districts attained middle-class respectability after being renovated, whereas young people of low standard of living were stocked in suburbs and in the HLM. Paris'

popular districts were pushed back from outlying wards to distant suburbs. The system of social housing allocation altered the traditions of urban life, breaking the bonds of solidarity. Change in social scale anonymity, solitude. Worse, it induced the concentration of large immigrant families in buildings provided with large accommodations; those buildings were shunned by french people. Beyond this, in Paris and other large cities, the "untouchables", generally immigrants, were packed together in swarming shanty-towns. Social oppositions stiffened to the centre/suburbs discrimination, suburbs/suburbs and even block/block discrimination in the HLM were added.

If the standard of elementary comfort was good in the new suburbs (bathrooms, central heating), the rents were high, the buildings lacked sound-proofing and rapidly fell into disrepair (one or two millions should be rebuilt). The most pressing thing alone had been attended: namely to supply shelters. And this at the lowest cost: green spaces, private/public equipments and jobs were all lacking. Thus daily mass travelling for which the most expensive alternative of individual cars was used, due to lack of public transportation and to general inclination.

A tied up economy resulting of downtown area decline and a social/spatial discrimination were the price to be paid for a mostly anarchic growth. But the slowness of general awareness was such that the notion of development only appeared with the IV and V Plans (1962 and 1966).

#### PLANNING EFFORTS

To the nineteen sixties' demographic and economic euphoria corresponded ambitious and innovating projects. In total opposition to former conceptions which, answering for an idealized vision of the past, tends to promote an egalitarian development in the entire territory, the government suddenly gave preference to a number of strong points. In 1965, in order to make up for Paris' giantism, the State brought in the *levelling metropolis*, a project based on the spontaneous development of eight large urban centers (Lyon, Marseille, Toulouse, Bordeaux, Nantes, Saint-Nazaire, Lille-Roubaix-Tourcoing, Nancy, Strasbourg) whose population and functions were asserting themselves, although they were not freed from the capital city's tutelage.

But in order to become restructurating poles with a region-wide leading effect, and to put into concrete form Perroux's propositions, they needed a strong push. Consequently, and in hopes of drawing Parisian firms and creations as had been done in the case of housing, the State took the initiative by investing massively in superior level equipment (administration, research, health, universities, culture). Those were gathered in "directing centres", that is large planned renovating undertakings close to the former centres. A prototype would be Lyon's "la Part-Dieu".

Simultaneously, the government decided the creation of ten *New Towns*. Classical in the sense that they had to be complete with housing, jobs and entertainment, they were a novelty as to their size (three to five hundred thousand inhabitants, the number outdid USSR) and as to their location which answered for a complex finality. Situated not apart but in the suburbs (in the large sense), they were to be part of a general urban restructuration (completed in Paris with the setting up of restructurating poles in the former suburbs),<sup>1</sup> as was the centre-renovating project (tertiarization and renovation of lodgings). Thus were set up in the larger Paris' suburbs, the following: Clergy, Pontoise, Marne-la-Vallée, Melun-Sénart, Evry, Saint-Quentin-en-Yvelines. In the province: Etang de Berre (Marseille), Isle d'Abeau (Lyon), Lille-Est, Le Vandreuil (Rouen).

During the nineteen seventies, the policy changed suddenly. Of course, the demographic and economic slackening was taken into account, and projects were revised which now seemed beyond measure. Wasn't this, in fact, the implicit recognition of a failure? In the "directing centres", apartment buildings, offices and stores were materialized or being built, but they did not rent or sell well. Though the State had set the example with important administrative decentralization, decentralized private firms maintained a registered office in Paris, and creations came slowly. Remaining dependent of Paris, the levelling metropolis had failed their aim. The New Towns were stalling where demography and jobs were concerned.

As a result of this, the last links of the urban network were uncovered, namely small and middle size towns (respectively 1973 and 1975), with which a contract policy<sup>2</sup> was attempted, as if following both the "thinking France's" aspirations and the subur-

ban dwellers' exasperation in large cities. Each town at its own level had to assume a leading position (once more). Small towns, moreover, were to avoid rural depopulation. The descent was completed. The "Charter on standard of living", summarizing the options of the VIII Plan (1980), was one of the former majority's last decisions: the vagueness of intentions was hardly covered by a humanistic polish, which may also have been an attempt to conceal the State's actual drawing back where development and housing were concerned. Locally, the contract policy which was not prescribed but offered was both educating and innovating, since it initiated (or it could have) a general reflection on the matter of town-planning problems. However it also represented a recession as it led to a juxtaposition of contracts instead of revealing a comprehensive development policy. As it was easier to take refuge in the notion of quality, no figure or functional definition was issued as to small and middle-size towns, though they were expected to induce the regional development. Thus it was not surprising if 75 of the middle-size towns' contracts adopted an aesthetic position tending towards the embellishment of the historical centre, which then became a commercial, cultural and playing show-case. But which social categories was this going to benefit? Contracts rarely approached the matter of restoration of old lodgings. Only exceptionally did they consider economic development. The former septennial government's last find, namely promotion of the "environment's" (*cadre de vie*) quality easily won general accord as it substituted, for a definition, a mixture of fashionable and stirring ideas that went from yearning for individual houses to the movement for the protection of environment. However, it hid the real problems (unemployment, inflation) and deviated the social claims. Yet the government had officially admitted the fact that urbanization worsened the social inequalities. While the disparities concerning clothing, cars and entertainment were subsiding, the right to "city advantages" was not given to all, and the "right to lodging" was not the same for all (Olivier Guichard).

The housing policy had grown unduly rigid and complex, and required to be reconsidered, which was called for by both the HLM Office and the government. The latter alone imposed its views. The Barre Act (1977) committed to irrelevance the entire previous policy which favoured social housing, while creating the

delusion of opening access to property for the greatest number through an aid to the person. On pretext of carrying out the "policy of austerity" extolled by the Prime Minister, and at a time when the general standard of living was declining through inflation and unemployment, the State stepped back financially. Housing was no longer considered a priority. Social housing would cease to be privileged and to be part of administrative economy. From then onwards all constructors (including HLM) became competitors and all could benefit (once a convention agreed) by the State's financial backing, namely an increase in the public funds transfer on to the private sector, or an increase on rents and on personal financing for accession to property, the latter being important functions in household budgets since they were hardly compensated for by the "personalized aid for housing".

Serious worsening of the economical context incited the government to invest in other more profitable lines of business. In fact, this act was the result, the systematic enforcement of economic liberalism which had been more and more pronounced with the last two septennial governments. Since 1966 (the V Republic dated from 1958) the government had strongly reduced the aid to HLM, a measure which brought about an increase in rents. Besides, the government had favoured the development of a non-aided private sector, by helping banks in liberating savings intended for construction and by creating an exclusive non-public mortgage market. Private banks therefore reinforced their intervention in the cities both on promotion and construction businesses.

With the exception of regionalisation, the new left-wing government's (Mai 1981) options on development are not revealed with sufficient precision. As to housing, the government relies on the fact that "construction" creates employment and they are also aware of the importance of the urban stake. The emergency measures are therefore aiming at an increase in tenants' rights, and also at giving construction a fresh start (clearly stated as a priority), through a budget raise of which 50% are assigned to preferably rental aided housing, and through easier credit facilities meant to favour private construction. But the HLM Office assesses to two years the period of time they will need to regain the building tempo that is apt to meet demand.



**Conditions of enforcement of urban policy**

New planning parapublic administrations and organizations have been set up, with methods more supple and often more efficient means of action than those of traditional wheels under or beside which they are placed.

*Research and programming organizations*

*At national level:* General Commissionship for Planning (Commissariat General au Plan) and more particularly DATAR (Delegation for Territory Development and Regional Action—1963) since the aim is the urban planning they submit in Parliament.<sup>3</sup> Options yet examined are owed to them. They use existing administration except for what concerns the creation of New Towns, for which new and direct channels are used. DATAR delegates responsibility to ten OREAM (Organization for Study and Development of Metropolitan Areas—1966) who are in charge of drawing up a report on local situations, also of assessing needs for the next thirty years and of working out town-planning designs (directive schemes). To these ten is added the Parisian one.

*At local level:* Local town-planning agencies in large and middle size communes, and IAURP (Institute for Town-planning and Development in the Paris Region 1960).

*Town-planning texts*

They are fundamental as they lay down constraining rules. The *SDAU* (Directive Scheme for Town-planning and Development) worked out at regional level, defines major orientations and long term planning. The *POS* (Plan for Land Occupancy) at the level of Communes, appoints short term use for each lot. It is based upon zoning. The *POS* draws up at the same time a snapshot image of the reality of yet built up areas and an imperative prospective text for those areas that are to be protected or urbanized. Then the *COS* (Land Occupancy Coefficient) settles the maximum building density (according to their intended use: offices, shops, types of residence). Zoning and *COS* distribute building rights and they introduce disparities among owners.

*Operational implements*

Fit to use in all interventions: reorganization of the older

structure, enlargements, New Towns.

*Legal measures add to the communities' hold*, to the prejudice of property rights. They represent at least potential corrections to law of the market which as yet has been in control of urbanization. As to land, (in order to control land occupancy and to restrain the rise), the community can set into motion, to its own profit, the "expropriation for reasons of public welfare" and the "pre-emption rights". Moreover, in order to recover the increase in value deriving from urbanization, extra-long term rentals can be made ("Grant of land usage"). As to COS and to "Maximum Permissible Density" regulating construction, they dissociate property rights and building rights.

*New structures permit realizations.* The Public Institution for Development (EPA : Establishment Public d'Aménagement) interferes at all levels : surveying, financing, realization, but only in what concerns New-Towns and punctual deals ; the Regional Public Institution (EPR : Etablissement Public Régional) which was created in 1972 at the same time as the notion of Region is in command at this level. Its action should become determining if the new government enforces the decentralization policy. Lastly, as to renovation, rehabilitation, enlargement, Societies of Mixed Economy, which was created as needs demanded, is the quickest and most widespread development implement (Holding the means of expropriation and pre-emption). It is responsible for all levels, from survey to materialization.

*Operational areas are demarcated by local communities.* The ZAC (1969), Area of Preconcerted Development (a significant name) is the improved successor of the ZUP, with its simplified procedures, its superior efficiency due to takers' obligation to realize the equipments agreed upon ; also with its more elaborate town-planning due to obligatory recourse to more than one promoter.

The PAF (Programme of Action on the Land) is part of the contract policy and shows a progress : the State having accepted it is involved financially and in priority, while the community is bound to carry it into effect within provided time.

On longer terms, the community is able to form land reserves with the ZAD (Area of Deferred Development) for which the sale of plots is submitted to the agreement of administration who can bring into play its pre-emption rights. With the

ZIF (Area of Intervention on Land) in built up areas, these pre-emption rights are unlimited and they are used to create green-spaces, equipment, social housing, renovation, reserves.

In fact, with the exception of Public Institutions for Development concerning New Towns, *planning implements and organizations have had as yet limited implications*. They came later than the great construction wave which releted around 1975. The main enlargements were accomplished in an unplanned fashion outside ZUP or ZAC, at the whim of promoters who imposed their own views. In the center : brutal renovations, densification or rehabilitation (with subsequent social/occupational alterations). In the outskirts, according to the benefit of the moment, constructions were done in large schemes or in small and middle size housing developments made up of apartment buildings or individual houses. The fact is that the present period being a difficult one, promoters give preference to these housing estates as they entail a lesser liberation of capital. Moreover, land reserves were only timorously started in 1970, that is a century later than in Sweden or the Netherlands. While legal means exist to influence prices, they are not systematically used, anymore than is felt a genuine will of global control on lands.

#### INFLUENCE OF INTERVENING PARTIES : WHO AND FOR WHOM ?

##### **The chief actors**

###### *The State*

Planning is part of liberal economy's framework, but to a highly centralized State's powerfull machinery is added the heavy argument of its decisions and financial incitements.

The State's wilfull town-planning is exercised on two complementary levels :

*At national level. The State settles global development.* It practically holds the monopoly on thinking and action. Even though, since the early seventies, plan designing has been a regional matter, decisions are taken in Paris and prescribed for the entire country. It is thus, as we have seen, that the State exerts its influence on urban hierarchy (main options) ; in this authoritative manner it modernizes cities by distributing the equipments, either through varied creations going from industrial areas to

hospitals via universities and culture, or, and systematically since 1975, through decentralizing main departments and nationalized administrations in the direction of metropolis, large cities and towns.<sup>4</sup> A land policy is led in this manner: the States proceeds to purchase land in order to form the reserves intended for large equipments, and afterwards they are retroceded or rented, generally to local communities. As to New Towns, they represent the true model of centralized and authoritative planning. They were designed and materialized without taking into account local communities in whose territory they were inserted. And this was done through new and specific channels: Commissions for Survey and Development for prospective work, and next each EPA (Public Institution for Development) acting as foreman; lastly Central Unit for New Towns (1970) (Groupe Central des Villes Nouvelles) as one passes from the Paris Region to the province New Towns. Not only do they short-circuit traditional administration, but they also answer directly to the Prime Minister. This crisis alone, which, as we have seen, reoriented expenses at priority sectors such as industries, was able to instigate the State's disengagement: the budget provided during the VII Plan (1976-80) as compared to the former one, was 40% less. Simultaneously, a transfer of authority was effected, to benefit local communities as they appeared unable to proceed with investment without an alteration in local fiscal policy.

The State also takes a decisive part in the *field of housing*. We have seen that it enforced its policy, whether it concerned its financial involvement initiating a construction boost (particularly social construction), its disengagement for the benefit of large financial groups who's creation was aided as was later their hold on economy, or the development of a high-rent policy with a view to liberating savings. As to the left-wing government, it is undertaking a policy based on interventionism with a social finality.

*At local level.* Prevailing decisions are taken by prefects and department administrations who are themselves dependant on various ministries, namely the Ministry of Equipment. These department or cabinet higher civil servants are often coming from the higher Academies (Grandes Ecoles) (moreover their fellow-students hold the key-posts in the private sector), and they represent a considerable pressure group which may well be specifically

french.

They transmit and enforce doctrines, directives and norms. (e.g. schedules for equipment).<sup>5</sup> In practice they direct the POS, since the compulsory consultation of concerned ministerial representatives with local elect during the plan elaboration, is a mere sham. The true deciders are the technical departments' civil servants in the Department Directorate of Equipment, as they produce an already finely elaborated plan and they have it granted on the grounds of both technical competence and the more or less explicit assertion of representing general interest as opposed to local pressures and rivalries. In the same manner, the prefectural departments also control building licenses which are a preliminary to all undertaking, however small. The State even succeeds in integrating the elect to the system as it is reduced to play a beggar's part : finally the modernization of towns is being decided "from on high" through investments. Thus the State interferes as much through the often esoteric technicality of its representatives, as through the fact that it decides financially with generally punctual and non-all-inclusive loans and grants, this situation restricting even more local powers. The new economic force is the only real power capable of standing comparison with the State.

#### *Financial groups and construction firms*

They took the place of the landlord middle-class. While the latter proceeded in an unplanned fashion, the new real estate power takes massive action and rules the entire market, as well in land and urban development as in construction itself ; as well in the field of building as in urban extension. They are a polyvalent pressure group, omnipresent and terribly efficient. It may be remembered that the constituting and consolidation of financial groups affecting real estate was meant by the former government (in order to relieve the State). But it is by help of the crisis that was wrought a restructuration of the building industry, that is an accelerated concentration. Small-scale businesses tending to be reduced to the part of sub-contractors, or relegated to small undertakings, that is particularly rehabilitation deals which are much less profitable as they mainly concern man power industry.

Thus the urban market is dominated by a few large financial firms as for example Paribas (and its specialized branch the

SACI) and, through the intermediary of two sub-companies (SCET and SCIC), the Deposit and Consignment Office. They work on all possible formulas, as direct promoters, as participants in Civil Real Estate Societies or in Societies of Mixed Economy. They play a part at two different levels : as the State's permanent interlocutors, and locally as well. We have seen what their part was in the uncontrolled urbanization. Today, they have succeeded in adapting their strategy, and they model themselves (apparently) to the POS in order to work it out : aren't the NA areas to be urbanized reserved for them ? In fact they obtain numerous derogations, as well concerning density in built up areas as regarding areas to be urbanized. Thus their pressure succeeds in bringing about a reconsiderations of the POS, needless to mention in who's favour.<sup>6</sup>

Simultaneously, the new financial arrangements regarding rehabilitation open for them this new field as it has become clearly more profitable than it use to be.

The Nationalization of the financial groups involved in urban real estate (e.g. Paribas) in October of 1981 may alter this much dominating situation.

### **The poorer relatives**

#### *Municipalities*

Legally they can play more of a prominent part than they used to : the POS offers a *choice* between waiting, supporting or prospective policies ; the State's financial disengagement regarding construction (1977) allows alternatives such as housing/equipment, rental/purchase, individual/collective housing, aid to construction industry/improvement of real estate park.

*Reality* is different. Municipalities are bound hand and foot both administratively and financially. They cannot behave as the head of a business concern would, and must take into account administrative pressures and slows ways as well as the electorate, the latter clearly meaning they have to restrict local taxes. The precariousness of their own means (in spite of the 70/80 decade reforms which we cannot examine here) prevents all freedom of action. It slackens or prohibits the creation or development of local technical departments that would be liable to counter administrative directives by bringing out locally elaborated

projects (for the POS for example). Particularly land interventions, which are the key to all planning, are restricted although they are provided for in the ZAD and ZIF. Thus projects are intended for control of the land problem. The "Left Common Platform" consist in both generalizing pre-emption rights to all transactions inside town-planning areas and in freezing prices through fixing a reference price. The CFDT (French Workers Confederation) and PSU (Unified Socialist Party) further this by demanding a "Municipalization of grounds": a public organization would hold the monopoly of all acquisitions. It would therefore retrocede not land but building rights. A question (among many others) which rouses technical, and also psychological difficulties, that the left-wing government must attempt to solve in the same time as that of local finance.<sup>7</sup>

However local elect retains unofficial, but implicitly recognized and supremely efficient means of action. Plurality of electoral mandates and belonging to government majority are all-important in the business of gathering State investments and attracting large national and private firms. Rennes and Bordeaux's spectacular transformations show this to be unquestionably true.

#### *Private individuals*

Of course they step in as consumers. But can they get beyond this part? Up until now the preconcentration, although wanted by a minority of users, the elect and the State, remains a delusion as decisions proceed from both the financial pressure group and the State. Additional evidence: the Prefect makes the POS public through a decree, and this before public survey. And although starting operational associations (Urban Land Associations) in order to bear the cost of town-planning undertakings is encouraged, users associations are mainly consulted on matters of protection of Nature and environment. If we attempt to think further: is a true democratization of town-planning decisions really possible? We own no urban "counter-power" such as Italy or Germany have: interest only grows with social promotion; as often as not a feeling of helplessness in the face of Administration (with a capital letter) coexists with the need of security ("They know better").<sup>8</sup>

Answers to a galloping urbanization generally came later


than the fact itself. Answering a new and delicate problem, they have been fluctuating and incomplete. Hesitancy? Realism in facing an economic situation that had become difficult? Or does it sooner reveal the choice of a society? Nowadays the great construction wave has passed, but urban discomfort is increasing. The new structures that were set up before May of 1981 can help pass from an extension based on "varying geometry" ("à géométrie variable"), that is spreading at the whim of various pressures, to a genuine townplanning. Some realizations prove, for example, that it is possible to build quality social lodgings and in the new left-wing government the huge and arduous task of conceiving and winning over general agreement for financial and administrative deconcentration (or decentralization?), land act, housing chart, and effective participation of inhabitants.

#### FOOTNOTES

1. Other strong points: touristic development of mediterranean and atlantic littorals, and development of large harbour industry platforms, which are not the subject of this work.
2. Binding directly and financially, for a limited period of time, the commune who wishes to be, with the State.
3. Three acts (1958-1967-1975) show for stages of the urban policy.
4. The western part of the country, which suffered underdevelopment of the tertiary sector, was the big winner. Deconcentration resulted in the setting up of specialized poles: Rennes for example with the telecommunication, Toulouse with Scientific Research.
5. They indicate levels of population at which the implanting of collective engineerings becomes suitable.
6. Town-planning vocabulary owns no less than 25,000 expressions and abbreviations.
7. To be observed: the arrival of American parties specialized in the production of a type of "key-in-hand" (clef en main) houses, which are generally clustered in housing developments as that of their french colleagues. These firms cover all dealings from sitehunting to construction.
8. The associations for the defense of leaseholders alone are asserting themselves, and their number and efficiency grow as following the brutal increase on rents and complementary charges (subsequent to heating costs skyrocketing).

*Sources*: INSEE Statistics—Official reports of French Documentation, Rapports officiels Documentation française).





## THE POLICY OF NEW TOWNS IN ISRAEL

ONE of the most important phenomena in the urbanization process of Israel has been the establishment of a large number of new towns within a short time period. Although this basic step of new town development is well known throughout the world, and many countries such as Great Britain, Poland, Holland, Finland, United States and Canada established towns after World War II, in Israel this occurrence is much more apparent, because within a period of 15 years 36 towns were constructed, in which a few thousand people inhabited.

The aim of this paper is to analyze the way in which these towns have been established, the national policy behind it, and the rate of their success.

### **New towns as a basis for immigrant absorption**

If the British Mandate period (1919-1947) can be characterized as one where most of the urbanization that took place was in the form of preservation and local addition to certain towns, than Israel's is typified by the creation of many new towns, established with a national and comprehensive approach, as a solution for settlement problems and in order to distribute the population—two challenges confronting the State.

It is difficult to say whether the government had made the decision to establish new towns at the time of the establishment of the State (1948). The decision to build new towns was forced upon the settlement bodies to the pressure of immigration and

absorption needs. Not all the immigrants arriving between 1948 and 1953 could be absorbed into the agricultural sector due to land and water limitations. It was felt that other solutions should be found and that something should be done in the urban sector. The establishment of new towns for the purpose of immigrant absorption and the distribution of the population appeared to be a reasonable solution for the problems. Once this route for immigration absorption was chosen, the settlement bodies did not forego their traditional agricultural ideology of the past, and so in the planning of the urban settlements, there was an intermingling of ideas resulting in new towns of low density with one-storey houses and yards for agricultural purposes. This penetration of agricultural concepts in the planning of the new towns greatly influenced their shape from the beginning. The new towns did not immediately become urban ideological goals. For at least 10 to 15 years this semi-urban approach continued, and no social or urban ideology developed regarding urbanization.

#### **New Town-Planning approaches**

It was first realized that Israel was in want of comprehensive physical planning following the needs of rapid immigration absorption. During the Mandate period no comprehensive scheme of town planning was developed. Planning, as it existed, was concentrated in the established towns only, in the detailed outline of neighborhoods, or in certain sections of towns, and usually for security purposes for the British army and government, rather than for constructive developmental reasons. With the establishment of the State, the settlement bodies had no national plan, nor principle concepts in the field of urbanization. During the British Mandate experience was accumulated mainly in the erecting of agricultural settlements, but no one had been involved in the development of towns.

The planners of the 1950's did not develop original concepts of their own, because of their lack of experience. Rather, they attempted to apply planning models that were widely accepted in other countries. One well-liked model of urban spatial distribution was the hierarchy pattern, based on the establishment of agricultural settlements which had a direct relationship with small or medium-sized urban centers, and those—were in contact with larger centres, townlets or towns, and those—had connec-

tions to a primate town, which was at the top of the settlement pyramid. This model of settlement distribution can be found especially in countries with a long history of settlement development, such as Holland, France, Belgium or Southern Germany.

The fundamental approach to the new towns was not very revolutionary, rather it was very conservative and was taken from European systems. The revolutionary side was the unexpected growth of the new towns, in contrast to the past populating and settlement systems in Israel. During the Mandate period in Palestine, urban development was nodal and typified by the growth of the three large towns: Tel Aviv, Jerusalem and Haifa.

Due to 50 years of extensive pioneering, there were many agricultural settlements, such as Kibbutzim (communal settlements) and Moshavim (smallholders' settlements). No recognizable development was found in the middle stage of the hierarchy model, so that the establishment of medium-sized towns in Israel became the intermediary between the large towns and the small agricultural settlements.

The first purpose of the physical planning was to complete the missing links in the former settlement layout, via the establishment of medium-sized development towns, which would be used as service centers by their agricultural surroundings. The settlement bodies had three options: to develop existing agricultural settlements into urban centers, to enlarge the established small towns, or to create new medium-sized towns. The first possibility was dismissed because of ideological and practical reasons which did enable the conversion of agricultural settlements into urban ones. The second option was only partially executed, because there were not enough small towns to be enlarged. Thus, what remained, was the third possibility of establishing new medium-sized towns.

The new settlement hierarchy was built in five levels, beginning with the village at the lowest level, until the large town at the top in order to change the nodality which had enrooted itself during the urban system of the Mandate period. The hierarchy presented the following types of settlement:

Type A—Villages with 500 inhabitants.

Type B—Village centers with 2,000 inhabitants each.

Type C—Semi-urban centers with 6,000—12,000 inhabitants each.

Type D—Medium-sized towns with 40,000—60,000 inhabitants each.

Type E—Large towns with 100,000 inhabitants or more.

The village center (Type B) was to supply services to 3—5 villages around it, shops, stores, garages, etc. The semi-urban center was to provide services to 30 villages with a radius of 10 kilometers, and the services located there would be of a higher rank, industries, factories based on local products, along with high schools and institutions. The medium-sized towns were to have a concentration of governmental institutions, banks, hospitals and factories. It was envisaged, that these towns would attract industries which could not find enough land in the larger towns, and that needed cheaper manpower. The large town was to be given the status of a regional capital and was to maintain connections with the other large towns in the country.

As mentioned, interconnection links in this system were settlement types B, C and D, so the planners made great efforts to establish them because of their potential to absorb new immigrants. The smaller center types of B and C gained more from ideologism, because they were not significant from an urban perspective and fitted more into the agricultural background.

Within a few years, these small centers became the weak and problematic links in the entire national urban network. The concept was to create a new urban center, but under the condition that it would not be disconnected from agriculture. The population of such a center had to be small in size and located in agricultural surroundings, living in houses with plots of land, which were to provide an auxiliary source of income. The land in these yards was designated for vegetables and daily agricultural products and supplemented the inhabitants incomes, when no outside work in agriculture could be found. These centers were later criticized as being too small to develop an urban lifestyle in them.

Perhaps the local reason behind the construction of small centers was, that the planners had to change gradually their settlement ideology, and to transfer it to the type of town planning forced upon them by the existing realities. The small urban center, comparatively speaking, was inferior to the developed

village or to the kibbutz.

### **The Execution of the Planning of New Towns**

The new towns and the different small semi-urban centers had to be integrated into veteran regions with established social and economical bases. The regions, where the new towns and centers were located, had been settled for many years by the kibbutzim and moshavim. These new towns could only supply low-level services to the veteran settlements, which from the beginning were not sympathetic towards, nor attracted to these centers.

Initially, the kibbutzim refused to employ town inhabitants because of their rejection of the principle of hired labour. The absence of an interrelationship between the immigrant towns and the veteran settlements prevented additional attempts to establish new towns on one hand, while also discouraging the improvement of services in the already existing towns, so that most of them developed slowly without impetus, and with the great concern of solving the daily problems of their own inhabitants.

The method of establishing small and medium-sized development towns changed in the mid-1950s, with the alterations of trends in the agricultural policy. During that time the settlement bodies expanded their use of mechanized farming in many of the regions throughout the country, which were settled by immigrants. This form of extensive agriculture was based on industrial crops such as cotton, sugar, beets, etc. which needed to be processed close to where they were grown, so that nearby factories were erected. The processing of these branches of agriculture took place on a regional and more comprehensive level, because of the private farmer's inability to execute the entire process. Agricultural diversification was the result of a saturation of vegetables, poultry, and dairy products. The new moshavim in the development areas were based on the new branches of industrial crops, which could only be economically grown on large tracts of land. Prior to the establishment of the State, farmers did not have vast tracts of land needed to develop and grow these branches, but after 1948 such development could be executed, mainly in the southern coastal plain and the northern Negev. A new settlement system had to be planned in order to cultivate such large areas. A single farm could not cultivate vast areas, only a regional settlement system with urban and semi-urban

centers was able to take on such a challenge. A regional town was needed in this system in order to be the centre of production, storage and export of the agricultural products.

Even in the well-established regions, where a transfer to intensive agriculture occurred, there was a need to establish medium-sized towns. Through their creation, the planners wanted to prevent a complete dependence of the old and new settlements on the large towns for their economic activities. They assumed, that the regional town would develop and prosper along with the entire region, thus becoming an integral part of it. The regional town even supplied services not related to agriculture to all of its surroundings, in the field of education, health, transportation, administration, etc. Apparently, the development towns did close the gap between the large towns and the small villages, as far as physical space and region are concerned, but what is troublesome today and has not been solved, are their own internal problems of employment, housing and level of services. It should be added that the approach to the development towns was not exactly suitable for Israel's conditions, the planning of them was often not done within a regional context, and their physical planning was not developed in conjunction with their social and economic planning.

#### **Geographical distribution of the New Towns**

The location of the development towns was decided to very according general criteria, the directed functions the towns would have along with suitable geographical conditions. From a geographical perspective, the distribution of development towns was not particularly appropriate. Many were located too close together, as Ofakim, Sederot and Netivot, while others were situated nearby large towns, such as Qiryat Malachi, Yehud or Mevasseret Ziyon. In areas like the eastern Galilee, the upper and central Galilee, and the Arava, no development towns were established. Town location was the result of practical reasons, immediate needs, and because of inexpensive land. By reconstructing the process of development towns, one sees, that the first stage involved resettlement of abandoned Arab villages, such as Lod, Ramla, Bet Shean and Beer Sheba, and even Arab neighborhoods as in Acre, Jerusalem, Majdal or Yavne. Once these areas were inhabited, immigrants were directed to the agricultural sector, with the aim of absorbing

them in the kibbutzim and veteran Moshavot (private holding's settlement), but as mentioned before, ability to absorb them in this sector was very limited. Immigrants were then guided to veteran moshavot near which camps were constructed, providing them with a place to live and seasonal employment in citrus work. The transit camps were manpower resources, in which many of their inhabitants were unable to find suitable employment in the moshava, or in the immediate surroundings. Many of those in the transit camps wanted to leave them, in order to move to the veteran and more stable settlements, but there were also people who preferred to stay in the camps for social reasons. The development and construction bodies gradually tried to eliminate the transit camps, because of their propensity to become slums. Due to the lack of new housing, only a part of the camps were eliminated, therefore, many of the temporary houses became permanent dwellings for their inhabitants. Thus, the basis of some development towns, such as Or Aqiva, Rosh Ha' Ayin, Yehud and others, was their past use as transitional camps. When the waves of additional immigrants to Israel could no longer be absorbed in the transit camps, the stage of new town development began in the country. Only in the Lakhish region, a development town, Qiryat Gat, was established, within the framework of comprehensive regional development, so that the town and its region grew simultaneously and in a homogenetic manner. In all the other locations in the country, development towns were situated in regions where settlements had been previously established, for example, Qiryat Shemona in the Hula valley, Bet Shemesh in the Corridor of Jerusalem, Qiryat Malachi in the southern coastal plain, Ma'alot in the upper western Galilee, etc. This stage of town establishment greatly assisted in the absorption of immigrants, on the background of the population distribution policy, and for the first time changed the original distribution in the northern and southern districts, so that their rate of population increase had a favourable increase over their pre-State rates. Only at the end of the 1950s did the planners begin establishing large towns like Ashdod and Beer Sheba, and when places like Arad or Karmiel were envisioned, they were planned and built with a complete urban character.

Upon classifying the new towns, according to year and place of establishment, we find, that since statehood, about



40 new settlements were founded and populated by Jews. 36 of those were given the status of a local authority or town. Town distribution according to founding date shows significant variations in the number established during each time period. The maximum number of towns founded was in 1948, when Bet She'an, Acre, Yehud, Lod, Azur, Bet Dagan, Ramla, Ashqelon and Beer Sheba were populated. Although nine were established in one year, it should be mentioned, that all of these towns previously existed, and had been abandoned by the Arabs during the War of Independence. Because houses were already there, immigrants were directed to them and shortly occupied all the abandoned structure (Fig. 22.1).

In 1949, Tirat Carmel and Yavne, also towns with abandoned houses, were populated. Since 1950 onwards, new housing has been established. In that year Qiryat Shemona, Shelomi, Yoqne'am, Rosh Ha'Ayin, Or Yehuda and Bet Shemesh were founded. All these locations were originally transit camps, which planners viewed as being suitable sites for future town development. Even in 1951 town establishment continued. Rechasim, Sederot, Yeroham and Elat were founded. If the former ones characterized settlements on the background of transit camps, all the other places mentioned, were built as new permanent towns. The time period between 1948 to 1951 is when the majority (24) of new, urban, Jewish settlements were added to the map. Migdal HaEmeq was founded in 1952, Hazor in 1953, Qiryat Gat and Mitzpe Ramon in 1955, Ofaqim and Dimona in 1956, Netivot and Upper Nazareth in 1957. Since that time, new town establishment has ceased, and most of the work in them is concentrated in improving their overall inner structure. This stoppage came with a decrease in the number of immigrants, and those who arrived later, were directed to live in existing towns. In the 1960s, two additional towns were founded, Arad in 1961 and Karmiel in 1964. The first was established as a town in the locale of a natural resource in the north-east part of the Negev, while the second was created in the northern part of the Galilee, for political reasons. They were different from previously established towns, because their populations were selected from people living in Israel for many years, and immigrants, and from the beginning, the towns' construction was modern. Since 1964 until today no new town has been added in the country.




FIG. 22.1 : New towns in Israel, 1982

New town classification according to regions in the country shows, that until 1950, the central district was the main location of the new towns, and to a lesser extent, the northern district. Because absorption initially took place in abandoned towns, which were located in the coastal plain, the main population increase took place there also. For towns being created without the basis of a former infrastructure, priority was given to the southern district, where most of the towns were built between 1951—1956. It is apparent, that the first new towns outside of the central district, were located in the northern part of the country where veteran, Jewish populations were settled in the western Galilee, Hula Valley, and that later on, after an infrastructure had been prepared in the northern Negev, the new town development wave moved to the South.

An additional classification of towns according to their infrastructure shows, that out of 36, 24 were completely new, 4 were mixed between old and new, and 8 were built on abandoned Arab infrastructure (Fig. 22.2).

The influence of geography on the distribution of the new towns was minimal. With the exception of location, like the Gulf of Elat, the transit area between the higher lowland and the Corridor of Jerusalem, and the upper Hula Valley, where new towns were objectively needed, town location was a matter of choice. Towns were not established on the basis of local natural resources, and because the distances from one place to another within the country was so minimal, with the exception of the central and southern Negev, it was not imperative to develop too many towns. Since water and energy sources were extremely limited, they were not taken into account in locating towns. Location therefore, was primarily the result of the following factors: topography, climate and land ownership. Establishing towns in Judea and the Negev was easily facilitated, as almost all of the land there was owned by the State.

Since 91 per cent of Israel's territory is in the hands of the Land Administration, the decision to establish development towns, was not difficult to make. Most of the immigrant public housing was constructed in peripheral development regions, thus contributing to population dispersal in towns in Israel. From the perspective of time, towns were established with the waves of immigration, as well as geographical locations, because initially, they were




Fig. 22.2 : New towns in Israel according to type year of establishment

constructed in the country's center, and then shifted to the north, and later reached the south. The Negev was opened for urban settlements only in the 1950s, after roads had been paved, and new projects constructed. Once begun, development increased at an accelerated rate from year to year, so that the southern district contained 12% of the country's population. The weight of the southern district expanded so, that almost half of the immigrants were concentrated there. The advantage of the Negev and the southern district had over the more populated districts was, that the growth of agriculture and urbanization there occurred simultaneously and in conjunction with each other. In the north, for instance, a veteran agricultural structure existed, which operated much more efficiently than the new towns. This was not the case in the south. Agricultural settlement in the south was based on new Moshavim, which needed a strong relationship with the new towns, thus bringing about an increase in urbanization. The new towns promoted the populating of peripheral regions of the country, in the northern district by 67%, and in the southern district by 83%. In the last number of years the growth of new towns has decreased due to lower immigration rates. The new towns have always responded to the immigration ebb and flow.

### **The Population in the New Towns**

The new towns in Israel are characterized by a cross-section of population, which has an impact on most of the urban population in the country. The composition of the population in the new towns was not planned in advance, but it was well-known, that it would be primarily made up of new immigrants and not by veteran inhabitants of the country. It was difficult to predict the immigration flow and thus the populating rate of the towns. Population composition was, therefore, determined by the countries origin, the rate of immigration, and the demographic structure of the immigrants themselves.

It should be recalled, that after all immigration was a very strong demographic phenomenon which the country was unprepared to handle. From the day of the declaration of independence (May 15, 1948), until the end of that year, more than 100,000 immigrants arrived. In 1949, twice that amount came to settle in Israel. The type of immigrant arriving in 1948 was quite different, that one who settled in Israel before the establishment.

of the State. In the past, most of the immigrants were young, single, socially and economically ambitious people, or pioneers with a Zionist mentality. The immigrants, who settled after 1948, came with large families, and with a high percentage of children and elderly. They were not Zionists. Prior to 1948, 17% of the immigrants were children, as contrasted to 30% after that time. In previous immigration waves, 37% were single people, while after 1948, the rate of single individuals decreased to 19%. There were even ethnic differences among the immigrants, as 85% were of European origin prior to 1948, and by the mid 1950s, only 5.5% came from Europe. The majority of the immigrants came from Asian and African countries. The weight of the veteran inhabitants, originally from Europe, decreased continuously, and most of them remained in the large towns or in the kibbutzim.

Although not all of the immigrants were directed to development towns, they did influence their size and character. In the 18 new towns, which were established until 1951, 120,000 people lived. Between 1952—1954, four new towns were added, which were inhabited by 22,000 people. Between 1958—1960 a decrease in the populating of development towns by new immigrants began. Most of the new towns expanded on their own, as a result of natural increase and internal migration, expressed physically by the construction of additional housing. Today, the rate of the new immigrants in urban population of Israel is 22 per cent.

It can be stated, that all of the development towns increased in population size, and that not one was abandoned or diminished in number of inhabitants. An extremely high growth rate occurred in Ashdod, Beer Sheba and Dimona. In many development towns through, the population is not greater than 10,000, and in several of them, there are even fewer. In several of the new towns such as Ashdod, Beer Sheba, Dimona, Upper Nazareth and Qiryat Shemona, growth was encouraged via the government, together with extraordinary investments, as witnessed by the industry in Beer Sheba, the harbour of Ashdod, the nuclear plant in Dimona, and the industry in Upper Nazareth. More than 20,000 inhabitants are needed in a town in order to reach a take-off point, and only Beer Sheba, Ashdod, Dimona, Ashqelon, Qiryat Gat, Lod and Ramla achieved population of this size. The higher rates of urban growth happened in the southern part of the country more so than in the center, and in the center more so than in the

north. Even the number of large development towns is greater in the south, than in the central part of Israel, or its north.

In the past number of years, only a part of the immigrants have been directed to the new towns, while the rest could be absorbed only in the large towns. Country of origin, level of education and socio-economic status, are the main reasons for that trend. In the first decade of statehood, one million immigrants arrived, but only 17.5% of them were directed to the development towns. As more immigrants came from western countries, fewer went to development towns. It can be assumed, that the rate of immigrants that will live in these towns in the future, will be more than 25%—30%. The development towns can expand only with improved infrastructure, level of services and by becoming more attractive. Each town has its own attraction power, dependent upon its geographical location, years of existence, the factories and projects located in it, and the amount of initiative its population has in shaping the town and its services. In several of the new towns there is a danger of a negative rate of migration, where the percentage of those leaving will be higher than the percentage of those moving into the towns. It appears, that the development towns in the southern part of the country have a much greater magnetic force than those in the north. This can partially be explained by the pull of Beer Sheba and Ashdod. In all the development towns, there are tremendous fluctuations in those coming and leaving, demonstrating that they have still not crystallized socially and economically.

The demographic composition found in the development towns today was mainly influenced by the immigration structure. This is witnessed especially in development towns, where a stratum of poorer people remained. Immigration to Israel brought with it a high percentage of uneducated people, without professions, who were unaccustomed to a modern urban way of life. 95% of those arriving in development towns were new immigrants, in medium-sized towns approximately 80% were new immigrants, and in the larger towns about 60%. In the agricultural settlements established after 1948 the percentage of new immigrants was above 95, especially in the Moshavim. In contrast to that was the small percentage of new immigrants living in Kibbutzim, because absorption was difficult without a strong

ideological background. The majority of immigrants was thus concentrated in the new Moshavim, or in the new development towns. The larger a town was, or the longer a kibbutz had been established, the lower the percentage of immigrants living there.

The distribution between veteran inhabitants and newcomers in the settlements is also very interesting. The larger the development town or settlement, the higher the number of veteran residents. In the small towns and young moshavim, the rate of new immigrants is high, irrespective of geographical region. During the urban process, integration of new comers with veterans was impossible. The arrival of large waves of immigration necessitated immediate settlement, so that time existed for social integration processes. An even more influential fact was, that it was quite difficult to separate people from the same homeland and community, because of the danger of isolation connected to the immigration and settlement periods. Integration was more successful in the younger towns, such as Arad and Karmiel, where a population composed of one third veterans, one third Europeans and one third Asian-Africans was mixed together. Practically speaking, it was quite difficult to guide demographic development in the new towns, as there was no reign over the sources of immigration, and those arriving with capital, were free to go where they pleased.

In the past number of years, a greater interest in the structure and quality of life of the new towns has arisen. A new wave of rehabilitation has appeared in many of them. Qiryat Gat, for example, experienced a renewal, with the construction of new neighborhoods built for veterans. In Arad, a careful social selection was done of those wanting to live in the town, so that a suitable group of veterans was chosen to live with new immigrants. Even the construction style was greatly improved. More compact and higher housing was built, the CBD was improved, institutions were constructed, industrial projects were promoted establishing an employment base, and even private enterprise was permitted to develop in that town, and even in all the others.

Today, new towns are recognized as important factors in settlement pioneering. Town and village are equal in importance and are given the same treatment by governmental authorities. Although the new towns have been greatly criticized, their imprint on Israel's landscape is strong, that people suppose they



will influence the urban layout for many years to come.

#### CONCLUSIONS

The shaping of the urban layout in Israel was too rapid, while during one decade only, most of the new urban facts were created. Beside the gradual growth of the veteran and historic towns, a new wave of towns appeared, and gained priorities in investments, in housing projects and in populating, and assigned new goals for inner-migration, and a new geography of settlement distribution.

But it is hard to say, that the new layout of towns has already been crystalized, from the demographic and economic point of view. Only a part of the new urban system shows signs of take-off, while most of the new towns did not success to develop by themselves, and still need a lot of subsidies and incentives. Many years will pass, until the new development towns will be able to have some influence on the urban structure of Israel, and prove strong interrelationships with the older and veteran towns.


The urban layout has never been planned to the end. It could never be examined according to long-range criteria, because Israel's constraints in security and policy were always very hard, which brought always to short-range decisions. But, because a geographical distribution of towns is a very rigid system, it is almost impossible to change it, so the only way to improve it is, to repair gradually the infrastructure of the new towns, and make them more attractive for all the people of Israel.

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THOMAS MULLER

## THE RECENT U.S. URBAN POLICY An Effective Approach for Metropolitan America ?

### **The changing American city**

Large cities in the U.S.A. as those in other nations undergo continuous transformation, reflecting shifts in population, income, technology and other economic as well as social forces. Why, one can reasonably ask, should the changing characteristics of cities in the U.S.A. be of special interest to European urban researchers ? Perhaps the most compelling response is that shifts observed in the U.S.A. tend to be observed, perhaps a decade later, in other western nations. This is not to suggest a cause and effect, as this phenomenon most likely reflects a lag in economic structure and social attitudes. Indeed, it can be argued that even within the U.S.A. the same process is evident. Phenomenon observed in California, particularly social changes, tend to be a good predictor of what is likely to take place within a few years in the Eastern region of the nation.

To understand the changing American city, it is necessary to first describe recent shifts in the population distribution of its residents. As shown in Table 23.1, Americans migrated out of central cities (those with populations in excess of 50,000) in record numbers during the 1970s. At the same time, they have also been leaving the industrial states of the so-called manufacturing belt (extending from New York to Illinois) to the South

Paper presented at the "European Meeting on Applied Urban Research", Essen, Oct. 2-4, 1981.

TABLE 23.1A : City, suburban and non-metropolitan migration 1970—80

	<i>(In thousands)</i>	
	1970-1975	1975-1980
Central Cities	—7,018	—6,346
Suburbs	5,423	5,001
Non-Metropolitan	1,595	1,345

TABLE 23.1B : Regional migration 1965—80

	<i>(In thousands)</i>		
	1965-1970	1970-1975	1975-1980
Northeast	—715	—1,342	—1,486
North Central	—637	—1,195	—1,173
South	656	1,829	1,764
West	696	708	893

and West. Finally, they are leaving, but at slower rates, the large urban areas and relocating in smaller communities. The two most rapidly growing states in the nation—Nevada and Utah—are among the least densely populated in the nation.

What are some of the more fundamental changes taking place *within* American cities? Almost without exception, the composition and density of the population differs in 1982 from characteristics twenty or even ten years ago.

Yet, it would be incorrect to consider large cities in the U.S.A. as a homogeneous group. It is essential that their diversity be illustrated, since this factor alone creates great difficulty when attempting to formulate a cohesive urban policy discussed in a subsequent section of this paper.

The diversity among cities, given the large geographic area of the nation, should be expected. However, even a casual observer would suggest that the contrasts are more extreme than found in Western Europe. To illustrate differences with the U.S.A. two sets of cities grouped by region are shown in Table 23.2.

The first group located in the industrial belt of northern states, the core of American heavy manufacturing industries. These cities reached their maturity, seen by their population peaks, as early as the 1920s with only minor increases in population

TABLE 23.2 : Change in population by region/annexation status  
(In thousands)

City	Northern Industrial Cities				Density <sup>1</sup>
	1920	1950	1970	1980	
Cleveland*	797	915	751	573	9893
Buffalo	507	583	463	370*	11205
Philadelphia*	1823	2072	1949	1688	15164
Pittsburgh*	588	677	520	424	9422
St. Louis*	773	857	622	453	10167
Detroit*	993	1850	1511	1203	10953
Total	5481	6954	5816	4711	—
Average	914	1159	969	785	11135

City	Southwest/Western Cities				Density <sup>1</sup>
	1920	1950	1970	1980	
Houston	138	596	1233	1573	1573
San Francisco*	507	775	716	679	15764
Dallas	159	434	844	847*	3179
San Antonio	161	408	654	785	3555
Phoenix	29	107	582	764	2346
San Diego	74	334	697	875	2199
Total	1068	2654	4726	5523	—
Average	178	442	788	921	4103

1. Persons per square mile based on 1970 population and geographic areas

\* No annexation.

during the last half century—primarily during World War II. The only exception to this pattern is Detroit whose economy accelerated with the mass production of automobiles during the 1920s and 1930s, followed by war production during the early 1940s.

While many cities were losing population as early as the 1960s, most observers did not recognize outmigration as a symptom of a long-run declining economic and fiscal base. The sharpest rates of outmigration are evident during the 1970s. Indeed, with the exception of Detroit all cities had considerably fewer persons in 1980 compared to six decades earlier, while the national population more than doubled during the same time interval. The high density of these manufacturing-based urban

of the century, which tended to be at a much higher density than newer housing reflecting a more affluent society.

The contrast between these older cities and those in the Southwest and West is indeed striking. With the exception of San Francisco, which had no annexation of adjacent land due to its status as a county, all other jurisdictions expanded their spatial boundaries greatly during the past sixty years. This is indicated by both their rapid population growth and low density. Cities such as Phoenix and San Diego were merely large towns during the 1920s while today they surpass in size all but five of the largest northern cities.

The substantial differences among cities just illustrated, however, does not exclude a discussion of patterns common to most, if not all, larger jurisdictions. Without exception, the proportion of non-white population in large cities exceeded the growth of this population nationally. The stability of this pattern is as important as the magnitude of the change. This is shown in Table 23.3, where the racial composition of the population in the largest ten cities is tabulated for the last two decades. The percentage of blacks in these cities rose by almost two thirds in 20 years, to 32 per cent of the total population. Growth rates of other minorities are even more rapid, although 1980 data are not compatible with earlier population census information. In 1980, one out of every six residents was of Spanish origin, with Mexican-Americans the dominant group. Other minorities including Chinese, Vietnamese, and Japanese comprise ten per cent of the population. This means that six out of every ten residents of large cities are non-white or of Spanish origin (which could be any race).<sup>1</sup> In three large cities, the number of blacks is 49 per cent or more, while the white, the non-Spanish population is a majority in only Philadelphia and San Diego.

The steady movement of industry, particularly larger enterprises, from the urban core outward, followed by the relocation of retail and wholesale trade, is the second prevalent city trend. Technological change as well as the emergence of the interstate highway system as the dominant form of interurban transportation have facilitated this decentralization process. The shift in retail trade from the urban core outward appears to be only in its early stages in Western Europe. However, this trend is likely to accelerate during the 1980s despite the high cost of fuel. Never-

TABLE 23.3 : Largest ten cities in U.S.A. by race/Spanish origin

City	Per cent Black			Other Minorities—1980			Total <sup>c</sup>
	1960	1970	1980	1961—80	Spanish <sup>a</sup> Origin	Other <sup>b</sup>	
New York	14.0%	21.3%	25.2%	80%	19.9%	13.9%	59.0%
Chicago	22.9	32.7	49.6	116	14.0	10.5	74.1
Los Angeles	13.5	17.9	17.0	26	27.5	21.2	65.7
Philadelphia	26.4	33.6	37.8	43	3.8	3.9	45.5
Houston	22.9	25.7	27.6	20	17.6	11.0	56.2
Detroit	28.9	43.7	63.1	118	2.4	2.5	68.0
Dallas	19.0	24.9	29.4	55	12.3	9.2	50.9
Baltimore	34.7	46.4	54.8	58	1.0	1.3	57.1
San Diego	6.0	7.6	8.9	48	15.0	14.3	38.2
Sad Antonio	7.1	7.6	7.3	3	53.8	13.9	75.0
Average	19.5	26.1	32.1	65	16.7	10.2	58.9

a. In a few instances, a very small proportion also included under "black".

b. Other racial groups, primarily oriental.

c. Sum of black, Spanish origin, other.

Source : Unpublished data from the 1980 Census of Population, Bureau of the Census.



theless, the urban cores of most western cities should remain economically viable in the foreseeable future.

The third stable trend is the increasing dominance of public facilities and functions, combined with office-centered service industries in the urban core. In many American cities, space vacated by private firms has been taken over by public bodies. The labor-intensive, clerical functions are leaving the city, but management functions tend to remain.

#### **Similarities and differences in urban problems : U.S.A. and Western Europe**

Even a quick examination of urban issues in the U.S.A., England, West Germany and other industrial nations reveals a common pattern. For example, there is outmigration from most large cities in the three nations, as well as in others. To illustrate similarities, characteristics of nine large German cities have been collected and are shown in Table 23.4. Among this group, five out of eight had outmigration of between 0.5 per cent and 3.7 per cent in one year (1979 to 1980). While these data are limited to one year and thus subject to some fluctuations, the pattern is evident—sharp losses in the number of residents in the majority of large German jurisdictions. Only Munich has signs of rigorous

**TABLE 23.4 : Characteristics of large cities in the German Federal Republic—1980**

City	Population (In 000)	Density <sup>a</sup>	Net Migration 1979-1980	Per cent Foreign Population
Hamburg	1633	5581	N/A	8.1%
Munich	1299	10840	4.5%	16.6
Koln	976	6239	1.9	13.0
Essen	652	8037	-2.6	4.9
Frankfurt	628	6537	-0.5	12.9
Dormand	609	5638	0.1	7.5
Dusseldorf	594	7094	-3.3	12.9
Stuttgart	582	7278	-1.4	16.9
Dussburg	559	6213	-3.7	11.8
Average	837	7051	—	11.6

a. Population per sq. mile to obtain population per sq. km., divided by 2.59.

population growth, no doubt reflecting its strong economy. The subsequent Table 23.5 shows the percentage of population that are foreign nationals. In Germany, this population is highly concentrated in large cities, as are minorities in the U.S.A. As city

TABLE 23.5 : Distribution of aliens as a percentage of population size—1980

Population Group	Per cent Aliens
(In 000)	
Over 500	11.4%
200—500	8.4
100—200	8.1
50—100	8.0
20—50	6.6
10—20	3.2

Source : *Statistische Jahrbuch Deutschen Gemeinden*, Jahrgang 1980.

population declines, so does the proportion of foreign born—from 11.6 per cent in the largest cities to 3.2 per cent in those with only 10 thousand to 20 thousand residents. If the U.S.A. pattern is a model for trends in other western nations, it is evident that the concentration of minorities in German cities will rise. This will take place *regardless* of immigration policies because minorities typically have higher birth rates.

In addition, regardless of restrictions, differences in the standard of living among nations and surplus labor (as Turkey and West Germany, U.S.A. and Mexico) create enormous pressures to migrate, temporarily or permanently, legally or illegally, to nations with higher wages. Such movement, as in the past, is most likely to concentrate migrants in large cities, where it is easier to lose (or gain) one's identity. While restrictive policies can slow this trend in the absence of a police state tactics, it is almost irreversible.

It is probable that by the end of the 1980s or mid 1990s, most large American cities will be predominantly non-white. At the same time, the population of such European cities as London, Munich, Stuttgart, among others, will be at least one-third non-white or foreign.

These ethnic changes create a set of urban problems as well as opportunities not typically considered by those involved in urban policies. These problems are along several dimensions—economic, political and social. From an economic perspective, many labor-intensive functions will no longer be centered in the large cities. Thus, a crucial need in all nations will be to find sufficient job opportunities in these cities and thus avoid serious social problems with adverse political repercussions.

The population of large cities, as a result of gains in the non-white or foreign population, will not continue to decline substantially in the next decade in the U.S. or elsewhere. This is, the non-white population will be able to sustain population levels at somewhat lower numbers that is presently the case, with the aggregate number of inhabitants stabilizing during the decade despite additional events outmigration from cities by households with families.

Somewhat surprisingly, the density of larger German cities is similar to the U.S. While the average density is lower than in older American industrial jurisdictions, it is higher than in western urban areas of the U.S.A. In part, the relatively low density in Germany is attributable to considerable annexation and consolidation during the 1950s and 1960s which extended municipal boundaries, lowering the average number of residents per mile or kilometers. Nevertheless, only minor differences in density are unexpected, as population per square mile in the Federal Republic of Germany in 1961, or more than 11 times above the U.S.A. level.

While even a casual observer would agree that there are distinct similarities among nations, there are also differences which can effect policy decisions. These differences exist despite the fact that causes for urban population decline do not differ greatly among western nations. These include the continuing preference for living in lower density, more spacious housing too costly to be constructed in central cities, and technological changes causing many new jobs to locate in low density areas. The suburban "tract" home was not observed in France or Germany in the past because most families did not own cars and most jobs were in the central city. As income rises, roads improve, and jobs become more decentralized, the movement to the suburbs can be expected to accelerate, particularly among house-

holds with children. The perceived problems of central city living—high cost, crime, inadequate public facilities—are common to many western nations causing a “push” from cities. This outmigration, of course, provides housing for immigrants, causing their numbers to rise in the urban core.

Despite these common elements, policies in western nations differ. For example, as discussed in a later section, the “urban conservation policy” aimed at preserving urban centres was severely criticized in the U.S.A. as preventing the market system from operating efficiently. While there may be some merit in this argument, opposition to a similar policy would not arise in most Western European nations where a higher value is placed on preserving the urban core.

Since payments to localities from the national government are higher in Germany, France and England than in the U.S.A., fiscal disparities are less extreme. Thus, mechanism and distribution programs already in place tend to equalize the fiscal and economic status of urban areas, reducing the need for special assistance to the group of jurisdictions particularly distressed from a fiscal perspective.

### **Policy responses to urban change**

Until the early to mid 1970s, American cities were not considered to require any special assistance from the federal government. Social policies developed during the 1960s stressed assistance to *people*, rather than *places*. While it was recognized that a disproportionately large number of poor households resided in central cities and rural areas, no need was perceived for assistance targeted toward geographically defined areas. The one exception to this pattern was the Appalachian region, an area which stagnated during the 1950s and 1960s as coal was replaced by cheap oil for heating and transportation.

During the 1970s, a group of ad hoc programs was developed to be packaged under the Carter Administration as an “urban policy”. City needs were perceived as primarily fiscal and much of the legislation was aimed at providing urban areas with additional federal revenue.

Whether the various programs actually increased the shared of federal funds directed at urban areas is a matter of dispute. One analysis of such assistance during the 1972–1979 time

period indicates that while such aid did increase during the 1970s, the increase was not discernably more rapid than federal outlays in general. The authors show that so-called "urban" outlays increased (in constant dollars) from \$ 22 billion in 1973 to \$ 26 billion in 1979.<sup>2</sup>

This represents a reduction in the share of aid from 12.0 per cent of the federal budget to only 10.7 per cent. However, there is also evidence to the contrary—that federal aid (in real terms) did indeed increase to distressed cities. While the issue remains to be resolved, it is not the objective of this paper to estimate the aggregate level of additional urban assistance. Neither is its aim to critique these policies and programs but rather to discuss the role of the urban researcher given the many conflicts and problems which inevitable arise from any spatially-focused national policy. Thus, programs will be discussed in the context of discussing research issues, particularly those aimed at measuring impact, which arise once programs are funded and implemented. However, it is useful to briefly note the current (1982) status of urban programs.

While a number of ad hoc programs were operational at the end of the 1970s, their continuation became very much a question mark following the 1980 election which resulted in a new administration. As of early 1980, no new urban policies have been initiated. With the exception of mildly endorsing the concept of "enterprise zones" in older cities, no new ideas on how to deal with urban problems has come forth. Indeed, there has been a total absence of discussion on this issue not only at the federal executive and legislative level but also in the media. With the existing federal programs phased out or placed in so-called "block grants", there is a policy void which likely to remain, at least for the next few years.

What explains this almost total absence of urban policies? Critics can argue that given the unimpressive record of the last administration, no policy may be preferable to a group of disjointed programs. A more realistic explanation for the absence of activity has to include changes in political philosophy and other pressing needs. The concept of "targeted" aid is in opposition to the Administration proposition that the market system will, over time, reduce differentials within metropolitan areas and among regions. Areas with high unemployment will

have rapid outmigration of its labor force, while the absence of demand for those remaining will pressure wages downwards. If continuous outmigration results in a labor shortage, wages will again rise. Thus, the focus needs to be on policies which will result in national economic growth, improving economic conditions everywhere. Following this reasoning, there should be little concern over micro-economic problems during a transition period which will result, by the use of macro-economic policies, in rapid economic growth.

A second reason for the absence of an urban policy is the dominance of serious economic problems at the national level, with all the attention focused on national unemployment, lack of productivity, and a generally stagnating economy. Given these crucial problems at the national level, micro-economic issues are at the end of a long queue of problems facing the Administration.

A third factor is the unwillingness to commit any specific funds to urban areas at a time when all non-defense programs are being curtailed. It is recognized that almost any new initiative, no matter how inconsequential, would require additional funding. The high and low federal revenue accrual has created conditions which would not support any new program which would even marginally increase the need for federal dollars.

The absence of an urban policy should not, however, be interpreted to mean that such policies have necessarily failed in the past. Whatever limitations can be cited in both the concept and implementations of earlier policies, it is evident that the current absence of policies cannot be attributed to an evaluation which concluded that such efforts are not cost-effective. Indeed, even if the evidence for the success of such policies had been overwhelming, it is improbable they would be implemented in the current political climate.

#### **Estimating the effects of urban programs—Problems and examples**

A major criticism of sub-national economic policies, both urban and regional, is that their effectiveness cannot be measured. It is further argued that such assistance tends to be, from an economic premise, inefficient. Thus, even if the principle of assistance is accepted, the lack of data on effects, particularly if aid is perceived as inefficient, concerns many elected officials and others. The

underlying premise for most U.S.A. urban policies has been that its older cities have an economic disadvantage in competing for skilled labor and new industry compared to their own suburban areas as well as growing regions. As a result of this imbalance, these urban centres are declining. The problem is thus recognized to be both intra-metropolitan and interregional.

This premise of comparative economic disadvantage noted above is generally accepted by those who favor as well by those opposing any explicit urban policy. The causes for the comparative disadvantage are also known—higher transportation costs and higher taxes in central cities, shifting markets, and technological change in both production and communication—factors placing older, higher density cities at a comparative disadvantage.

Most of the economic development policies during the 1960s and 1970s were based on the premise that if the public sector invested capital to improve the infrastructure in a jurisdiction, this would provide an incentive for business to locate there. The need for direct assistance to business in the form of subsidized loans, grants, tax incentives and the like was, however, recognized by many as more practical approach to aid distressed areas. While improving the infrastructure met little opposition (the responsibility for the infrastructure is considered to be public—new programs merely provided federal funding for this purpose), direct subsidies met with criticism as well as some skepticism. Two questions arise when direct subsidies are provided: Do we know that even in the absence of a subsidy, a firm would have relocated to the community? In this instance, the subsidy would merely increase the profitability of the investment, rather than causing it to take place. The second question is the *net* effect of a new facility on long-term employment. The so-called UDAG program initiated by HUD in the late 1970s raised both issues. The first group of UDAG projects funded included a number of large hotels to be owned by national chains, whose own market studies suggested building a hotel in the community receiving a federal (UDAG) grant to be used to subsidize the construction. If the hotel did not locate in the central business district, would it have located somewhere else in the metropolitan area? While empirical data are lacking, it appears that at least some hotels would have located in the general area, but probably at a less expensive site. While there are always some investments, “on the

margin", where the assistance was crucial in the decision to construct the building in the urban core, it has to be assumed that there is a market for a hotel in the area. In the absence of effective demand, a subsidy, no matter how high, would have little impact on the decision.

For projects subsidized by HUD involving non-hotel activities, the role of the federal grant was no doubt more crucial in the location decision. Nevertheless, it is valid to state that it is extremely difficult for analysis to evaluate the importance of a federal grant in a private venture investment decision. The employment effects are also unclear. Continuing the hotel example, if such a building was constructed in a suburban area, some in the central city labor force could have obtained employment at the suburban site, although it would have been less convenient (and more expensive) to reach the building from inner city residences.

Let us suppose the facility (hotel or other service sector industry) is to employ 500 workers. What effect will the net hotel have on *existing* hotels and motels? In a few (but very few) instances, a shortage of "good" hotel space has discouraged travelers from coming to a city, as such hotels were close to 100 per cent capacity. In reality, this scenario rarely holds. More likely, a new hotel will cause business in older hotels to decline, and these, in turn, will have to curtail their employment. Thus, the problems for the analysts is to determine what *net* employment gains have resulted from such an action. In most instances, the net effects are a small fraction of the estimated gains which do not take into account offsetting losses in jobs in the same sector.

Another urban activity, in some ways a counter-example to the UDAG concept was the "community conservation policy" developed in the waning days of the Carter Administration. The implicit objective of this policy was to slow down large shopping malls development outside older central cities, at least in instances where federal funds were utilized to improve the infrastructure.<sup>3</sup> This author has demonstrated the adverse effect regional shopping malls can have on central business districts (CBDs) in several publications.<sup>4</sup> Mall construction has led to the loss of substantial downtown retail trade sales of related goods, services and retail employment.



While these adverse effects have been challenged by shopping centre advocates, few analysis doubt their impact. In this instance, by the use of techniques discussed in the referenced material, it is feasible to estimate the shift in sales from a CBD to a new site. Shopping malls, unlike some other activities, provide (except during the construction period) few if any new jobs. Rather, such a facility tends to *redistribute* existing sales and thus retail employment. Consumption levels do not change, and the only significant effect is thus a redistribution of retail activity within an expanded trading area. The short-run effects of preventing the construction of a regional mall are predictable by the use of time series data from areas where such malls have been constructed, as well as cross-national analysis based on communities with varying number of malls (or no malls at all). However, such research tends to be lengthy, plagued by data constraints as well as errors in information collected by federal agencies. The development of predictive models, while feasible, requires resources most urban researchers have difficulty obtaining.

Another crucial issue for urban researchers has been substitution of funds flowing from the national government for local resources. Despite conceptual problems and data constraints, the substitution phenomenon has been the subject of several studies aimed at determining the extent of local or state fund replacement with federal dollars. The need for estimating substitution effects became critical during the 1970s as federal aid to distressed cities of the USA increased, with the intent (usually requirement) that the assistance *supplement* rather than replace local effort. It is known, nevertheless, that jurisdictions frequently utilized federal funds as a means to reduce or stabilize local taxes rather than expand services. This substitution in turn, reduces the number of public sector jobs. The problem is exemplified by the passage in 1972 of a large federal program known as the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act (CETA) aimed explicitly at creating new jobs in the state, local and non-profit sectors. The assistance was to be channeled to jurisdictions and regions with high unemployment. In 1979, over \$ 7.8 billion was allocated to states and localities under various provisions of CETA. At the aggregate regional level, the allocation funds favored western states. The two northern regions received 51 per cent

of all funds (\$ 36 per capita) southern states 28 per cent (\$ 30 per capita) and western states 21 per cent (\$ 40 per capita). This allocation appears contrary to what one would expect, given the concentration of distressed urban areas in northern industrial states. For example, California, by no means a "needy" state received \$ 43 per capita, Pennsylvania, one of the most distressed states, only \$ 39. While there was a slight tilt in assistance toward states with above-average unemployment and fiscal problems, the allocation formulas themselves provide little "targeting" toward areas with the severe fiscal distress, although some impacted cities including Buffalo, Newark (N.J.) and Cleveland had substantial numbers of CETA workers. Did such cities, as well as affluent jurisdictions, substitute federal aid for their own efforts in the public sector ?

The level of substitution for the CETA program has been the subject of several research papers.<sup>5</sup> While there are some differences in study results attributable primarily to differences in methodology, these studies without exception show high rates of substitution, particularly in the long run. The expenditure impact of CETA based on this research tended to be rather small, which is to say that the program permitted recipient jurisdictions to reduce expenditures financed from their own sources. Typically, for every dollar of CETA funds, only *one-third* was actually applied towards wages for new employees, although the use of CETA funds for CETA jobs is legally *mandatory*. The balance of two thirds of the funds were used primarily to pay for existing workers, reducing the need for local revenue and thus stabilizing local taxes.

The same pattern of substitution can be observed for such programs as federal revenue sharing with states and localities. This program, initiated in 1973, has an allocation formula aimed at providing above-average assistance to cities with high tax burden (measured on the basis of local taxes as a percentage of personal income) and low income compared to its state. Studies of this programme show statistical evidence of variation in the level of substitution by city size and region. Large modern cities, as would be expected, did not typically substitute revenue sharing dollars for local taxes ; rather, these jurisdictions added these funds to maintain basic services. Since these jurisdictions constitute a large share of the city group defined as being

"fiscally distressed" it is not surprising that these jurisdictions had no option but to apply revenue sharing funds for otherwise insufficient services. In the economically stronger southern and western regions as well as in smaller cities, the rate of substitution was high—between 40 per cent and 70 per cent.

Another program aimed at urban areas, the result of consolidated smaller programs initiated during the 1960s, is the Community Development Block Grant (CDBG). This legislation provides several billion dollars annually to local communities which have considerable discretion in their use. The research question, as in other programs, is to what extent these funds enabled localities to undertake activities and services they would not have provided in the absence of this program. One study of the program by Dommel and his associates at Brookings shows very little substitution—less than ten per cent.<sup>6</sup> This appears surprising, given the high levels of substitution in other federally funded urban programs discussed earlier. According to the Brookings study, about half of the funds were for new facilities or expanded programs, with about 40 per cent applied to maintain existing programs. This would suggest that the programs, because it is funded on a project by project basis with each project approved and monitored by HUD, does not lead to substantial substitution.

In fiscal 1979, \$ 2.8 billion was allocated for this program. An examination of per capita allocation indicated that Texas received \$ 12. California \$ 13. By contrast, two states with numerous distressed cities, Pennsylvania and Michigan, received \$ 18 and \$ 14. As in the instance of CETA and revenue sharing, distressed states and areas did receive somewhat more than an allocation based exclusively on population. However, the incremental differences among cities were not large, particularly when compared to differences in need.

These programs as well as several others aimed at assisting fiscally distressed urban areas point to two major policy issues: the ability of programs to target assistance to the "truly needy", and the effects of substitution. It is evident that for primarily political reasons, it is not feasible in the U.S.A. to target assistance exclusively to regions and areas which are the most distressed. It is possible to provide these areas with somewhat more assistance than to those with more robust economies, but

since almost every large city regardless of its economic or fiscal status has to receive "a share of the pie" in order that the assistance legislation be passed, only the extent to which some receive a slightly larger slice compared to others is at question.

The second issue is the level of substitution and its effects. Study results indicate that it is not feasible to avoid substitution of assistance in the U.S.A. *regardless* of mandated requirements. In areas of distress, substitution rates tend to be small while in rebust economies, however, federal assistance is more likely to become a mechanism to stabilize or reduce taxes. This, of course, places these areas at a comparative advantage in the search for more industry. From a regional perspective, the net effects of substitution are less significant. If an economically stagnant region receives federal funds it would otherwise not receive, and the amount it obtains is more than its proportionate contribution to federal taxes, it will have a positive fiscal flow.

This point highlights another problem for urban researchers evaluating urban and regional program: our ability to estimate the multiplier impact of assistance at the sub-national level. Until recently, conceptual problems and data limitations constrained researchers in the U.S.A. from estimating the differential effects of spending a federal dollar in state "A" compared to state "B". To estimate these effects, it was necessary that internally consistent input-output or econometric models be available for each of the 50 states in the U.S.A. In 1980 and 1981, economists at the Bureau of Economic Analysis (U.S. Department of Commerce) developed such models. While the research is far more complete, the results indicate substantial variation in the aggregate output at the state level resulting for a dollar of federal funds flowing to its communities.<sup>7</sup> These studies find that \$ 1 in federal grants have a personal income multiplier of only 0.65 in the New England region, while the same \$ 1 will have a multiplier of \$ 1.36 in the Mid-West. Thus, from a national efficiency perspective, it makes more sense to provide assistance to those regions with high multipliers. However, the extent to which such policy would be politically feasible, and in the long run efficient, is not known. More research is required before one can deal with this issue from a policy perspective. Nevertheless, progress so far will assist urban researchers in future years.

**An Agenda for the 1980s**

This paper has suggested, but not demonstrated conclusively, that many changes discussed in American cities are likely to take place in other industrial nations during the decade. More research is required to test this proposition which could have serious repercussions. If the views expressed in this paper are found to be fundamentally correct, policy makers in other industrial nations will have considerable lead time to deal with the issues, hopefully learning from some errors in the U.S.A. response. Additional research also needs to be focused on how to measure the impact of specific policies spatially at the sub-national level. Unless the positive and negative effects of specific programs can be evaluated, it will be difficult to convince those in power to adapt such actions, unless their aim is purely political. The differential impact of the same assistance to two urban areas and regions also requires further analysis. Current research in the U.S.A. and elsewhere needs to be evaluated and placed in the perspective of needs across national boundaries.

The ethnic shifts in urban areas point to more social divergence in future years at the local level, but also to a more homogenous society from an international perspective. That is, our large cities in the future will more closely reflect the international community, while the contrast between these cities and the balance of the national population will grow. Finally, we need to view these changes as not only causing additional problems but also providing new opportunities. Urban researchers will need to apply all their skills to meet this challenge.

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- For example, Muller, Thomas, *Regional Malls and Central City Retail Sales: An Overview*, Washington 1981.

For an excellent critique of this research, see Whitman, Ray D., and Cline, Robert J., *Fiscal Impact of Revenue Sharing in Comparison With Other Federal Aid*, The Urban Institute, Washington, 1978.

#### FOOTNOTES

1. Because of duplicate counting (some Spanish-region persons list themselves as black), the actual percentage is probably 57 per cent to 58 per cent.
2. William W. Goldsmith and J. Devion, Toward a Nation Urban Policy, *Journal of Regional Science*, Volume 19, 1979.
3. The federal government could only ask for fiscal impact reviews if federal funds were applied to develop the facility or the supporting infrastructure.
4. For example, Thomas Muller, Regional Malls and Central City Retail Sales : An Overview, asWhington 1981.
5. For an excellent critique of this research, see Ray D. Whitman and Robert J. Cline, *Fiscal Impact of Revenue Sharing in Comparison With Other Federal Aid*. The Urban Institute, 1978.
6. Paul S. Dommel et al., *Targeting Community Development* U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development 1980.
7. Kort, John R., and Cartwright, Joseph V., *Modelling the Multi-regional Economy Integrating Econometric and Input-Output Models*. Paper delivered at Southern Regional Science Association Meeting, Arlington, Virginia, April 1981.



OSWALDO BUENO AMORIM FILHO

## MIDDLE SIZE CITIES AND BRAZIL'S TERRITORIAL PLANNING

### INTRODUCTION

The acceleration of the world urbanization phenomena was one of the factors that helped to increase the importance of the urban and regional planning in the period that followed the World War II, mainly after the 50's.

The large urban agglomerations were, during the 50's, the favorite subject of researches and policies of urban-regional planning.

During the 60's, with the increase of the urban planning, the regional metropolis turned out to be one of the major themes in many parts of the world.

We can say now that, though the original trends have not been relinquished, the themes connected with middle cities are the great contribution of the 70's.

Related to the urban and regional planning would, in this sequence, the small cities and the rural spaces be the great themes of the 80's ?

In fact, the themes of middle and small cities, as well as the themes of urbanized and rural areas fit in the tendency (and the necessity) of promoting a decentralization and deconcentration of the large human groups, their activities and of course their problems.

This is how, in our opinion, three great geographical, social and economic problems are, among others in the roots of the



recent concern with the theme of middle and small size cities ;

- the aggravation of the urban and regional disequilibrium, the classic type was largely described by GRAVIER in his work "Paris and the French Desert"<sup>1</sup> :
- the aggravation of the conditions and relations that characterize the quality of life in the large urban agglomerations, as well as a rapid increase of the social problems ;
- the weak hierarchic organization of the cities and obviously, the insufficient flow of the information and of the social and economic relations in the urban network of most countries of the world, with negative reflections on the functioning of the political and economic systems—be they capitalist or socialist.

The remote cause of the current concern with the middle size cities is found in the after war Europe, when the necessity of a new way of planning appears: the land management ("l'aménagement du territoire").

Although the urban and regional planning already existed in England since the beginning of the 20th. century, this intervention of men over the territory and the society takes new proportion in Europe, in the period of reconstruction.

The land management was systematized in 1952<sup>2</sup> as a result of a geographic reflection, of a reflection on the search for a more balanced distribution of activities, wealth and men over the national and regional space.

Pressed by the uncountable problems generated by the imbalance between the giantism of Paris and the weakness of the urban-economic structure of the rest of the country, France has developed since 1954 a great effort to apply the principles and theories of the land management.

In a first stage (1954-1962), the action following this policy was confined to interventions of a sectorial type, i.e. developing industry, energy production, regional economic reconversion or of a punctual one (as in location of industries).

The necessity of a better coordination of this policy, as well

as of an integrated action including the structural aspect of the organization of the French space, led to the creation of D.A.T.A.R. (Delegation al' Amenagement du Territoire et al' Action Regionale).

From then on, the cities start receiving special treatment in function of their importance in relation to the national system and the principle of decentralization.

In 1963, the idea of the "metropolis of equilibrium" starts materializing in attempt to reach balance amongst the regions that form the French space, up to then extremely centralized by Paris.

A hierarchical classification of the French cities made in 1664 by HAUTREUX and ROCHEFORT<sup>3</sup> shows the importance of regional metropolis, that is, the metropolitan agglomerations with populations of 100 000 to 1 Million inhabitants, and the necessity of a volunteer strenghtening of this cities as "equilibrium metropolis" for Paris.

This policy is sanctioned in the V Plan of Social and Economic Development (1966).

For its part, LABASSE's<sup>4</sup> work provides theoretical support for that policy as well as for the land management.

Starting in 1966, a series of practical measures were taken in favor of the 8 "metropolis of equilibrium" selected : attraction of industrial investments, installation of a number of tertiary equipments (in some cases transferred from Paris), a development of the communication and transportation network, etc.

But, some indications confirm the fear that the "metropolis of equilibrium" would function as attraction poles in the region in the same way as Paris on national level.

Besides, to fulfill a more adequate integration between the balance metropolis and the regional area around them, some towns should have the function of relay between the balance metropolis, the small cities and the rural area. Thus a policy to the middle cities (that would work as relay cities) would be a logical consequence of a deepening of the plans for the decentralization and search for a better balance of the system.

Thus the VIth Plan for Social and Economic Development (1971-1975) promotes the middle size cities without relinquishing the policy of the balance metropolis, which only undergoes a change in its nature.

Though the French policy of middle size cities is not the solution to all the problems of space in this country, it represents an important step in the land management process. In 1975 it had been applied to 70 cities.

On the same line D.A.T.A.R. added to their priorities a policy of support to the small towns and their rural spaces.

The French experience showed an alternative to those regions and countries where the problems of disequilibrium between cities and regions as well as among cities are acute. Thus, this concern ended up having repercussions beyond the French borders. As a consequence, in the World Conference on Population, organized by the U.N.O. in Bucarest, in August/1974, one of the final recommendations referred to the necessity of creating or reinforcing the world network of middle size and small cities to diminish the exaggerated growth of the large agglomerations.

#### WHAT IS A MIDDLE SIZE CITY ?

The French experience above all as well as that of other countries that apply a policy of decentralization have made possible the assembly of theoretical information about the hierarchic level of the cities. Nevertheless the experts have refused the idea of formulating unrestricted definitions of medium size cities. Jerome MONOD, of the D.A.T.A.R., said : "it seems vain to establish a scientific definition, nevertheless the notion of medium size city comprises a quite real meaning".<sup>5</sup>

To Joseph LAJUGIE, of the University of Bordeaux, "the most one can try to determine is a range that comprises a certain number of cities that may intended to be called medium size cities. . . , it would be better to call them medium dimension cities, not necessarily medium size in the functional sense".<sup>6</sup>

As one can see the demographic criterion (though useful and not neglectable) can only lead to the group of cities that comprises the medium size cities. Other criteria, such as the functional, should be taken into consideration to define a medium size city.

Based on the experience so far accumulated, there seems to be an agreement about the characteristics of a medium size town :

- constant and long lasting interactions between them and the region where they are located as well as with the urban agglomerations hierarchically superior ;
- demographic and functional sizes big enough to provide the region with a wide range of goods and services ;
- capacity to receive and absorb the migrants from the smaller cities or rural areas through employment, stopping the migratory flood towards the large cities, already saturated ;
- the necessary conditions to establish relations of dinamization with the microregional space ;
- differentiation within the urban space, with a well developed center, and a dynamic suburb. The evolution should follow the same model as that of the large cities, that is, a reproduction of new suburbs ;
- the presence, though to a smaller extent, of similar problems to those of the large cities, e.g. the poverty of the people in some sectors.

Anyway one cannot disregard aspects such as the demographic size, functional size, external relations, internal structure, and social problems of the medium size cities that may vary between countries and regions being of course a function of the level of development attained, the geographical position, and the historic and social conditions of the development of each country or region.

Though there may be an agreement as one regards the characteristics that qualify a medium size city, defining them has always posed some problems, mainly when the cities are in the boardline or in the intersection between the medium and the small or the large cities. For this reason, and for it is the easiest one, the criterion of demographic size has been the most largely used one to identify the medium size city, at least as a first approach.

From this point of view, although there is not a unanimity about the demographic threshold (maximum and minimum) that can hold the set of middle cities, there is a convergence of ideas about the "optimum" size of the cities considered typically middle, in many parts of the world.

The French researchers and planners have considered as

middle cities the ones that range between 20 000 to 100 000 inhabitants.<sup>7</sup>

Those limits are in general the same used and accepted in most of the countries of the western Europe. For example, the German geographers and planners—like HOFMEISTER<sup>8</sup>—usually give the following hierarchical classification of the cities using the demographic variable :

TABLE 24.1

Zwergstadt	till 2,000 inhabitants
Landstadt	from 2,000 to 5,000
Kleinstadt	from 5,000 to 20,000
Mittelstadt	from 20,000 to 100,000
Grosstadt	over 100,000 inhabitants
Weltstadt	more than 500,000 inhabitants

*Source* : HOFMEISTER (B.) : Stadtgeographie Das Geographische Seminar, Braunschweig, Georg Westermann Verlag, 1976.

In the Soviet Union, B.S. KHOREV—from the University of Moscow—states that the cities with population between 50 000 and 100 000 inhabitants have been considered as middle cities, although urban geographers like DAVIDOVICH and KONSTANTINOV state that the limit of 20,000 inhabitants would be the most adequate.<sup>9</sup>

Maybe it is due to those opinions that KHOREV says that a subclass of cities from 20 000 to 50 000 inhabitants has a transitional character, with characteristics of both, small and middle cities : “cities in the 20 000—50 000 subclass have in fact been called semi-middle”.<sup>10</sup>

Related to that, Africa is a good case example : the demographic size of middle cities is in general inferior. In the Ivory Coast, for example, Anne-Marie COTTEN identifies as middle cities those in which the population varies from 20 000 to 50 000 inhabitants, although she also says that cities with less than 20 000 inhabitants may also function as middle cities.<sup>11</sup>

In Asia, the cities with population between 20 000 and 250 000 inhabitants are usually considered middle size. Such is the case of the cities of Malaysia, studied by James OSBORN.<sup>12</sup>

The higher demographic limit is comprised in almost all the countries within 100 000 and 250 000 inhabitants.

However, this classification based on the demographic size is considered preliminary and incomplete by almost all the specialists in urban problems. To it should be added hierarchical and typological classifications based on other criteria, such as the functional size, the intensity and quality of the external relations, the economic specialization or diversifications, etc.

However it is necessary to say that the main aspects to characterize a middle city is its position and its role in the region and in the urban system as it has been said by MONOD.<sup>13</sup>

#### THE NECESSITY OF THE MIDDLE CITIES

Before we begin to analyze the policy for the middle size cities in Brazil, a last general aspect, of a theoretical nature, is worth being considered :-- why does the current (academic or political) concern about the problem of the middle cities increase ?

The search for a better inter-urban and urban-regional balance, the necessity of breaking the migration flows towards the big cities would already be enough to justify a policy for the middle cities in most countries.

But, there is, in our opinion, a much stronger reason related to the function that those cities have in the economic systems as that in the communication and functional organization of the countries and regions of the world. Following the same reasoning on those lines, one get to the conclusion that the notion of middle city related to the demographic size loses its place to the middle city "relay" within a regional or a national system. In this case, the power of the middle cities well depend rather on its geographical situation than on its size.

Along that line, we get to the conclusion that the development of the middle cities (i.e. their multiplication and growth) appears as a necessity, as something inevitable in the present stage of evolution of the society. From now on this tendency will certainly become stronger.

On one hand, the middle city is necessary because it represents a way to keep the social and economic status-quo (regardless of the ideological orientation). The bad functioning of the system originated from the exaggerated concentration of men, activities and capital must be corrected in someway, and in this case the middle cities functions as valves that can minimize the

bad functioning.

In the middle cities the problems that cause the bad functioning of the social and economic system, do not show up with the same intensity as in big cities; the internal de-economies, the high prices of the land, the high wages, the expensive moving to the place of work, the social problems, etc. The middle city, on the contrary, offers lands at more reasonable prices, labor force often available and not concentrated, hence harder to organize and most of the times that can be satisfied with lower wages. They are also more adequate places for the location of equipments of commercial distribution to the area where they are located, without the problems of traffic and communication found in large urban areas.

On the other hand, the middle cities turn out to be advanced expansion poles to the national system, perhaps in the same way as the Intermediate Powers function as essential links to maintain the political and economic systems of the world.

Using its own production or functioning as a trade center, the middle city represents a point of diffusion of the values of the social and economic system of which it is part. Its participation on the decisions is still kind of small, but its role on the "transmission" is fundamental.

#### THE POLICY OF MIDDLE SIZE CITIES IN BRAZIL

Unlike most developed countries where planning is a tradition and where the steps of the organization of the territory (urban and regional planning, metropolis, middle cities and small cities programs) followed a well defined time sequence, only recently had Brazil conditions to start its urban-territorial policy.

Besides that, programs like those of the metropolitan areas and middle cities only started after 1973 (that of the metropolis) and 1976 (the one of the middle size cities). Being almost simultaneous, there has been no time to use one's experiences to the advantage of the other. On the same lines, it is quite probable that programs for the small will be created before the programs destined to the cities and agglomerations of superior hierarchy had been evaluated.

In spite of this deficiency, a great effort of volunteer action

on our urban system has been done in the present decade.

The First National Plan of Development (I PND) for the years 1972/74, does not refer directly to a national urban policy. From the spatial point of view, its basic orientations are the search for national integration and a broadening of the internal market. As for the urban problem, the only references made were the necessary of coordinating the growth of São Paulo and Rio and an orientation to develop the "brazilian metropolitan areas", mainly in the center south part of Brazil.

In 1973 and 1974, with the results of the census of 1970, now widely diffused it is easy to become aware of the phenomenon of urbanization in Brazil :

TABLE 24.2 : Brazil : Growth of the Urban Population

Years	Population	% of Growth
1950	1,87,75,198	—
1960	3,19,55,633	70
1970	5,29,04,744	65

Source : FIBGE, 1972.

In fact, the quick evolution of the urban process in Brazil has reached a point where a spontaneous or semi-spontaneous growth cannot be accepted anymore.

Besides the absolute and relative growth of the Brazilian urban population, the last decade showed also an increase of the number of cities, a growth in their sizes and an intensification of the "metropolization process".

This is how the II PND (1975/1979), in what concerns the urban-territorial policy, represents a great advance when it is compared with the I PND.

Without really working out a real urban policy, the II PND proposes a large number of measures of national reach. The II PND makes a diagnosis of the evolution of the urbanization process in Brazil and drives the attention to the estimate that in 1980 about 2/3 of the population will live in the cities. It evidences that the urban development is closely connected with the national strategy of development.

The II PND main options are basically of a functional and geographical nature, opposing to the former orientations based



on engineering solutions to the urban problems. A better structuralization of the urban system and the occupation of the interior are the main special directions of the II PND.

The II PND is the first plan of national development that clearly refers to the necessity of strengthening the regional metropolis and the middle size cities.

Finally this plan preconizes differential urban policies in function of the regional peculiarities.

But, in fact, before 1975/76, it cannot be said that there is an urban policy for Brazil. What can be seen are setorial or punctual policies, a result that comes rather from the spatial intuition of our politicians and planners than from theoretically based programs.

A multiplication of studies about the cities, the awareness of the growing importance of the cities on the territorial organization, as well as the intensification of the social and economic problems in the big cities have led to the first important attempt of making a national urban policy. This assignment was given to FRANCISCONI and SOUZA<sup>14</sup>, who wrote the first report, widely published, on a global urban policy for Brazil. That report is a real mark in the planning of the urban policy and territorial organization in Brazil.

The great gap found by FRANCISCONI and SOUZA was that "the sectorial investments and policies are planned and implemented with little spatial compatibility, both intersectorial and as related to the urban system...The same applies to the intra-urban variables as regards the location. As for the investments in the cities, they are casual and disorganized as a consequence of a lack of a statement of priority for the cities"<sup>15</sup>. FRANCISCONI and SOUZA add that the principle that should guide the urban policy in Brazil is that "the urban system should not be treated in a standardized way anymore. The regional peculiarities and characteristics should be taken into account" (16). They refer to the important works of FAISSOL<sup>17</sup>, who identifies three different regional sets in the Brazilian urban system :

- The Central Nucleous : a system, leaded by São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro, which embodies mainly the areas around those cities, the rest of the Southeast and the South of the country. That is the most urbanized and

economically developed part of the country.

- Secondary Nucleous : it is the Northeast, with an older urban network which nevertheless presents a weaker interiorization as well as a rather deficient economic basis.
- National Periphery : corresponds to the Amazonas region and to the large areas in the Centre. The urban phenomenon is not significant there. The urban sub-systems are in a low level of organization.

Starting from geo-economic diagnosis of that kind, and following the lines of the II PND, FRANCISCONI and SOUZA<sup>18</sup> present different regional strategies for the implementation of a nationwide urban policy (Fig. 24.1).

- LIMITATION OF THE URBAN DEVELOPMENT : metropolitan areas of São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro.
- DISCIPLINE AND CONTROL : regional metropolis of the Centre and South of the country (Belo Horizonte, Brasília, Santos, Campinas, Curitiba, Porto Alegre) and the metropolitan areas of the Northeast and of the North (Salvador, Recife, Fortaleza and Belem).
- DYNAMIZATION : it corresponds to the interior of the Centre-South and of the Northeast ; the over-all objective is to provide some cities there with the conditions to become "development poles". It corresponds to the adequate space to the implementation of the medium size cities programs.
- PROMOTION : it corresponds to the National Periphery of FAISSOL, and the aim is to strengthen the few urban centres which have the conditions to organize the germs of urban networks which will be necessary to the integration of those spaces to the Brazilian economy and community.

Considering those general guidances of the national urban policy, the program for the medium size cities is given a high importance starting in 1976.




FIG. 24.1 : *Intervention areas of the nation wide policy for urban development*

#### THE PROGRAM FOR THE MEDIUM SIZE CITIES IN BRAZIL

##### The 1976/1977 period

The first part of the Program for the Medium Size Cities was actually implemented during the period 1976/77.

That pioneer program was a result of a study of the CNPU (National Commission for Urban Policy) which coordinated it for the whole country<sup>19</sup>.

The Program begins with a general diagnosis of the imbalances of the Brazilian urban system, and it proposes an action

over the middle cities aimed at renewing them as an alternative solution. Its main reasons are based on the guidances of territorial policy of the II PND.

It consists of a rather cautious program as regards the real steps which would result of its application to the cities chosen. For the selection of the cities it preconizes a lower limit of at least 50,000 inhabitants. Nevertheless, the basis for the selection is IBGE's work on the division of the country in functional urban regions<sup>20</sup>.

In accordance with the II PND, the Program presents the following global guidances :

- actions of deconcentration and of limitation of the urban processes in the areas of strong urbanization in which there are medium size cities ;
- dynamization actions in regions which are depressed or not enough differentiated economically ;
- promotion actions in those areas where there are medium cities which have economic functions related with tourism and leisure.

Previous surveys at state or regional levels were said to be required for the implementation of the Program. At least the following points should be covered by the surveys :

- the geo-economic diagnosis of the urban situation of the region and the state ;
- the site and the potential of the industries in the region ;
- the relationship between the medium size cities with the smaller urban centres and with the rural area.

The following criteria have been suggested to identify the middle cities to be covered by the Program :

- the importance of the tertiary functions ;
- the importance of the factors related with the income, the equipments and the ICM (Tax on Merchandises Sold) ;
- the structure of the economically active population, both local and microregional ;

- the position of the city in the region and in the national geographic space.

The Program aimed at acting upon two levels : on the intra-urban, by means of projects of modernization and creation of equipments of social and economic importance, of projects to discipline the land use as well as the urban expansion, and of projects to train people for the management at municipal level. At the level of the external relations of the cities, the Program foresaw studies regarding the placement of tertiary facilities within the reach of the region or microregion as well as exemption from taxes to attract capital (industrial or not).

That first Program pointed the means to obtain financial resources which would enable its implementation. Amongst the potential financing bodies there were : the BNH (National Housing Bank), the BNDE (National Development Bank), the FNDU (National Fund for Urban Development), etc.

In this first stage of the Program (1976/77) only a few regions were able to select the cities and the necessary projects (Fig. 24.2).

- the São Paulo State, which was the first one to conclude the studies and the projects according to the program. That was possible thanks to the work of the geographer Maria Adélia de Souza who directed the studies for the selection of the cities and projects ;
- another area which was benefited in the first stage of the Program is comprised by the states in the Northeast, for which the studies and projects have been accomplished by the SUDENE (Agency for the Development of the Northeast) ;
- some cities in isolated states have also been selected : three in the State of Espírito Santo and one in Santa Catarina.

The capital investment obtained by the cities included in the stage of the Program have covered the following sectors :

- planning and administration ;
- intra-urban transport ;




FIG. 24.2 : *Medium-size cities program for 1976-77*

- basic sanitation ;
- social substructure ;
- miscellaneous (industrial districts, provision markets, etc).

The first stage of the Program has showed some problems : first of all a guidance as for the priorities in regional or state level was

not established and as a result a rich state like São Paulo has been benefited before the poor regions of the country. By that time the CNPU had no conditions to assist and guide all the states in the preparation of the projects. On the other hand the capacity to prepare, to plan and to implement the projects of the Program varied a lot amongst state and city councils.

Though it has not been officially discussed it is known that strong political interests have pressed in an attempt to influence, at local or regional level, the selection of the cities. In some states, they even prevented the states from accomplishing the works and the projects in time to participate in the first stage of the Program. The CNPU technicians had to provide strict directions to prevent from the use of the Program for political purposes.

It should be added that though aiming at structuring the space the Program for the Middle Size Cities, in its first stage, assisted mainly the intra-urban projects, and only indirectly did it give assistance to the external relations of the cities.

#### **The 1978/1979 stage**

A new stage of the Program for the Medium Size Cities developed during the 1978/1979 period, when the lines stayed almost the same as before and the capital benefited the following sectors :

- intra-urban transport ;
- sanitation ;
- urban and municipal planning and administration ;
- social substructure.

At that stage the funds come mainly from : FNDU, FNTU (National Fund for Transport Development), the states and the city councils. The EBTU (Brazilian Enterprise for the Urban Transport) had a much more important participation than before.

Comparing with the first stage one could note a real technical and administrative improvement as a consequence of the experience acquired by the key body to the implementation of the Program : the CNPU. In fact, a higher quality, reliability and objectiveness were required as regards the works that led to the elaboration of the projects, the investment programs and the financial and physical charts.

The projects were more coherent with the reality of the cities selected and an effort was made to harmonize the actions of the several bodies in the Program.

At last the city council of the cities selected were required to prepare or up to date the PDU (Urban Development Plan) as a condition to participate in the Program. But the largest changes as regards the first stage of the Program referred to its spatial reach. While in 1976/77 the Program only benefited a few areas of Brazil, in 1978/79 most states had cities accepted on the Program (Fig. 24.3). Even those regions far from the coast started having cities selected though of course not as many as in the states east part of the country.



FIG. 24.3 : *Medium-size cities program for 1978-79*



As one can see, larger number of cities (115) were benefited than in the first stage (76).

It is basic to note that in the second stage the strict demographic limit were not followed. Cities located in regions weakly developed from an economic viewpoint as well as those located in areas with low demographic density were covered by the program regardless of the fact that sometimes their population below the 50,000 inhabitants.

The main problems of that phase can be rangered in three groups :

- lack of studies about the local urban, regional and national realities, especially as regards the level of the medium size cities. Those studies would serve as reliable information to the selection of the cities and to the elaboration of projects ;
- little capacity of the local administrations to appraise and manage the projects ;
- lack of financial funds.

It was that very lack of resources that led the government authorities to search funds at international organizations which started participating in the Program.

#### **The special B.I.R.D. program (CPM-BIRD)**

The first program for the Brazilian medium size cities in which International organizations participated was the CPM-bird. Its preliminary studies started in early 1977 when the CNPU defined the criteria for the selection of the medium size cities which were approved by the B.I.R.D. (Inter-American Bank for Regional Development) :

- geographic position and regional functions ;
- geographic size and dynamism ;
- importance of the recent immigrants in the total population ;
- economic structure and potential ;
- situation regarding some indicators of urban poverty ;
- local capacity of execution, fiscal position and potential to develop the Program.

Based on those criteria, the CNPU selected 48 cities at first. That number was reduced to 12 due to the limitation of financial and technical resources as well as to operational difficulties.

New problems (especially concerning the difficulties to elaborate the projects according to the BIRD's directions) prevented the program from getting off the ground.

At last, in October 1979, the CPM/BIRD was implemented by the Minister of Interior in Florianopolis (Santa Catarina). It included 8 urban units in the first stage (Fig. 24.4).



FIG. 24.4 : *Medium-size cities the world bank program*

The especial program will last for three years, from October 1979 and has been foreseen to cost 6 Billions Cruzeiros, 70 per cent of that amount will be paid by the Central Government (Part of which will come from the BIRD) and the states and city councils will be responsible for the rest.

The CPM/BIRD will finance projects for the modernization

of the substructure of the cities, the food supplying, the city management, and especially will make an effort to strengthen the medium, small and micro enterprises. Nevertheless the major objective will be to promote an improvement in the situation of the low income urban population. The creation of new jobs for them will be stimulated and so will be the participation of the local administration in the "assimilation" of activities of the so called "informal sector of the economy".

Besides that, the CPM/BIRD projects emphasize the improvement of the quality of living of the urban populations, especially the low income groups.

On the other hand, the CPM/BIRD brings an important innovation comparing with the regular program since it will act straight upon the economic basis of the cities through the support to the medium, small and micro enterprises.

Besides the state and municipal bodies, the following federal institutions are participating this program : BNH, EBTU, COBAL (Brazilian Food Company), SUDEPE (Agency for the Development of Fishery), CEBRAE (Brazilian Centre for Enterprise Support) and CEAG (Centre of Management Support for the Small, Medium and Micro Enterprises).

#### DIRECTIONS TO THE NEXT PROGRAMS

The experience accumulated during the two stages of the Program as well as the preparatory and initial phases of the CPM/BIRD, together with the understanding of the geo-economic and social evolution of Brazil in the few past years have provided the information which serves as basis for the directions to the medium size cities programs to the first years of the next decade <sup>21</sup>.

First of all, the intention to proceed with the programs for the medium size cities in the next coming years is seen in all the official papers and declarations by the Brazilian technicians in urban policy.

To select the cities for the future programs two aspects should be considered : one of a spatial nature (mainly the regional and national position of the city) and the other of an intra-urban nature (generally speaking, the aspects connected with demographic structure, and in particular the economically active population, as well as the role of the migrants and the levels of

urban poverty).

This time the cities in the interior of the country will be also included in the Program regardless of rigid demographic and economic limits.

But much more important innovations will concern the requirements for the implementation of the Program : the basic one will be the elaboration of an Urban Investments Program which can be defined as a group of inter connected steps aiming at a harmonic urban development. Those steps should be a result of local, state and national proposals.

The general directions for the thematic composition of the Urban Investments Programs give priority to the actions which cover :

- the organization of the use and occupation of the urban space :
- the improvement of the housing conditions, especially for the low income population ;
- the modernization of the urban transportation systems, especially the mass transportation ;
- the improvement of the quality of living of the urban populations through the action on the basic sanitation and water supply systems ;
- the creation of a permanent documentation and local planning structure so that the necessary plans and projects will be made and implemented by local administrators and technicians.

As for the funds they have been foreseen to be provided by the FNDU as well by the states and city councils.

The document that serve as base for the elaboration of the Urban Investments Program at local level is a study called "Profile of the City", which is one of the most important innovations for the future programs. It must be elaborated by the council of the cities intending to be included in the next programs, with the help of the state planning bodies. This is expected to stimulate the creation of local planning groups.

The "Profile of the City" should contain objective information to the evaluation of the present reality as well as the perspectives for the city and the district. It should also inform

about the local government problems and conditions as well as about their plans. The following aspects should be diagnosed, and if possible mapped :

- urban site and regional position ;
- geo-economic structure (economic activities, urban facilities, trends and problems of economic growth) ;
- urbanistic features (basic substructure, transportation, energy and communication services, health and education, use and occupation of the land) ;
- population structure (evolution and growth, composition, spatial distribution, social problems, etc) ;
- organization and necessities of the urban and municipal administration ;
- strategy of development (global planning, intra-urban and external relations problems and embottlements that should be tackled ; necessary actions to achieve the objectives of the local administration, the state and the country ; characterization of the intended model).

The general guidance is that the Profile should be simple and easily readable.

The purely technical and operational perfectionning and the broadening of the geographic reach of the Program are not sufficient though, hence the preconization of actions on the so-called "points and spaces of support". For that it is suggested that exploratory studies about the planning of other unities start to be made for the medium size policy, so far based mainly on projects of intra-urban characteristics resents the lack of actions on its meta-system, basically composed by :

- its region (the microregion) ;
- the small towns (basic for the links with the region, especially with the rural area) ;
- the regional and national communication axles in which the medium size city is located.

The information so far obtained show that in some Brazilian states those problems are being tackled : in the South (Santa Catarina, Rio Grande do Sul and Parana) there are studies for

the implementation of programs for the small cities and the communication axes ; in Sao Paulo, a policy for the communication axes is being developed, and in Minas Gerais the future programs for the medium size cities will not restrict to one city and its district only but will include its microregion.

#### REFLECTIONS AND CONCLUSIONS

In spite of being a recent object of concern <sup>22</sup> the problem of the medium size cities in Brazil has already gone through a long way.

Beginning at the moment when the Federal Government started their Program for the Medium Cities (1976) a lot of positive steps have been taken regardless of the political and ideological point of view.

The Brazilian urban planning starting applying, though in a naturally limited way, a real policy of interiorization of the benefits granted by the Government.

The projects for the medium cities ended up by leading the local administrators to a greater participation in the solution of the local problems, and even to a wider understanding of the regional and national realities. Hence a greater integration of the several levels of administration (federal, macroregional, state, regional, microregional, municipal and urban).

New opportunities, though limited, of redistribution of federal resources have appeared to scape from the concentrating monopoly of the large metropolis.

From the social viewpoint, the most recent projects of the Program for the Middle Cities (especially the CPM/BIRD) have started to benefit the low income population. In the same way, ANDRADE and LODDER<sup>23</sup> preconize as basic criterion to select the cities for the coming Programs the highest degree of urban poverty.

Nevertheless, not all the features of the Program for the Middle Cities can be seen so optimistically. It has been, by its own nature, a generator of discussions. At last two can be put in relief, though without the intention to invalidate the Program : one at the level of thought, another of action.

At the level of the ideas, the role of the government in that group of cities can be considered an unsolved problem : should

the government accelerate the urbanization process of the medium size cities ? The point is to know whether or not the government should *accelerate* the process since the intervention through actions or credits ends up by drawing those cities the problems that used to be restricted to the large cities (though those are not exclusive to the latter).

It is known that the migration towards a city is connected with the expectation of a job and of the improvement of the quality of living rather than to the real offer of a job and of better living conditions. While the government publicises a program of support to the medium cities, it gives publicity to their new conditions (though they are still few), hence attracting the migrants.

If, on one hand, the pressure upon agglomerations like Sao Paulo and Rio de Janeiro should be relaxed, on the other, the migration to the middle cities would bring to them the problems of the rapid and disorganized urbanization which the government wants to avoid. Besides that, the real offer of funds to the city councils is much lower than required, and in most cases cannot be applied in investment which are directly productive and job generators.

An action aiming at the broadening of the collection of taxes and the retention of those resources by the local administration, as well as an effort to prepare human resources for the city administrations could bring less artificial and less expensive results, which would also be more equanimous.

At the level of the action, the choice of the cities to be benefitted by the Program has a political component part, technically unponderable that causes strong deviations, especially of a geographic nature. It has happened, amongst other undesired effects that most of the cities selected is located not far from the coast. The government plans consider that region critical and its development liable to reorientation.

The reason for the discrepancy between the objectives and the action could be that though the objectives may be relevant and necessary in a national sense (with Sao Paulo and Rio de Janeiro as centres of command already saturated) the criteria for the selection have been restricted to the "urban size", usually measured in terms of population. This way, it is of course expected that the regions with a larger of inhabitants have

not only the largest cities but also the largest number of middle and small size besides a higher demographic density in the country. How can one distribute to the regions of lower demographic density the population that is stimulated to go to the overpeopled regions?

Besides, in the group of middle size cities, factors like the location in more or less developed regions has created a serious problem of inhibition, not conveniently tackled by the Central Government. The technical (preliminary studies, elaboration of projects, understanding of the official planning policy, etc) or administrative requirements (management of the projects, changes of a financial nature or regarding the objectives, etc) may inhibit cities that are typically medium size but located in the underdeveloped areas. Such cities would require especial orientation and advisory to be treated in the same conditions as the others.

As for the size of the cities currently selected, another aspect is worth discussing. Their size is representative of what we could call a city "already consolidated". It should be noted that a lot of capitals of states have been selected for the Program. Would those cities that have certainly gone beyond the "no return point", and which have their own growth energy, be the best suited gainer of the scarce federal resources? Would not the cities of an inferior hierarchy, more interiorized, more linked to the rural world, typically in a stage of "economic take off" and thus characterized by a certain degree of instability and insecurity, in short, those called "emergent centres" by the technicians the ones that should deserve the government support? Why are those cities in the threshold of indetermination which separates the small from the medium cities not promoted instead of the medium cities of a higher hierarchic level?

Those arguments, as we have said, do not invalidate the whole of the policy developed in the latest years in search for a better balance in our urban growth, and for a better organization of our territory, mainly because there is evidence that there has been a betterment of that policy. But it should be considered that the institutional and operational improvement of programs for the middle cities, its higher technical reliability as regards the selection of the cities and projects, the enhancement of the funds to be allocated to those cities, may be hindered by problems of




unknown power and consequences. In fact, at the very moment when we finish this work, Brazil struggles in an economic, social and political crisis of large proportions (worsened by the world energy crisis), which may develop in a way to cause a redirection with consequences upon the urban and territorial planning of the country.

For a poor country like Brazil, that simple effort to organize its territory as well as to discipline its urban growth had already appeared extremely costing and difficult. Now, when the country is in a phase of social and economic evolution called by some people "economy of war", will there be conditions to proceed and broaden the planning policy for the Brazilian cities and regions ?

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PETER M. TOWNROE

## NATIONAL SPATIAL STRATEGIES IN THIRD WORLD COUNTRIES

### NATIONAL SPATIAL STRATEGIES IN THIRD WORLD COUNTRIES

“ . . . population distribution policies, especially internal distribution policies, are still in their infancy, perhaps a decade or more behind family-planning policies in their specifics of definition, implementation, and evaluation. Whereas several nations have reached a low fertility and low mortality equilibrium, and the means are at hand for others to do so, the problems of population distribution have remained fairly intractable and may even intensify with each new generation. In fact, present demographic trends suggest that by the 1980s policies to deal with migration and distribution will be more controversial and complex than policies dealing with fertility.”  
(Piotrow, 1978)

### INTRODUCTION

Recent demographic evidence suggests that the explosive growth in the population of the world may be beginning to fall away. During the past thirty years or so, the less developed countries of the world have been experiencing preindustrial rates of fertility with post-industrial rates of mortality. Together with much slower but still positive population growth rates in the industrialized countries, the gain of births over deaths in the LDCs has increased the world population from an estimated 2.5 billion in

1950 to just over 4 billion today. However, even if, as the recent U.N. fertility survey indicates, fertility rates are falling in countries containing at least half of the present 3 billion people of the less developed world, the inbuilt momentum of the skewed age structure of the population growth of the last thirty years will lead to a world population of some 6 billion by the end of the century.

This present demographic avalanche is not only awesome in its total magnitude, with all its consequences in demands for basic needs of food, clothing and shelter as well as for access to health services, education and jobs ; it also has major implications for the social and economic structures of most countries. Ethnic, racial and religious balances will change, the proportion of the elderly will increase, and the proportion of energetic and mobile 15 to 30 year old will increase, and the proportion of the total living in absolute poverty may well increase. The attitudes and actions of both of these latter two groups will be influenced by expectations generated by the extension of radio and television.

Among these implications one dominant set of pressures in most LDCs is already clearly evident : the pressures arising from the redistribution of population from rural to urban areas, from the growth of urban areas, and from the rising proportion of the urban population living in very large cities.

By the year 2000 it is expected that over 50 per cent of the world population will be urbanised. This implies that the total number to be absorbed by the growth of cities between 1975 and 2000 is of the order of 1.3 billion, or in excess of 70 per cent of the anticipated increase in population (Beier, *et al.*, 1975, based on U.N. projections). By the end of the century, the population of cities in LDCs will be growing at approximately three times the population of rural areas, fuelled by two factors : the age distribution of existing city populations, and rural-urban migration.

The inbuilt growth of a young and fertile population is particularly significant in the largest cities, especially those in middle income countries (e.g., in Latin America). The continuing trend in many countries is for large cities to increase their position relative to small and medium size cities. More and more of the world's population is becoming concentrated in very large urban agglomerations, even though cross-country data do suggest a weak negative association between city growth rates and city size

(Preston, 1979).

In many countries the resources and levels of skilled manpower to effectively tackle the resulting economic and social problems of this urban flood are grossly inadequate. It is possible to detect a rising sense of panic among governments searching for appropriate policy responses. In 1973, half of the governments in LDCs contacted in a United Nations enquiry considered current growth trends in their metropolitan centers as excessive and saw policy intervention as desirable (United Nations, 1974).

It is not just that awareness of the dimensions of both existing and coming problems has increased. The 1976 U.N. Habitat Conference in Vancouver alerted the industrialised countries to the urban growth pressures in LDCs and reinforced concern in the key international aid agencies at the potential economic and social costs of mismanaged or unplanned urban development. But in some LDCs themselves, the pressures have led governments to an anti-city stance in policy. Attempts have been made to halt or slow the flow of rural immigrants coming into the city, and to develop industry in the country side and in small towns to counter the growth of the largest cities. Often led by inappropriate European paradigms, in most countries where they have been attempted these policies have met with little success.<sup>1</sup> Consequently some disillusionment has set in. Perhaps it is better to let market forces work themselves out in distributing the population between urban areas in a country, using that distribution then as a given, within which to pursue other chosen social, economic and political goals?

This paper argues that, although there is a danger of excessive determinism in policy making, there is nevertheless a clear need for a government strategy towards the spatial patterning of growth and development in those LDCs faced with the twin pressures of rapid and large scale urbanisation. This strategy has to concern itself not merely with the location of urban growth but also with the implications of that growth for the full range of government policies and programmes as well as for the more general questions of economic growth and the interpersonal distribution of the benefits of that growth. Also, of course, the processes of economic growth and the economic and social impact of government policies and programmes will influence the course, distribution and efficiency of urban growth. A national spatial

strategy is required to look both ways : towards those factors influencing the growth and form of cities, and towards the implications of that growth for the social and economic structures of the society.

The following section discusses the concept of a "national spatial strategy", offering some alternative interpretations and suggesting a list of key objectives for such a strategy. This section is based on part of an earlier paper (Townroe, 1977) but also draws upon the recent paper by Renaud (1979). The third section explores the need for such a strategy. It could be argued that this section should come first, the problems defining the content of the policy. But many of the problems engendered by the processes of urban growth are tackled by a very wide range of policies in all countries. The need for a grand strategy as set out in section two is neither clear nor universally accepted. Section four briefly discusses some policy options, not by reviewing policies which have been used, both successfully, and unsuccessfully but rather by suggesting why policy forms from the industrialised nations are not always appropriate in LDCs. Section five, on problems of implementation, overlaps with four, but stresses that the speed of change is so fast that any strategy for urban development in an LDC has to be continually modified and updated. The single plan blueprint from the external consultant may do more harm than good.

### **The role of a national spatial strategy**

Nearly all governments have elements of spatial strategy within their overall programme of policies. In both developed and less developed countries many governments seek to promote economic development in lagging regions and to decentralise urban growth away from the existing largest cities. Policies for rural development in many LDCs have an important spatial component. Furthermore, there are frequently implicit spatial objectives contained within ostensibly non-spatial policies, both in intention and in execution. Policies for housing, transportation, civil rights, defense and industrial development all have clear spatial consequences for the evolution of a nation's urban system. However, relatively few nations have designed and introduced a comprehensive national policy for urban expansion : relatively few have moved beyond the twin foci of curbing metropolitan growth

in one or more major cities and of promoting growth in selected centres elsewhere.

Rapid growth in population plus industrial expansion and economic growth has created imbalances in the urban system of many LDCs. Larger cities have grown faster than smaller cities, employment and income growth has come in the towns rather than the country-side, some regions have grown faster than others, while prosperity and the negative externalities of large cities have had differential incidence between social groups within those cities. Identification of those imbalances has led Renaud (1979, p. iii) to argue that a national urbanisation policy should have four major objectives :

- (i) the full development of the national resources of the country ;
- (ii) the maintenance of national cohesion among regions with different levels of per capita out put and income ;
- (iii) the prevention or correction of excessive concentration of economic activities within the capital region (or the region with the largest metropolitan area, if different) ;
- (iv) the achievement of a more efficient and more equitable management of growth within cities.

The final objective here immediately suggests that a national urbanisation policy or spatial strategy has to be concerned with more than the developing pattern of settlements. Indeed, a concern with the physical extent and distribution of urban expansion barely meets the other objectives either. Perhaps some distinctions in terminology will lead to a better understanding of the potential role of a national spatial strategy. We may distinguish initially urban growth policy in a LDC from a "national urban policy" in the sense used for example by Moynihan (1969). Moynihan was looking for an urban policy framework which would recognise the interrelatedness of the urban system as a basis for integrating the 600—plus federal domestic programmes existing at that time in the United States. Such a national urban policy would search for both synergy and wasteful overlap in these programmes, so enhancing the capacity of central and local government to tackle urban problems. Moves towards this sort of comprehensive policy approach for the economic and social



problems of the major conurbations were made by both the two previous administrations in the United Kingdom. But this is an institutional blueprint focussed on particular problems, as Wingo (1972) suggested. It is not a general approach, developing a framework within which *any* relevant influence or problem may be considered. "Urban growth strategy", may be distinguished from "urban development strategy", if by "development" we include social and economic development, embracing structural change of socio-economic systems within cities. A development strategy may be required even in the context of a static population and of low economic growth.

Should we distinguish "urban growth strategy" from "spatial strategy" in the typical LDC context? If an "urban growth strategy" is regarded as being primarily concerned with the implications of the patterns and forms of the growth of cities, then such a strategy hardly meets the objectives of Renaud set out above, and certainly does not focus itself on the unintended and unwanted spatial effects of non-spatial policies. Renaud's objectives flow into a wider concern with both social and economic efficiency, and equity. Efficiency in the process of urbanisation refers to the most productive (in both a cash and a non-cash income sense) use of economic resources. It is clear that the policies of many city governments yield grossly inefficient results; and, furthermore, results which exacerbate inequities in the inter-personal distribution of the benefits of urban growth [Linn, (1979) gives many examples]. A "national spatial policy" requires a catholic orientation and concern. It must concern itself both with geography and with guidance of social and economic change. It must encompass the effects of existing non-spatial policy programmes, as well as providing a framework for analysis and policy design to guide the path of urban growth.

How is a "strategy" different from a "policy"? This is a crucial distinction. The term "strategy" implies something wider and perhaps looser in detail than a "policy". Policy implies a plan for course of action whereas, following Bourne (1975, p. 41), we may take strategy to include questions of attitude, of organisational procedures, of political and social philosophy as well as specific plans and proposals for instruments. A national spatial strategy implies some form of value orientation and a long-term view, a summation and integration of those various influences

on settlement patterns both within and outside government. It includes the specification of objectives and the design of policy instruments and legislation, but it is broader than both of these. It becomes a framework for policy development. Such a strategy becomes concerned with more than merely accommodating urban growth. It encompasses all four of Berry's (1973, p. 176) modes of planning; from ameliorative problem solving, to allocative trend modifying, to exploitive opportunity seeking, to normative goal achieving.

Effective policies for the process of urbanisation in LDCs have often failed for many of the same reasons that policies of decentralisation and regional development have failed in the industrialised countries. Short term political and/or economic changes have led to a stop-go application of policy instruments with a frequent change in specification. The level of political commitment to such policies has frequently been low because of an inadequate recognition of need and of the long time scale before measurable results can be identified. There has also been a tendency to focus on decentralisation within and from the major metropolitan region while ignoring the implicit incentive effect in favour of the core resulting from many trade, industrial and infrastructure policies. The separate elements of implicit and explicit spatial policy have not been coordinated together. An effective national spatial strategy will require four pre-conditions :

- (i) that urban growth and development is seen as a national policy issue ;
- (ii) the associated problems and opportunities appear capable of solution or achievement through the operations of government ;
- (iii) there is a political will to formulate policy ;
- (iv) the ability exists to implement policy laid down by the central or federal government.

No West European country has developed a full national spatial strategy (with the possible exception of Sweden). But urbanisation and urban expansion in the present more developed world took place in a very different environment than that ruling at present in the LDCs. The size and the speed of urban growth in many LDCs is greater than anything experienced in the developed

countries. Available resources to meet this expansion are less, while the channels and intensity of interurban interdependencies in the urban systems of LDCs are quite different from, for example, nineteenth century Europe. Urbanisation in the present LDCs is occurring within a new socio-economic context. These contrasts alone argue the need for a national spatial strategy. Urbanisation policy in most LDCs, as in most developed countries, has been essentially reactive rather than initiatory. It has tended to be partial and uncoordinated, lacking strategy, and frequently containing a large element of political smoke screening in the face of a lack of capacity and a lack of political will to plan. Too often governments have resorted to a projects—and—programme approach, with all the limitations that implies. However, recognition of interdependencies in both problems and policies is coming. It is now well established in programmes for rural development in LDCs; and “integrated” is becoming a by-word for regional development. A full national spatial strategy takes this one step further.

In defining a role for a national spatial strategy in a LDC we can develop thirteen distinct objectives :

- (a) To promote economic and social efficiency in the use of human and material resources for urban development.
- (b) To prevent or ameliorate undesirable political, social and economic ills and inequities shown to be associated with large concentrations of population or with fast urban growth rates.
- (c) To promote economic development, not only in improving the use of resources but also in the creation of resources.
- (d) To prevent intraregional and interregional (and perhaps tribal or ethnic) economic imbalance and inequity in access to public services.
- (e) (linked to each of a to d) To select urban centres for the promotion of economic development and of population expansion.
- (f) To eliminate and prevent unintended and unwanted spatial consequences of national economic policies.
- (g) To promote economic integration through the removal of interregional barriers to trade, resource mobility and

- the diffusion of information and innovations, in so far as this is consistent with (d) and (e).
- (h) To support and develop more efficient internal management of cities.
  - (i) To provide a framework for the formulation of other (i.e., non-spatially strategic) planning decision. These decisions may be in the areas of urban planning or municipal management; or elsewhere in the public sector (e.g., the location of schools and hospitals and transportation (investments); or in the private sector.
  - (j) To allocate scarce spatial planning manpower skills.
  - (k) To link urban development trends to the location of administrative and political decision making centres, so that cities will be interdependent rather than being forced into a "colonial" relationship up and down the hierarchy.
  - (l) To provide a framework for the research activity undertaken by the governmental office assigned the task of formulating an urban growth strategy, or by anyone else.
  - (m) To give a basis for learning from the experience of other countries.

If objectives serve to define the structure of the contents of the ideal national spatial strategy, then we may now turn in more detail to the urban growth pressures and the policy concerns which will put executive flesh on to the bones of that structure.

### **3. Government Intervention and the Processes of Urban Growth**

Within the total group of LDCs both the speed and the extent of urbanisation vary a good deal, as seen in Table 25.1 The dominant related policy concerns likewise will differ. Clearly per capita income will be as much, if not more of, an influence on the costs and benefits of urban growth as the head count alone. The spatial development problems of the industrialising middle income nations of Latin America or South and East Asia or the oil rich countries of the Middle East are rather different than those of the large low income nations of Africa and Asia. It is difficult and perhaps dangerous to generalise. There are however four levels of focus for spatial policies common to many LDCs, each level

TABLE 25.1 : Urbanisation levels in a sample of less developed countries

Country	G.N.P. per capita US S, 1978	Percentage of Total Population which is urban 1980	Urban-Rural Growth Differential 1950-70	Annual Average Urban Growth Rate 1970-80
Argentina	1910	82	3.18	1.8
Brazil	1570	65	3.89	4.3
Mexico	1290	67	3.37	4.5
Algeria	1260	61	3.35	6.4
South Korea	1160	55	5.71	4.8
Malaysia	1090	29	1.96	3.5
Colombia	850	70	3.08	3.9
Ivory Coast	840	38	5.51	8.2
Nigeria	560	20	2.60	4.9
Philippines	510	36	1.38	3.6
Egypt	390	45	2.66	3.0
Indonesia	360	20	2.32	3.6
Senegal	340	25	2.07	3.3
China	230	25	3.79	3.1
Pakistan	230	28	2.68	4.3
India	180	22	1.11	3.3
Upper Volta	160	9	3.17	4.1

*Source : World Development Report, The World Bank, Washington, D.C.*

requiring rather a different justification for government intervention in the urban growth process. All interrelate, and all would come under a national spatial strategy.

The first level is at the bottom of the urban hierarchy. It is now widely recognised that economic and technological development in agriculture requires a complementary development of services and markets that is urban based, in small towns across the countryside. This development provides agriculturally linked employment, the resulting skills then allowing the growth of other small industries. As employment opportunities on the land fall or fail to expand, out migration of the surplus labour force is restrained. Many public services in rural areas also require an urban base. (Rondinelli and Ruddle, 1978).

The second level of focus of spatial policy is that of the (usually) large number of intermediate sized centres. The concern here is normally with the span of services offered by these centres

to smaller centres and with the adequacy and efficiency of the communications network between them and with the largest metropolitan areas.

The third level of focus is towards lagging regions, or regions of especial political sensitivity. This is the familiar West European policy areas. The justifications for government policy interventions are reasonably well defined (e.g. Armstrong and Taylor, 1978, Ch. 5 and 6) ; although differentials in recorded unemployment are unlikely to be such a spur to government activity in LDCs as in the industrialised nations. The political demands for tribal or ethnic integration may be more important between regions in a LDC.

Finally, there is the concern with the largest cities. Or rather three related concerns : those of size, speed of growth, and of primacy.

The advantages and disadvantages of very large cities are well known in general terms, although it has proved to be extremely difficult to develop unambiguous indicators of the costs and benefits of different sizes of cities. The resulting ambiguity has led to differing views as to the desirability of policy interventions to limit the size or rate of growth of cities in developing countries (Gilbert, 1975), (Richardson, 1976). The divergence of opinion stems in part from differing perceptions of the ability of most LDCs to effectively deliver a policy of restraint without unacceptably high social costs, but also in part from differing views as to the nature of the problem. The problem can be seen as one of *existing and potential size* alone, very large size giving rise to negative externalities and high social costs. Or as a problem of *growth*, when the rate of growth outstrips the capacity of the urban management system, leading to a progressive failure of public services and regulations. Or the concern is focussed on the *relative size* of the largest one, two or three cities, with the belief that excessive "primacy" in the urban system leads to an economic, social and political imbalance, resulting in a discrimination of interest and resource allocation to smaller intermediate sized cities.

All three concerns result from strong forces of concentration within a developing urban system. The most important of these forces interrelate as shown in Diagram 1. This diagram is adapted from a model developed by Thompson (1978) to explain the




Fig. 25.1 : Diagram line : The interaction of size growth rate and primary in urban development

transition of small cities in the U.S., usually into larger cities but sometimes into even smaller cities. Thompson did not include primacy or rural-urban migration among his concerns but laid more stress on the role of physical amenity than the diagram here.

Interpretation of the diagram may usefully start at the commonly accepted core process of urban growth : growth of industrial investment leading to additional jobs attracting immigrants who increase the population and the city grows in size. This process runs down the centre of the diagram. In mixed economy nations the central dynamo behind this process is the private sector capital market, frequently assisted by public sector agencies (development banks, industry ministries, economic councils, etc.) channelling credit to industries. This capital market will normally follow three conventional wisdoms when considering location of investments and the anticipated rates of return : "larger is safer", "newer is more safe", and "largest is safest". The three attributes of very large cities, size, growth and primacy, are therefore strengthened and the potential policy concerns are heightened.

The rate of growth of industrial investment is dependent upon the rate growth of exports from the city and the development of the local goods market. Expansions here in turn interact with the development of local services (as shown top left), all three sectors of activity benefitting from economies of agglomeration which show increasing returns to urban size. Absolute size may be measured in terms of income, employment, area or population. Here increases in population result in a larger city. But a larger city may run into diseconomies of scale. These may be land restraints, rising costs in urban services, service defaults, or increasing congestion and pollution. There is therefore a negative feedback between size and growth rate at some (unknown) size of city. Rising real incomes may be a factor adding to these problems. The negative pressure is indicated by the dotted line of the diagram.

Rising real incomes result from the increasing labour productivity made possible by the industrial investment (although such rises may be held back if there is an excess supply of labour). Higher incomes mean demands for more and better local services from the private sector. They also allow (through the tax system) increases to be made in the stock of public capital. If this capital



is in the form of industrial infrastructure yet more private investment is encouraged, giving the result found in many countries that primacy is reinforced by the operation of the public sector in the largest and richest city. If the government and civil service are located in the primate city and this city also serves as the principal destination for international industrial investment, then primacy is reinforced again.

In the long run, the ability of a city to export depends upon the skills and innovative capabilities of its labour force. Education is therefore a clear investment in urban growth, whether it is paid for directly out of personal incomes or through the government. Similarly new housing, however, financed, encourages in-migration to the city. Improved medical services may also encourage in-migration. They certainly influence birth rates and, with improvements in public health services, improve survival rates. The resulting increases in population eventually increase the size of the labour pool, a pool already being made larger by in-migration. This movement into the cities is encouraged by any imbalances in urban and rural wages and in opportunities for employment.

Each of the links shown in the diagram is familiar individually to those who have thought about the processes of urban growth. Further links may be identified. However, what the diagram seeks to stress is the inter-dependency of the links, demonstrating that intervention by public policy at any one point will have consequences, perhaps unforeseen, elsewhere in the system.

So, when does it make sense for a government to intervene to try to influence the size or rate of growth or degree of primacy of a city? There are those who say never: that if correct policies of pricing for urban services and for congestion and pollution are applied, then the size of city which results will be optimal from the point of view of the national economy in aggregate. The city will stop growing when the costs to the last migrant and to the marginal investor outweigh the benefits.

However, even with correct pricing and policies for externalities, the slow down size of the city may be far in excess of the size that is felt to be tolerable for the existing inhabitants or to an optimally productive environment for the past investor. The sunk costs of both businesses and households and their ties of

family and friends, sources of information and commercial contacts, hold them into the city. For both of these groups, any new or developing problems of living, working and making money in the city may be attributed (correctly or not), to increases in the size of the city.

In the face of any deterioration in living and working conditions in the city, the residents (who are voters) will demand greater public expenditures to remedy the ills. If the city is large, is primate and is the home of the nation's power elites, the political imperative of such a demand will be answered, even if fiscal resources involved could have been used more productively or more equitably elsewhere in the economy. Anticipation and experience of such demands, plus a fear of increasing diseconomies of scale in urban services, will lead governments towards a metropolitan decentralisation strategy focussed on easing the pressures of growth in the central city.

It is also clear that the markets involved, whether for jobs, homes, land, or urban services, work imperfectly in most countries. There are regulations and controls as well as high degrees of uncertainty and significant costs of reaction to changed conditions. Knowledge on alternatives is imperfect. Any of these afford grounds for policy intervention to influence decisions on the choice of locations of homes and factories, whether directly or indirectly.

It is, however, unfortunately true that any spatial policy which seeks to completely reverse strong economic forces is unlikely to succeed. Attempts to prevent rural migrants reaching a large city or to lure industrial investment out of the city face very strong countervailing forces, if it can be shown that the city is still growing faster than all other cities. This is why the onset of reverse polarisation is catching attention (Richardson, 1977). When secondary cities start to grow faster than a central city, then a policy of metropolitan decentralisation and/or a strategy towards the growth of medium sized cities can hold some confidence in achieving its objectives.

It was argued earlier that a policy or strategy towards the largest city or cities should lie within the context of a national spatial strategy. Attention in this section has been focussed on the big city problem. The grounds for active policy intervention guiding the path of urban development at the other three levels

of focus of a national spatial strategy (the rural service towns, the intermediate size cities and urban areas in lagging regions) are more familiar, and less subject to confusion. We may now return to the wider canvas and ask whether the policy instruments used for spatial economic and social policies in the industrialised countries are fully appropriate for the conditions found in many LDCs.

#### 4. The Choice of Policy Options

The policy instruments used for spatial objectives fall into two groups: fiscal and non-fiscal. *Fiscal instruments* are normally directed at the investment decisions of companies, seeking to influence post-tax rates of return on projects. They include the various forms of investment subsidy (grants, tax allowances, cheap loans, etc.); subsidies towards the cost of establishing a new plant (removal expenses, employee relocation, training, etc.); subsidies to operating costs (tax holidays, pay-roll subsidies, etc.); and fiscal penalties. The *non-fiscal instruments* are also designed to influence corporate locational decision making, but in addition have a direct influence on the spatial pattern of employment. They include the direct provision of industrial facilities, such as sites and buildings; the provision of indirect services and amenities to include public utilities, housing, commercial services and educational institutions; and the location of public investments in state owned industry, in government offices and in educational, health and research institutions. Locational permits and permissions for industrial construction and occupancy of premises have also been widely used.<sup>2</sup>

The choice of a package of policy instruments appropriate to the situation of a particular country is made in the light of four considerations:

- (a) economic analysis of the likely effects of each instrument, both positive and negative;
- (b) the lessons to be learned from the experience of other countries;
- (c) recognition that the set of chosen instruments may change in the future in the light of analysed experience; and
- (d) the contexts of the existing situation in the given city

and country and the constraints they impose.

Over the past twenty years extensive research has been undertaken in both North America and Western Europe into the nature of the impacts of different types of spatial policy instruments. This research offers a firm base on which to consider the impact of the same instruments in LDCs. A range of accepted techniques and methods of analysis are available for empirical work (e.g., see the review by Armstrong and Taylor, 1978). The results of many studies are available for comparison (e.g., in those summarised in Townroe, 1979). However, considerations (b) and (d) above do suggest that the lessons from more developed countries for LDCs in the use of spatial policy instruments must take account of a number of contextual differences between the two groups of countries. The most important of these are as follows (Townroe, 1979, p. 125) :

- (1) *Small target group of firms.* If the number of firms large enough to respond to spatial policies is small enough, selective rather than general instruments may become possible.
- (2) The *relative agglomeration advantage* to industry of being in the largest city may be particularly high compared to other urban centres.
- (3) *The scarcity of managers and skilled labour* may act as the key constraints on non-metropolitan locations.
- (4) *Government involvement with industry* is high and so the need for close contact is strong. Key government offices usually in the metropolitan centre.
- (5) Technologist, and hence cost structures, are normally *more labour intensive* than in industrialised countries.
- (6) *Multinational corporations* are a particularly important source of capital and technology and may offer projects which are more spatially "footloose" than those of local firms.
- (7) *Underdeveloped capital markets* increase the importance of access to both loan and equity capital.
- (8) *Foreign exchange* is a scarce commodity and may therefore be used as a policy lever.
- (9) If *tax revenue* has a high opportunity cost, revenue spen-

- ding policies are less attractive.
- (10) *Industrial estates* with utilities and key services may offer important locational advantages.
  - (11) *State ownership of industrial concerns* is frequently extensive, allowing the use of "lead industries".
  - (12) *Non-spatial trade and industry policies* frequently offer such large explicit and implicit incentive effects (measured in terms of effective rates of protection) that the financial benefits of the spatial policies to industrial enterprises are perceived as insignificant.

Among these contextual differences for the design of spatial policies, the last one may be the most important, although very little is known at present about the interaction between spatial and non-spatial policies for industry. A recent study in Nigeria showed that some 90 percent of the indirect subsidies yielded by trade policies were received in the Lagos region where much of Nigerian industry is located (Bertrand, 1978). This encourages a cumulative causation of spatial concentration which Nigerian decentralisation policy is trying to counter. It seems probable that this conflict between spatial and non-spatial policy instruments is encountered in many LDCs. The trend towards metropolitan concentration is often further intensified by policies which have a bias against agriculture and rural industries, by government regulation of activities (e.g. for transport or energy), and by the structure of intergovernmental fiscal relations (Renaud, 1979, pp. 119-127).

### 5. The Implementation of a National Spatial Strategy

This paper has suggested both the need for and a role for a national spatial strategy in LDCs. A major function of such a strategy is to integrate and harmonise (a) existing spatial policies with each other and (b) non-spatial with spatial policies. However, this wide and perhaps diffuse function has two major problems. The first is operational, the second is political.

Operationally, a national spatial strategy has to be formulated in several stages. Firstly, general goals which are essentially value laden and political in nature and which relate to the processes and patterns of urban development in the country have to be turned into specific policy objectives. A general policy struc-

ture can then be developed taking into account the various contexts, both as constraints and sources of uncertainty. From this general structure, taking account of budgetary, institutional and manpower resources, alternative packages of instruments can be specified and evaluated. (Townroe, 1979, p. 127-133). The chosen package can then be negotiated with the executive agencies of government : and it is here that the first problem occurs.

A national spatial strategy by its very nature has concerns which lap over into the spheres of interest of many different agencies (ministries, department, authorities) of government (physical planning, transport, housing, industry commerce, construction, etc.). If responsibility for the strategy is placed in any one of those agencies, cooperation from the other agencies may not be forthcoming or a particular bias may be placed on the focus of the strategy. If responsibility for the strategy of the other hand is kept out of the hands of those executive authorities and is given to a special agency without executive powers then the agency and the strategy may be ignored or may attract no more than lip service. One solution may be to follow the French example and to formulate the strategy from the office of the Prime Minister. Or to rest the strategy with a Ministry of Planning. Either way, the bureaucratic link between strategy formulation and relevant and/or consequent executive action is worthy of careful attention.

A national strategy will always have three key characteristics which make it difficult to "sell" politically : by advisers to politicians and by politicians to their supporters. This is the second major problem area for implementation. Even though urbanisation and population growth may be proceeding very rapidly in the given country, a spatial strategy by its very nature has to have a long time perspective : perhaps ten years as a minimum. It will therefore be difficult to obtain a supporting political commitment from a politician looking for policies with which he or she can be identified. The second characteristic is that a spatial strategy will imply selectivity : of support to some areas and of restriction to others. Or selectivity of support by type of firm or type of worker. Any strategy or policy which has strong unambiguous distributional implications make political enemies. This may well lead to political attempts to try to blur the true focus of the strategy and to compromise the effective operation of the chosen instruments. Indeed the final characteristic which counts against

a national spatial strategy may also aid ambiguity. This is the characteristic of ill-defined indicators of success. The strategy may be being successful when the problem is getting worse at a reduced rate. But this is hardly success to the politician. The major metropolitan area is still growing when reverse polarisation starts to occur. The concepts of relative growth rates, or real resource savings, of opportunity costs, or of negative externalities are hardly material for the hustings. The indicators of social success for the strategy may be much less sharply focussed than the private costs imposed by the strategy.

#### FOOTNOTES


1. On migration policies, see Shaw (1978). On industrial decentralisation, see Townroe (1979). The more general policy experience is reviewed by Renaud (1979).
2. The use of different packages of spatial policy instruments in Mexico, South Korea, Iran, Malaysia, Colombia, Pakistan, Spain and the Philippines is outlined in Townroe (1979, pp. 147-150).

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DENNIS A. RONDINELLI

## REGIONAL DISPARITIES AND INVESTMENT ALLOCATION POLICIES IN THE PHILIPPINES

### Spatial Dimensions of Poverty in a Developing Country

A largely unheeded warning to development administration and political modernization theorists during the 1960s that spatial factors would become increasingly important in national and international development policy has been born out in the urgent and complex problems of poverty and inequality that Third World countries faced during the 1970s and will continue to struggle with during the 1980s. Heaphy noted that of the many dimensions to the study of national development, "the spatial dimension is both crucial and regrettably understudied."<sup>1</sup> And in his seminal work on the spatial influences on development processes in Tanzania, Gould foresaw the difficulties of understanding the dynamics of modernization in the developing world "before we have good descriptions of the basic spatial patterns that ultimately must be linked together through time."<sup>2</sup> Unfortunately, the spatial distribution of power and resources and the implications for subnational modernization, decentralization of government functions, and allocation of national investments among competing sectors and regions, identified as crucial subjects for research and policy analysis during the 1960s, subsequently received little attention by political modernization and development administration theorists. Now the severe spatial inequities in national development in much of the Third World pose a set of difficult problems with which developing country governments must grapple directly if their announced intentions of reducing

levels of abject poverty and creating more socially equitable patterns of economic development are to be achieved.<sup>3</sup>

Growing disparities in income and wealth between urban and rural populations, and in levels of economic development among geographical regions within developing countries, became a crucial problem for government planners and an important concern of international assistance agencies in the mid-1970s. Both capitalist and socialist governments began to realize that aggregate economic growth does not ensure widespread development and that benefits of progress in leading sectors do not automatically "trickle down" to lagging regions or spread to the majority of the poor. In much of the developing world economic growth has been limited to a few urban centres or to regions where governments have heavily concentrated their investments in social overhead and productive activities. Despite impressive gains in industrial and agricultural output over the past quarter century in Third World nations, a majority of their populations remain in abject poverty. Rural areas have not benefitted from urban industrial growth and modernization. The poorest groups, which comprise a substantial portion of the population in these societies, have been by-passed by economic progress, or worse, their standards of living have deteriorated. A recent study of eight Asian countries by the International Labour Office concludes "that incomes of the rural poor have been falling absolutely or that portions of the rural population living below a designated 'poverty line' have been increasing, or both."<sup>4</sup> World Bank studies confirm this finding on a broader scale, nothing that historically the poor in developing countries do not share equitably in economic growth because of their limited access to productive assets, educational opportunities, land, credit and jobs.<sup>5</sup>

Growing inequities in the distribution of development benefits that are seen most starkly in the large disparities in living standards between urban and rural areas and in the differential growth rates of regions, are now a crucial concern of national development policies. Thailand's Fourth Five-Year Plan for 1977-1981 emphasizes, for example, that the overwhelming portion of growth in GNP over the past decade was contributed by a single region dominated by Metropolitan Bangkok, which has "expanded at a more rapid rate than the economies of other regions as evidenced by its increasing share in national production

from 57.2 per cent in 1971 to 59.8 per cent in 1976." Government planners argue that "this undesirable trend will continue unless some effort is made to develop the peripheral area by improving the economic structure of these lagging regions."<sup>6</sup> And a former planning official of India notes that his nation, "like most countries around the globe has become increasingly concerned with the problem of regional disparities. . . . The growth which took place in the country during the past two decades or so confined to selected areas, and had little or no impact on many regions, which remained underdeveloped, stagnant and marginal." Indian planners and policy makers now recognize, as Mathur points out, that the pattern of inequitable regional development, "exemplified by the existence within the country of large depressed areas is inconsistent with the concept of national development, and that such inequalities should be minimized for attaining the goals of a just and equalitarian society."<sup>7</sup>

In the Philippines, as in much of the developing world, these disparities did not emerge accidentally. "The unequal distribution of benefits among the population and the unbalanced pattern of sectoral development that characterized Philippine growth for much of the past three decades," the World Bank insists, "was closely linked to resource management policies and to the pattern of resource allocation."<sup>8</sup> In most developing countries, as in the Philippines, investments were heavily concentrated in large-scale, capital-intensive industries, usually located in a primate city or a few metropolitan centers, and allocated to physical infrastructure development in one or a few favoured regions, again usually in and around the metropolitan center.<sup>9</sup>

The adverse results of these investment allocation policies on the distribution of income and wealth and on the productive capacity of rural regions have only recently been recognized. Governments in Asia, Africa and Latin America now seek to alter the pattern of over-concentration. Recent evaluations of development experience strongly indicate that increased access for groups who are excluded from, or who are on the margin of, the productive economy is essential to equitable growth. And a more spatially balanced pattern of economic development has been found to be crucial for increasing the access of the urban and rural poor to productive resources, employment oppor-

tunities, social services and facilities, and physical infrastructure that can raise their levels of living.<sup>10</sup> To reverse the concentration of national resources, Tanzania, Kenya, Nigeria and Ghana have attempted to disperse investments in rural areas and to develop secondary cities.<sup>11</sup> Brazil has experimented with a variety of policies to deconcentrate growth from two major metropolitan centers, Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paulo, and to stimulate development of the North-east and Amazon regions.<sup>12</sup> Colombia's plans for regional development focus on promotion of growth centers and expansion of economic activities in intermediate-size cities in each region.<sup>13</sup> And in perhaps the most sweeping strategies, Chinese development policy under Mao viewed urban and rural disparities as a basic indicator of social inequity; it sought not only to reduce disparities among sectors but also to achieve urban and rural balance intensified regional development.<sup>14</sup>

Although some form of growth-with-equity strategy has been adopted by governments in much of the developing world, little consideration has been given to its micro-spatial dimensions and implications. Much of the planning to reduce regional disparities in growth, productivity and standards of living over the past few years has focused on macro-development policies taking one of four basic forms: 1) attempting to limit the growth of primate cities and metropolitan centres, a strategy that has been either ineffective or extremely slow to produce change: 2) reallocating national investments among regions to reverse the discrimination against those with lagging or depressed economies, also a slow and politically controversial process that many economists claim retards overall rates of economic expansion: 3) promoting the development of "growth centers" through concentration of selected investments in regional or provincial capitals, a strategy that has had limited impact on rural hinterlands in most of the developing world: and 4) emphasizing agricultural and rural development as a countermeasure to the "urban bias" of past development policy, a more successful approach but one that often deliberately or inadvertently ignores the essential linkages between urban and rural sectors needed to create a nationally economic system.

The emphasis on micro-development policies, moreover, often leads planners and policy-makers to overlook the pervasiveness of spatial inequities: in attempting to reduce inter-regional

differences planners often simply replicate at the regional level the pattern of economic dualism that maintains high levels of poverty nationally. Increasingly, evidence suggests that unless development occurs throughout a national economy and is promoted from the "bottom up" within rural regions, the access of the rural poor to town-based resources continues to be weak. Despite inter-regional reallocations of investment at the national level the poor are excluded from the basic economic activities required to improve their income and living standards.<sup>15</sup>

This paper explores the spatial dimensions of poverty in developing nations by focusing on a relatively typical manifestation of inequity in the Philippines, examines the need for micro-spatial analysis by describing the spatial pattern of underdevelopment in an economically depressed region of that country, and delineates the implications for national development policy. It contends that macro-development policies can perpetuate regional poverty in much the same fashion that concentrated national investment policies created severe economic inequities, unless deliberate strategies are formulated to integrate urban and rural spatial systems. Investments must be allocated in such a way as to articulate and integrate regional spatial systems, link urban and rural settlements more closely, and establish an interregional network of production, distribution and exchange centers that afford the urban and rural poor greater access to productive resources, markets and social services.

THE SPATIAL DIMENSIONS OF UNDERDEVELOPMENT :  
INTER-REGIONAL DISPARITIES IN THE PHILIPPINES

Disparities in economic development and standards of living in the Philippines manifest themselves in four major dimensions. They appear as substantial differences in personal and household income, access to public and social services, concentrations of productive activities and allocation of national investments in physical infrastructure : (1) between urban and rural areas generally, (2) between the national capital and the rest of the country, (3) among regions within the Philippines, and (4) between urban and rural settlements within regions.

*A. Urban-rural disparities*

The Philippines is a predominantly rural society. In 1975, more than 70 per cent of the country's 42 million people lived in rural areas, and many of those classified by the national census as "urban", actually lived in small towns and villages that are essentially rural in character. By more stringent definitions of "urban"—cities with populations greater than 50,000 and with economic bases sustained by secondary and tertiary industries—no more than 20 per cent of all Filipinos are urban dwellers. Yet, nearly all indicators of development show that urban populations are significantly more prosperous and that cities contain the bulk of social services and public facilities, an overwhelming percentage of the nation's manufacturing and commercial establishments and have received disproportionately large shares of national expenditures for productive and social overhead investments during the past three decades.

Average family income is substantially higher in urban areas than in rural. Household and family income surveys taken in 1975 indicate that both median and average annual income for urban households is nearly double that of rural families. Moreover, while about 70 per cent of urban families earned more than P 5,000 per year, only about 40 per cent of rural families surpassed that income level. In addition, the distribution of income is highly skewed, with more than 53 per cent of family income going to 20 per cent of the highest income families, nearly all of whom live in urban areas. The bottom 40 per cent of rural income-earning families received only 13 per cent of household income in 1971. Nearly 20 per cent of rural families had incomes of less than P 2,000 a year in 1971 and are considered to be living in absolute poverty, while less than 4 per cent of urban families fell into this lowest income category. (See Table 26.1).

Even when income and expenditure levels are adjusted for differences in cost of living between urban and rural areas, urban families tend to be far better off than their rural counterparts. About one quarter of urban families had incomes below the minimum necessary for adequate food consumption in 1971, but nearly half of rural families had incomes below the food threshold. Although slightly more than a third of urban families had incomes below the national poverty level of \$ 114 per capita per year, more than two-thirds of rural families were categorized as

**TABLE 26.1 : Socio-Economic Characteristics of Urban and Rural Areas in the Philippines**

	Urban Areas	Rural Areas	The Philippines
Family Income (in Pesos), 1971 <sup>1</sup>			
Median	3,972	1,954	2,454
Average	5,867	2,818	3,736
Income Distribution, 1971 <sup>1</sup> (Per cent of Families)			
Under 500 Pesos	0.1	0.8	0.5
500— 599	0.4	4.2	2.4
1,000—1,499	1.2	6.6	4.1
1,500—1,999	2.1	8.5	5.5
2,000—2,999	7.4	15.7	11.8
3,000—4,999	16.3	24.1	20.4
5,000+	72.4	40.0	55.3
Families with Incomes Below Poverty Threshold, 1971 <sup>1</sup>			
Number (in 000's)	1,196	3,676	4,872
Per cent	61.6	83.0	77.7
Percentage of Dwelling Units by Type of Construction Materials, 1970 <sup>2</sup>			
Strong	55.8	25.7	32.1
Mixed	22.6	24.6	24.2
Light	21.1	47.8	42.0
Others	0.5	1.9	1.6
Percentage of Households in Occupied Dwelling Units with Piped Water, 1970 <sup>2</sup>	54.3	10.7	24.6
Percentage of Dwelling Units by Type of Lighting Used, 1970 <sup>2</sup>			
Electricity	59.9	39.4	22.7
Kerosene	6.7	91.8	76.0
Percentage Distribution of Persons Employed by Major Industry Groups, 1976 <sup>3</sup>			
Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing, Mining, Quarrying	10.0	72.3	53.1
Manufacturing	16.2	8.5	10.9
Construction	4.8	2.5	3.2
Transport, Storage, and Communications	6.3	2.3	3.6
Commerce	23.8	6.8	12.1
Government, Community, Business			



TABLE 26.I : (Contd.)

and Recreational Services	21.5	4.4	9.7
Domestic Services	12.2	2.0	5.1
Electricity, Gas, Water and Sanitary Services	0.7	0.1	0.3
Personal Services, Other than Domestic	4.1	0.8	1.8
Not Reported	0.4	0.3	0.3

1. Republic of the Philippines, Bureau of Census and Statistics, 1971 *Survey of Households on Family Income and Living Expenditures*. Special Release Series : Manila : National Economic and Development Authority, 1972.
2. Republic of the Philippines, National Census and Statistics Office, *Philippine Yearbook*, 1975 : Manila : National Economic and Development Authority, 1975.
3. Republic of the Philippines, National Census and Statics Office, *Journal of Philippine Statistics*, Vol. 28, No. 2, Second Quarter, 1977.

poor.<sup>16</sup> Caldito and Parel point out that "besides earning higher incomes than rural households, urban households are also wealthier in terms of real property and ownership of houses and vehicles . . . . This disparity in wealth between urban and rural houses may even be much more with regard to other family assets such as bonds, savings and bank accounts".<sup>17</sup>

Even the poor in cities—the unemployed or underdeveloped, and those holding low income jobs and living in slums and squatter settlements—often enjoy higher levels of living and greater access to services, employment and education opportunities than do the rural poor. Studies of squatter residents in the largest cities recurringly conclude that "few have any serious plans of moving. . . . Squatters especially cling tenaciously to their preempted sites despite the unkempt surroundings, conscious that the city offers the best and perhaps the only avenues to success." Few plan on returning to their rural villages for "they believe that there are more opportunities for jobs in the city than in the places where they came from".<sup>18</sup>

*B. Disparities between the primate city and the rest of the country.*  
The disparities between urban and rural areas and the extreme concentration of productive activities, infrastructure and "modern" resources in a single metropolitan center, so characteristic of

many developing nations, are most clearly reflected in a comparison of socio-economic profiles of Metropolitan Manila and the rest of the Philippines.

Although Metropolitan Manila contains less than a third of the nation's population and about a quarter of the labour force, the core of the capital city centered on Manila Bay alone accounts for 72 per cent of all manufacturing establishments and fixed assets of manufacturing in the country and 81 per cent of all manufacturing production. Metro Manila employs nearly 80 per cent of the nation's manufacturing workers and 40 per cent of all workers in secondary industry. It generates 86 per cent, and consumes 83 per cent, of the country's electrical power. Although Manila contributes more than two-fifths of the nation's government revenues it has received substantially more than that share in expenditures for public and private services, facilities and productive activities. It has, for instance, two-thirds of the nation's hospital beds, about half of all hotel rooms in the Philippines, and more than 50 per cent of all banking offices.<sup>19</sup>

The advantages of the primate city have not been lost on rural Filipinos seeking better economic opportunities. Rural to urban migration has been high in the Philippines, and historically migration has accounted for nearly half the total population growth of Manila. Its share of urban population has risen at the same time that population shares of smaller cities and towns have fallen. Nearly all growth in other cities has been by natural increase. That the rate of urbanization in the Philippines has slowed over the past decade may be an indicator that Manila's absorptive capacity has been reached and that its primacy has become an impediment to faster and more dispersed urbanization in other regions of the country.<sup>20</sup>

### *C. Regional disparities in development and living standards*

The high concentration of investments in social and productive activities in Metropolitan Manila accounts in large part for the wide disparities in economic and social development among the Philippines' eleven administrative regions. The two regions encompassing and surrounding Metropolitan Manila—Central Luzon and Southern Tagalog—are, and historically have been, the most developed areas in the country. Over the past three decades they have received a substantial proportion—well beyond

their national population shares—of public investments in services, facilities and infrastructure, and private investment in productive activity. All other regions which are predominantly rural with under-productive agricultural economies and with low levels of urbanization—have the majority of the nation's subsistence and povertystricken populations. The Western Visayas and Northeast, Western, and Southern Mindanao regions, have kept pace with some aspects of economic progress in the Philippines, but four other regions—Ilocos, Bicol, the Cagayan Valley and Eastern Visayas—are economically depressed areas with the lowest levels of income. Median income in these regions was nearly 50 per cent below the national poverty mark in 1971. They contain large numbers of families with household incomes below the minimum for adequate food consumption. Agricultural productivity in these depressed areas has generally been low in relation to both the Philippines and other East Asian countries. Their vast rural hinterlands are weakly linked to towns and cities and rural people have limited, if any, access to urban services and facilities in regional centers. Inputs and infrastructure required to increase agricultural production and market farm outputs are usually not available. Off-farm employment opportunities are either scarce or non-existent.

By nearly all social and economic standards, the development of the Central Luzon and Southern Tagalog regions far surpasses others in the country. The two regions account for about 37 per cent of the total population in the Philippines, yet they contain over half of the country's urban population, with other regions ranging from less than nine per cent of urbanization in the Visayas to a little more than two per cent in the Cagayan Valley. In overall production the two most developed regions contributed about 48 per cent of the Gross National Product in 1966 and nearly 55 per cent of the regional product attributable to industry, and their share of national production is estimated to have increased over the past decade. Their contribution to national wealth is not surprising given that nearly 45 per cent of all secondary industries and commercial establishments in the Philippines are located within their boundaries (See Table 26.2). In 1970 the Southern Tagalog region had nearly three times the number of persons employed in secondary industries as rural regions and nearly four times the numbers employed in com-

TABLE 26.2 : Socio-economic profile of regions in the Philippines

Region	Per cent Share Mean Popula- tion 1970-1973 <sup>1</sup>	Per cent Share Urban Popula- tion 1970 <sup>1</sup>	Per cent Families with Income Be- low Food Thres- hold 1971 <sup>2</sup>	Per cent Families Below Threshold 1972 <sup>3</sup>	Population Per Physician <sup>3</sup>
I. Ilocos and Mountain Provinces	4.3	2.6	72.6	85.2	2,094
II. Cagayan Valley	4.6	2.1	75.8	84.8	4,769
III. Central Luzon	14.0	12.5	36.5	68.5	3,861
IV. Southern Tagalog	23.1	44.7	30.6	54.5	1,889
V. Bicol	7.9	4.9	70.9	87.3	5,713
VI. Western Visayas	9.7	8.2	65.3	84.5	3,776
VII. Central Visayas	8.1	7.4	70.7	85.4	3,056
VIII. Eastern Visayas	6.3	4.0	73.7	86.4	6,250
IX. Western Mindanao	5.0	2.6	NA	NA	7,165
X. Northeast Mindanao	8.3	5.3	65.1	8.61	4,228
XI. Southern Mindanao	8.7	5.6	58.3	79.8	4,776

TABLE 26.2: (Contd.)

Region	Per cent Share Industrial Est- ablishments 1970 <sup>1</sup>	No. Persons Per Thousand Em- ployed in Sec- ondary Indust- ries 1971 <sup>1</sup>	Percentage Share of Public Infrastructure Expenditures by National Government <sup>1</sup> FY 1969-61 FY 1971-73	Per capita Expenditures (In Pesos) by National Government <sup>1</sup> FY 1959-61 FY 1971-73
I. Ilocos and Mountain Provinces	9.2	42	4.8	134.30
II. Cagayan Valley	4.7	24	4.4	154.10
III. Central Luzon	14.7	62	7.0	74.41
IV. Southern Tagalog	27.7	164	49.6	350.19
V. Bicol	7.0	45	4.3	71.99
VI. Western Visayas	10.3	52	7.1	82.75
VII. Central Visayas	5.2	55	1.9	29.65
VIII. Eastern Visayas	3.1	35	5.9	113.41
IX. Western Mindanao	3.0	26	1.6	48.06
X. Northeast Mindanao	6.2	40	2.6	262.91
IX. Southern Mindanao	8.8	28	11.1	632.44
			1.6	368.13

1. Compiled by Evangelina P. Javier, "Economic, Demographic and Political Determinants of the Regional Allocation of Government Infrastructure Expenditures in the Philippines." *Journal of Philippine Development*, Vol. III, No. 2 (1976); pp. 281-312.
2. Compiled by Ma. Alcestis S. Abrera, "Philippine Poverty Threshold," in M. Mangahas (ed.), *Measuring Philippine Development*, Manila: Development Academy of the Philippines, 1976, pp. 233-273.
3. Republic of the Philippines, Department of Health, *National Health Plan 1975-1978*, Manila: Department of Health, 1975, Vol. II.

mercial activities. Moreover, the Central Luzon region has generally been the most productive agricultural area in the country. Yield per hectare of palay has been 40 per cent higher in Central Luzon than in other regions, even after introduction of "miracle rice" strains throughout the Philippines.

Not unexpectedly, levels of poverty are lower in Central Luzon and Southern Tagalog than in other regions. About a third of their households received annual incomes below the poverty level in 1971 as opposed to the 70 to 85 per cent of households below the poverty mark in other areas. These two regions also have substantially higher standards of living measured by access to urban amenities, quality of dwelling units, and numbers of households served by piped water, electricity and sanitary facilities. Southern Tagalog has the highest rate of physicians per thousand population in the country and the highest rate of hospital beds per thousand population, nearly four times the average of the Philippines.

#### INVESTMENT ALLOCATION POLICIES AND REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT

The relatively high levels of economic development in Metropolitan Manila and in the Central Luzon and Southern Tagalog regions cannot be attributed to natural advantages. They are the result of a sustained concentration of public and private investments in infrastructure, services and productive activities in these regions over the past half century and of the comparative advantages created at Manila by heavy investment during the preceding colonial periods. In every aspect of economic and social life, residents of the Central Luzon and Southern Tagalog regions have greater access to the resources generated by concentrated investment. Agricultural production outpaces that of other regions because 50 per cent of Central Luzon's cultivated area has been irrigated as opposed to 13 per cent of cultivated land in the rest of the Philippines. The region reports the highest percentage of farmers obtaining credit from institutional sources and greater access to fertilizers and other farm inputs than most other regions in the country.

Historically Southern Tagalog and, more recently, Central Luzon have received the largest allocations of government social

overhead investments. Javier's studies of regional allocations of government expenditures, for example, show that although overall inequalities have been slightly reduced over the past decade, that these two regions have consistently received more than half of all government investments in major categories of physical infrastructure, except highways.<sup>21</sup> In the 1959-1961 fiscal years, nearly 57 per cent of infrastructure expenditures were made in these two regions, with Southern Tagalog alone obtaining more than 49 per cent. Slightly more than 70 per cent of expenditures on ports and harbors, 49 per cent on waterworks, 61 per cent on flood control and drainage, and almost 70 per cent on buildings, schools and hospitals went to Southern Tagalog, and primarily to the Metro Manila area. Although the concentration in Southern Tagalog lessened dramatically by the 1971-1973 fiscal years, the allocations to Central Luzon increased substantially, maintaining these two regions as the most favored for government expenditures. From 1971 to 1973 they split almost evenly 56 per cent of all infrastructure investments. Sixty-four per cent of port projects, 91 per cent of waterworks, 63 per cent of irrigation, 67 per cent of flood control and drainage expenditures, 60 per cent of buildings, schools and hospital investments, and more than a quarter of all highway outlays were made in these two areas.

In the 1959-1961 fiscal years per capita expenditure on infrastructure in Southern Tagalog was nearly triple that for the Philippines, while the poorest regions received comparatively low per capita allocations. By the 1971-1973 fiscal years overall per capita expenditures increased in all regions, but those for Central Luzon rose to double the national average with some regions such as Ilocos, Bicol, Central Visayas, and Western and Southern Mindanao obtaining significantly less than the national average.

Moreover, central Luzon and Southern Tagalog were favored with higher allocations for social services and government economic development program expenditures. Nearly two-fifths of all community development projects funded between 1956 and 1973 were concentrated in these two regions, and 43 per cent of the National Cottage Industries Development Administration (NACIDA)'s assisted enterprises were found there. Indeed, these two regions accounted for nearly 70 per cent of the total capitalization of all NACIDA projects by 1972. More than 43 per cent of the Board of Investment (BOI)'s large scale industrial

assistance, by 1973, was allocated to firms located in these regions.<sup>22</sup>

INTRA-REGIONAL AND LOCAL DISPARITIES IN ECONOMIC  
DEVELOPMENT : THE SPATIAL PATTERN OF RURAL  
POVERTY

Extreme disparities in economic development and levels of living among regions and between urban and rural areas are relatively easy to document, and the Philippine government's policies have consciously recognized the adversities of concentrated investment for national development in the past few years. Yet solutions to the problems are more elusive. Recent Philippine plans, as do those of many developing nations, call for drastic remedial action to alter past patterns of investment and expenditure. The Fourth National Development Plan for 1974-1977 emphasized integrated regional development to correct "the glaring growth imbalance among regions" and those policies "which artificially favor a few select areas."<sup>23</sup>

Indeed, the previous emphasis on macro-economic growth and concentrated investment in the most productive areas of the country assumed that the spread effects or "trickle down" of growth in GNP would eventually extend the benefits of development to rural regions and to the poor in both urban and rural areas. And many of the same assumptions characterize more recent regional reallocations and growth center investment strategies. But the evidence suggests that the preconditions for "trickle down" and spread of development from a few urban enclaves do not exist at either the national or regional levels. The spatial pattern of development in the Philippines, and in many other Third World nations, is not conducive to widespread economic growth and social progress, and indeed, acts perversely to maintain subsistence populations in poverty. And because of the pervasiveness of spatial inequalities in development within rural regions, and the lack of access of the rural poor to resources concentrated in a few urban centres, national policies for regional development may merely replicate at the regional level the same pattern of dualism that has characterized national development.

The spatial pattern of development within regions in the



Philippines mirrors that of the national space economy. Services, facilities and productive activities are highly concentrated in a few urban centers. Large disparities exist in levels of development and standards of living between urban populations and those in the hinterlands. Linkages between the peripheral rural areas and town centers are weak. The limited access of rural people to productive resources, social services, public facilities and markets for agricultural and consumer goods perpetuates rural poverty. The weak linkages among settlements within the region makes the spread of growth from urbanized centers slow and uncertain.

### **A Spatial Structure and Rural Poverty : The Case of the Bicol River Basin**

The spatial dimensions of rural development that sustain economic depression and inhibit accelerated growth in the Philippines are perhaps no better illustrated than in the Bicol River Basin, an extensive portion of the Bicol Region in Southern Luzon with more than 700,000 hectares of land, over half of which is arable. The nearly 1.8 million people in the Bicol River Basin for decades have experienced high levels of poverty, owing mainly to the predominance of a subsistence agricultural economy that perpetuates chronic underemployment, low wages, serious malnutrition and high levels of outmigration.

Over 80 per cent of the population had incomes below the national poverty level in 1971. Nearly 90 per cent of the Basin's families had annual incomes below the poverty threshold in 1975 and nearly 65 per cent had incomes of less than half of the poverty mark, classifying them as the "poorest of the poor." About 28 per cent of the labor force is either unemployed or underemployed. Nonagricultural job opportunities in the Basin's towns and rural villages are limited. Income levels are not only low, but income and wealth are seriously maldistributed. Ten per cent of the households in the Basin receive 43 per cent of total income, and the poorer 50 per cent of the population receives only 13 per cent of income. The poorest Bicolanos live on about \$45 per capita a year, Only enough to buy rice, occasionally some fish, and the barest necessities of life.<sup>24</sup>

Nearly 80 per cent of preschool children suffer from serious malnutrition, many adults are afflicted with water-borne enteric diseases and intestinal parasitism, and nearly 73 of every one

thousand infants born in the Basin die during their first year, primarily of pneumonia, gastroenteritis and bronchitis. There is only one physician for every 4,600 people and most of the doctors are located in larger towns, inaccessible to rural people.

The population growth rate of 3.4 per cent a year results in a high dependency ratio—nearly half of the population is under 14 years old—and more than one per cent of the population migrates out of the Basin each year. Most migrants are younger, more productive people seeking job opportunities in larger towns outside the Basin, and usually in Metropolitan Manila. The Bicol Region, of which the Basin is a part, has had the lowest net domestic product (NDP) in the Philippines over the past decade. NDP declined in real terms by an average of 1.5 per cent between 1972 and 1974, at a time when the national average was growing by nearly four per cent. The Bicol Region in the early 1970s had the lowest share of employment and production among all regions in the Philippines. Indeed, the only industrial capacity in the Basin takes the form of small agro-processing and cottage industries that are primarily family-owned and operated. Nearly all manufactured goods sold in Bicol are imported from Manila.

Ironically, most Bicolanos live in poverty in a land of great natural beauty and abundant natural resources. Properly irrigated and cultivated, the Bicol's rich alluvial soil could produce enough rice to sustain an additional 8 million people. Production of agricultural commodities is only a fraction of its potential under favorable conditions. Bicol also has a wealth of untapped mineral resources—about 30 per cent of the marble deposits, 75 per cent of the perlite and about 20 per cent of the coal reserves of the Philippines. The Tiwi Geothermal Plant, located in the Basin's north-eastern section, will soon generate up to 100 megawatts of power.

But as a regional economy, the Bicol River Basin is not well equipped for increased productivity and widespread development. Through much of the year the Basin is battered by frequent typhoons that bring high winds and heavy rains: perennial flooding destroys crops and homes, pushes saline water into interior rice fields and causes widespread silting and erosion. The area is physically isolated from the rest of the Philippines during the worst of the typhoon season and poorly linked to other regions or to Manila even during good weather. A single paved

highway weaves tortuously through the mountains of the southern Luzon peninsula connecting Bicol to Manila.

Nor are current land tenure arrangements conducive to increasing family incomes. Farm holdings are small and fragmented. From a third to half of all rice and corn farmers work as tenants or landless laborers. Farm productivity is nearly 10 per cent lower than that of the Philippines. Former owners of large landed estates reinvested little of their profits in the Basin over the years, and agricultural technology on small farms remains primitive. Manpower and draft animals provide the bulk of agricultural labor. Relatively few milling or processing facilities have been established: marketing networks in rural areas are poor and storage capacity is limited. Because productivity and income are so low, both tenants and small land owners are continuously in debt. Whatever small surpluses they accumulate are quickly spent on baptisms, weddings, funerals, children's schooling, the annual fiesta, and on repaying loans. Only about half of the Basin's 100,000 hectares of potentially irrigable rice lands are irrigated: nearly 50,000 hectares of prime agricultural land are flooded during the typhoon season.

Analysis of the spatial pattern of development and the regional settlement system in Bicol shows trends similar to those of the nation:

### *1. Intraregional urban-rural disparities*

The Bicol River Basin encompasses 54 municipalities in Camarines Sur and Albay Provinces, including three small cities of Naga, Legaspi and Iriga, which are the most economically diversified settlements within the area. Municipalities are administrative units in the Philippines, composed of a town center called a *poblacion* and smaller villages known as *barangays*. Municipalities in Bicol are generally small in size, averaging a little more than 30,000 people or about 5,200 households. The municipalities are subdivided into 1,534 *barangays*, some of which are discrete villages and others are scattered clusters of houses with no communal core. The number of *barangays* in the municipalities range from 6 to 75, with an average population size of a little more than 1,000 each. Only about 13 per cent of the *barangays* are classified by the Philippine census as "urban" and they are generally the municipal *poblacions*. The urban *barangays* con-

tain only about 18 per cent of the Basin's total population.

Although the entire Bicol River Basin is predominantly rural municipalities differ significantly in their socio-economic, demographic and physical characteristics. Services, facilities, infrastructure and economic and social organizations are unequally distributed among municipalities (see Table 26.3). The six most urbanized municipalities encompass the two provincial centres of Naga-Camaligan and Legaspi-Daraga, the city of Iriga

TABLE 26.3 : Socio-Economic Profile of Municipalities in Bicol River Basin, the Philippines, 1970

Per cent Distribution of	Urbanized Municipalities (N=6)	Municipalities with High Access to Urbanized Centres (N=10)	Rural Municipalities (N=38)
Population	22.4	26.4	51.2
Educational Attainment			
High School Graduates	31.2	23.2	42.2
College Graduates	44.8	23.2	32.0
Dwelling Units of			
Strong Construction	32.6	26.9	40.4
Municipal Revenue	44.5	18.6	36.9
Financial Institution	48.1	13.4	38.2
Deposits and Loan Assets of Financial Institutions	86.9	4.7	8.4
Agro-processing Storage and Commercial Establishments	24.9	31.4	36.7
Rice and Corn Mills	23.9	32.8	43.3
Warehouses	36.5	33.0	30.4
Agro-Supply Stores	41.7	30.6	27.7
Farm Machine and Tool Stores	64.5	9.7	25.8
Manufacturing Commercial and Service establishments	45.4	29.8	24.8
Health Facilities			
Hospitals	52.2	25.5	23.8
Hospitals Beds	58.9	11.7	29.3

Source : Government of the Philippines, National Census and Statistics Office. Unpublished reports, 1970.

and the town of Tabaco. Services, facilities and economically productive activities are highly concentrated in these six municipalities, with the highest concentrations in Naga and Legaspi cities. These six municipalities contain about one-quarter of the total population (386,000 people) but account for more than 40 per cent of the urban population. Average literacy rates are high in these municipalities, which contain nearly a third of all high school and 45 per cent of all college graduates. Moreover, these half dozen municipalities account for 45 per cent of all municipal government revenues collected in the Basin. Significantly higher percentages of households are served by piped water and electricity; most of the Basin's educational and vocational training institutions are concentrated within these clusters, and many of the major health care institutions are located within their boundaries. These urbanized municipalities are the financial centres of the Basin, containing nearly half of all financial institutions, with more than 85 per cent of deposit and loan assets. More than one-third of all corn mills, agricultural warehouses, farm supply stores and farm machine and tool establishments, and nearly half of the cottage industries, commercial, financial and service establishments are within their boundaries.

Ten municipalities that lie at or near the Manila South Road are less urbanized and less developed, but have access to the more urbanized centres. They are distinguished from rural municipalities only by the fact that access roads have generated some diversification of economic and social activities within their poblacions and that they contain the richest agricultural land within the Basin. All are either linked by the Manila South Road to the cities of Naga and Legaspi or by provincial roads to the Manila South Road. The group of municipalities accounts for slightly more than one-quarter of the Basin's population (4,56,000 or 26 per cent). These less developed municipalities average less than 4,000 urban residents, almost all of whom live in the poblacions. The characteristics of the rural areas in these municipalities are not much different than those of the most underdeveloped sections of the Basin: less than 20 per cent of their households are served by piped water, they have far fewer educational or health institutions and commercial establishments than the urbanized municipalities, and fewer cottage industries.

Perhaps because of their physical proximity to the major provincial centres these areas have not become highly specialized and seem to depend on the larger centres for marketing and trade activities. They have concentrations of services, facilities, manufacturing establishments, commercial activities, and infrastructure in about the same proportions as their share of population.

The 38 predominantly rural municipalities are subsistence agricultural areas forming the periphery of the Basin in which more than half of the population in the Bicol River Basin lives. They have a far smaller portion of facilities, services, educated manpower, financial resources, and productive economic activities than their share of population. Their residents are scattered in rather small barangays. Only eight per cent of households receive water and less than six per cent have electrical power. Only five of the 38 municipalities have post-secondary educational or vocational training institutions; nearly 40 per cent have no markets of any kind, and 8 contain no financial institutions. These municipalities collect less than two-fifths of all municipal revenues and, on the average, depend on the national government for nearly a third of their municipal income. Some of the municipalities obtain more than half of their revenues from the national government and have few source of internal income. The financial institutions in these underdeveloped municipalities have less than 10 per cent of the deposit and loan assets in the Basin. As a group, these municipalities contain less than one-quarter of the manufacturing, commercial, financial and service establishments, only a little more than a third of agro-processing, storage and commercial establishments and one-fourth of the health facilities.

Thus, a majority of the population in the Bicol River Basin lives in municipalities with few services or facilities needed to meet basic human needs or to increase agricultural production and expand non-agricultural employment opportunities. Moreover, they are generally isolated from or have extremely poor access to the urbanized municipalities in which services, facilities and markets are most highly concentrated. Indeed, levels of urbanization, transport linkage and physical access seem to be key variables explaining much of the differentiation among municipalities in the Bicol River Basin

## *2. Concentration of Services and Facilities in Town Centers*

Services and facilities needed to serve basic human needs and generate economic development in rural areas are not only inadequate in the Bicol River Basin, but those that do exist are concentrated in a few small central places, which are not easily accessible to people living outside of their boundaries. A study, conducted in 1976, inventoried and scaled 64 major functions—services facilities and organizations—and analyzed the composition, characteristics and distribution of socio-economic activities in communities of various sizes in the Basin.<sup>25</sup> Of the 1,419 discrete settlements within Bicol, little more than half contained any of the functions. Nearly 90 per cent of all functions appeared in less than 20 per cent of the settlements. More than 40 per cent of all settlements are unserved by any function of economic or developmental significance. The most ubiquitous of the 64 functions—farmers associations, agro-processing facilities (such as corn and rice mills or storage sheds) and cottage industries—are found in only about half of the settlements.

Nearly all services and facilities that could potentially contribute to rural development are usually found in poblacions or municipal centres. But the distribution of even these functions is highly skewed. Nearly 60 per cent of the functions appear in less than 20 per cent of the poblacions. Only the two largest cities in the Bicol River Basin—Naga and Legaspi—have a wide variety of these functions, and these two centers contain less than 11 per cent of the Basin's population. More than 96 per cent of the settlements, containing over 70 per cent of the population, are villages of at most a few hundred families engaged in subsistence or near subsistence agriculture and are generally too small to support any significant form of economic or service activity, even periodic markets, which are the most basic of agricultural exchange arrangements.

## *3. Weak Linkages Among Settlements*

An intermodel transport study undertaken in 1977 founded that because of the high cost and great difficulty of travelling, most travel within the Basin is highly localized. About 85 per cent of all trips taken within the Basin are among places within the same municipality and 99 per cent are within the same province

Relatively little travel—for shopping, work, trade, social interaction, or any other purpose—is intermunicipal and there is little interaction on a regular basis between the Basin's two provinces.<sup>26</sup> Physical infrastructure that might link communities, and that is necessary for higher level economic activities, is clearly inadequate. Electrical power is unreliable, with frequent brown-outs and black-out, even in Naga and Legaspi. Telephone communications are sporadic, and most places within the Basin lack telephone exchanges.

Market linkages, which should form a major network of commercial interaction within predominantly rural areas, are also weak in Bicol. The greatest amount of market interaction occurs through the central markets located in Naga and Legaspi cities. A significant portion of the Basin's population lives in settlements too small to support even a periodic market, which adversely affects their ability to sell agricultural surpluses, raise their income levels, obtain household goods or to buy inputs needed to increase agricultural production.

Analysis of commodity flows and market functions of six of the largest centres within the Basin and six of the prominent periodic markets indicate that a "market system" does not really exist. Nearly all commodities traded within the markets surveyed are obtained from and sold to people who live within the municipality. Except for manufactured consumer goods, which are imported from Manila for resale through the Naga and Legaspi markets, even the two largest market centres primarily only serve their immediately surrounding territory. Smaller regular markets within Bicol obtain and sell nearly all of their goods within a 10 kilometer radius. Moreover, markets within Bicol are primarily undifferentiated agricultural exchange points. The substantial majority of goods traded in Bicol market consist of six agricultural commodities. Bicol River Basin markets have insignificant trade linkages with each other, or with markets outside of the Basin. More than 80 per cent of all transactions in the markets surveyed were local.<sup>27</sup>

The periodic markets are generally isolated, highly localized and virtually unintegrated collection and exchange points. Most meet once a week : all have a small number of stalls (average 30) and trade primarily in fruits, vegetables, poultry, rice, clothing and small households items. For most people in rural areas, the



periodic market is the only organized outlet for trade to which they have access. The periodic markets are generally not linked to larger markets except by travelling middlemen who sometimes bring manufactured goods from the cities to exchange for scarce local agricultural commodities. Farmers living outside the market barrio must often start out on foot the night before, transact their business early in the morning and return home before the heat of the day makes travel burdensome.

#### IMPLICATIONS FOR NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT POLICY

Traditional macro-economic approaches to accelerating development will have little effect on ameliorating poverty in regions with spatial patterns such as the Bicol River Basin. Simply reallocating investments more equitably among regions or favoring these previously given low priority, while necessary, are not sufficient to reduce spatial inequalities and increase the access of the rural poor to the resources necessary to ameliorate their poverty. Similarly, growth centre development strategies are likely to exacerbate already severe urban and rural differences within regions. Given the highly skewed, poorly articulated and weakly linked settlements within rural regions, these policies often replicate national patterns of economic dualism at the regional level, leaving the vast majority of the rural poor living in scattered villages with little access to the benefits of investments concentrated in larger towns or cities.

Instead, a strategy combining regional reallocation of national investment and selective location of physical infrastructure, social services, facilities, and productive activities is needed. It should aim at generating growth in rural areas and at articulating the spatial system of rural regions thereby extending services to the rural poor and increasing their access to town-based functions. The strategy involves four major components. First, the strategy must seek to deconcentrate important development investments from already burgeoning primate cities and metropolitan centres to other less developed regions, both to provide the opportunities for developing potential resources in those regions and to create a more articulated and integrated national spatial economy. In countries like the Philippines this requires a regional investment program primarily focused on

rural industrialization and infrastructure support—one that extends communication and transportation linkage to peripheral areas such as Bicol and promotes investment in agribusiness, small and medium scale industries and local consumer goods manufacturing. Such a strategy, in addition to providing the means of absorbing, processing and distributing agricultural surpluses could also provide a wider range of household and local consumer goods to rural people at lower cost and expand off-farm employment opportunities. The International Labor Office observed the paucity of appropriate industries in the rural Philippines and that “in spite of substantial transport costs, textiles are shipped from Manila to the smallest towns in Mindanao. Shoes are produced only in large towns. There is, in short, a surprising absence of the kind of lower cost adaptive consumer good produced for the domestic rural market and traded among and within the island.”<sup>28</sup>

Although the Philippines has extensive programs for industrial promotion these alone will not generate the volume of private investment needed to vitalize and diversify rural economies. Indeed, the promotion programs have generally benefitted those industries that located where previous priorities for infrastructure investment have made operation most advantageous—in and around Metropolitan Manila. Unless infrastructure investments are also deconcentrated and support facilities extended to rural areas like the Bicol, prime investment will not precede them. The World Bank notes that “fiscal incentives without these provisions are unlikely to simulate much new investment in the outer provinces, and with such infrastructure incentives are probably not needed.”<sup>29</sup>

A second element of the strategy requires careful location and “decentralized concentration” of high population threshold investments in intermediate and secondary cities, which would serve as interregional production centers, act to counter-balance continued rapid growth in Metropolitan Manila and become part of a network of domestic exchange and market centres. Cheetham and Hawking correctly observe that “to dare the intermediate size cities have been neglected in the Philippines as a focus of policy.”<sup>30</sup> The high priorities that Manila received in public investment and expenditures allowed the Metropolitan area to grow at the expense of both rural areas and other urban

centres. Manila's primacy is now extremely high : it has more than ten times the population of the next largest cities—Davao and Cebu. Yet these two smaller metropolitan areas and a number of other secondary cities—such as Iliolo, Zamboanga, Bacolod, Cagayan de Ore, Angeles and Olongapo—might serve as inter-regional production and exchange centres if appropriate investments were made in public infrastructure and productive activities.

Third, a spatial strategy for more equitable development requires locating infrastructure investments and productive activities within regions in such a way as to articulate the spatial system and integrate urbanized centers and rural hinterlands. A deliberate policy of decentralizing investment in lower population threshold functions and combining in "minimum investment packages" those services, infrastructure and facilities needed to promote functional specialization and trade among settlements within rural regions is essential for accelerating and spreading the benefits of development. Articulation of the spatial system implies the development of at least three "levels" of settlements within regional economies : rural services centres, small cities and regional centers.

Rural services centers, periodic market town or strategically located villages would accommodate relatively low threshold services and facilities to assemble agricultural commodities, provide area-wide periodic market functions, extend transport access from regular-market towns and larger cities, accommodate small-scale agroprocessing and handicraft industries, distribute credit, market information and other technical inputs to farmers, facilitate savings mobilization and provide basic health, recreation, education and administrative services.

Market towns and small cities would be build-up to provide area-wide exchange points for trade in agricultural commodities, processed goods, household and common consumer products and farm inputs. They could offer access to an all-weather road network, serve as a transportation and distribution node linked to regional centers and provide the preconditions and infrastructural support for private investment in agro-processing and small bulk commodity handling facilities. Smaller cities can make available a variety of financial and credit services ; meet rural

energy and utility needs ; provide a higher level administrative services that cannot be accommodated in rural service centres : and offer vocational and secondary education, health and child care services and rural commercial services.<sup>31</sup>

Regional centres and intermediate size cities would be physically linked to each other and to interregional urban centres by frequent and reliable transportation and all-weather roads. They can offer more diversified commercial professional and administrative services than could be accommodated in market towns. They could accomodate regional offices of national ministries and branch offices of provincial government agencies. Regional centres can support larger and more diversified markets, serve as communications nodes for a larger rural hinterland, provide sites for agribusiness and larger scale agricultural processing, offer incentives for a variety of small-scale consumer goods industries : offer higher-level educational opportunities and more specialized vocational training. and provide diversified and multi-purposes hospital and health clinics.

With careful allocation and packaging of investments, towns and villages that already exist within regions of the Philippines could be made to perform these three levels of functions. In some regions substantial investments would be necessary to create regional centers, and in most areas the paucity of market towns and rural service centers would require careful analysis of incipient centers prior to designing investment packages. Creation of this hierarchy of settlements, however, would provide a spatial framework for spreading the benefits and increasing the multiplier effects of public and private investment.

Finally, creation of a more equitable development pattern requires that linkages among rural settlements, and between them and urbanized centres within regions be strengthened. Among the most important linkages are farm-to-market roads and all-weather arterials between market centers and larger towns and cities. It is inconceivable that the Philippines will be able to attain its goals of increased agricultural production, economic diversification, and more equitable distribution of services, fertilities and income without first extending transportation access within and among regions. A network of all-weather and farm-to-market roads in regions like Bicol is an essential precondition for extending services to rural people, promoting investment in

agribusiness and small-scale manufacturing, and providing access for rural people to the higher threshold services and facilities that must be located in cities and poblacions. Without access to markets farmers will simply not increase output. The costs of transporting agricultural goods in peripheral areas of regions like Bicol wipes out marginal profits from increased production for farmers without access to roads and highways.

This four-pronged strategy of regional reallocation of investments in infrastructure, the gradual building up of secondary and intermediate-size cities as interregional production and market centres, articulating the spatial systems of rural regions, integrating town centres with rural hinterlands and strengthening linkages among settlements in rural areas, would both promote greater spread effects from development in larger urban centers and generate more diversified economic growth in smaller rural villages. It combines "bottom up" and "top down" development strategies to forge an integrated national economy in which the benefits of accelerated growth could be more equitably distributed.

#### EFFECTS ON NATIONAL INTEGRATION, MODERNIZATION AND EQUITABLE DEVELOPMENT

Because the spatial dimensions of national development have been given so little attention by development administration and political modernization theorists, the effects of such a national investment policy have not been systematically analyzed. Experience with spatial articulation and integration, where they occurred spontaneously or as the result of government policies and programs in developing countries, indicates that profound social economic and political changes followed, and offers important hypotheses and propositions for further testing.

The extension of physical linkages, especially through the construction of transportation networks in rural regions, is known to integrate economic subsystems and broaden opportunities for rural populations to participate in productive economic activities. Evaluations of such programs in rural areas of Nicaragua, for instance, found that creation of farm-to-market road networks during the 1960s "has pulled together in one national market what a decade ago were dozens of small autonomous economic regions." And the extension of the access roads into rural

hinterlands was particularly important in "bringing national markets up to the farm-gate of a significant number of remote and marginal small producers".<sup>32</sup> Within a number of Latin American countries—especially Brazil and Colombia—construction of transport linkages between urban and rural areas broadened the radius of trade and increased productive capacity of small farmers.<sup>33</sup> Together with the expansion of market interaction of physical linkages has also produced important social and political changes. Skinner notes that the growth and integration of markets in China had a profound effect on rural social interaction. Widening market areas extended the range of social interaction for rural people, altered traditional behavior, steadily integrated smaller clans communities and villages into the wider regional society, and transformed social and organizational relations. The integration of space displaced primitive trading arrangements and the commercialization of agricultural markets eventually created new patterns of social interaction. "Inevitably the social horizons of the peasant—now in the process of becoming a farmer—are extended toward the limit of the larger trading area," Skinner observed. As market areas widen and exchange relations become more complex, "the range of his acquaintances expands to include initially townspeople and eventually residents of villages elsewhere in the trading system. The marriage area of his village is likely to grow accordingly."<sup>34</sup>

Moreover, as urban centers grow, new central places emerge, and relationships between smaller and larger centers are strengthened. Political and administrative linkages change, for instance, as do political functions. Whang found that as the intermediate city of Taegu in Korea grew and became more industrialized, city government took on more functions, expanded its budget 15-fold in 10 years, and was generally transformed from a passive maintenance organization into an active political force intervening more directly in the economic affairs of the area and guiding the direction and pace of development. As it grew from a regional marketing center to an important secondary city, Taegu established new and more extensive linkages with its rural hinterland and other jurisdictions and with the central government in Seoul. Cooperative and coordinative ties were established with national ministries and with neighboring countries and cities.<sup>35</sup> Analyses of the emergence of African middle cities

confirm that as they grow in size and diversity, a complex set of political patterns change. In her study of the growth of Lagos, Nigeria, from a town of 1,00,000 people to a metropolis of over a million. Baker notes that during a 50-year period, "each stage is distinguished by transformation of some or all of the political variables," affecting patterns of political behavior and formal government structure.<sup>36</sup> Political participation increased, political interests became more diverse, a larger number of social and economic groups were included in decision-making, control shifted from national factions to resident groups, and politics generally became more localized.

In one of the few detailed histories of urban-rural integration at the regional level in India, Spodek points out that spatial integration and the growth of urban centres serving rural hinterlands in Saurashtra not only generated economic development but fundamentally changed political relationships and the distribution of power. "The dominance of an urban elite of Brahmins and Banians in the political system of Saurashtra had ended by the mid-1960s," Spodek points out. "A newly rising group, the *patidars* of the countryside, had come at least to equality with the urban groups."<sup>37</sup>

And it is this realization by political elites—that more equitable economic growth and integration of urban and rural areas will bring profound social and political changes—that often leads them to oppose or obstruct the reallocation of central government investments. For ultimately, the redistribution of political power is the strongest instrument that rural groups can gain for achieving more equitable economic development. Spatial integration and political change are inextricably related, and some degree of the latter is necessary to bring about the former. Spodek concluded from his study of Saurashtra.

that development which involved not only the city but the countryside as well was accompanied by a shift in the centre of political power from aristocratic urban elites to the farmers through the mediation of urban professionals and business classes . . . Under appropriate circumstances 'the city' could function effectively as market place and as growth pole, but only when the dominant political residents wished it to. The cities, became most productive economically after

independence as a new interest group, desiring balanced economic growth, came to power.<sup>38</sup>

Clearly, if the new development strategies for promoting more equitable growth and reducing the high levels of abject poverty are to succeed, government planners, international assistance agency advisors and development theorists will need a more profound understanding of the spatial dimensions of national development. And equally important, they will need a better understanding of the social, economic and political effects of changing investment allocation policies to integrate urban and rural areas in economically depressed regions. More must be learned about the most effective means of integrating regional spatial systems into a national economy, and about the political prerequisites for reallocating investments among and within regions in developing countries.

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DENNIS A. RONDINELLI

## APPLIED POLICY ANALYSIS FOR INTEGRATED REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT PLANNING IN THE PHILIPPINES

IN much of the developing world spatial development reflects the highly dualistic nature of economic growth. Investment has been heavily concentrated in one or a few metropolitan centres, usually in a 'primate city' which dominates the national economy and overshadows all other cities in the spatial system. The dispersion of economic activities to smaller towns and rural areas is retarded; and in many cases, the primate city draws resources from rural areas to maintain its own growth and expansion. In many developing societies the primate city receives the largest share of national investment—significantly beyond its proportion of population—in physical infrastructure, commercial and social services, manufacturing and industrial enterprise, and utilities, thus becoming an enclave of urban modernisation in nations predominantly rural, traditional and poor. These premier cities usually attract the most talented and skilled manpower and are favoured locations for domestic and foreign investment. Their residents enjoy substantially higher average income than those living in the rest of the country and have greater access to services, amenities and opportunities for improving their living standards.<sup>1</sup> That these large urban centres often drain their rural peripheries of much of their productive manpower, natural resources and investment capital is rather clear.<sup>2</sup> But in addition, the large streams of migration into the primate cities often overburden their physical facilities and social services and strain severely their capacity to provide jobs for unskilled labour. Thus, large numbers of unskilled and

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unemployed rural migrants living in squatter settlements on the fringe of the urban economy remain in poverty.

Dualistic economic growth also creates and maintains a highly skewed settlement pattern, especially in former colonies of industrialised nations. The primate city not only constrains the growth of other metropolitan centres, but also limits the number and distribution of middle size cities that might support industrial and other economic and social activities in poorer regions of the country. Thus, many developing nations now have spatial systems in which middle-level cities and market towns—with sufficiently large populations to support services and facilities needed to meet basic human needs, provide outlets for the sale of agricultural goods, produce agricultural inputs, and provide off-farm employment for surplus agricultural workers—are neither numerous enough nor adequately distributed geographically to serve the rural poor or to stimulate regional development.<sup>3</sup>

The classical pattern is clearly reflected in the spatial development of the Philippines, where the Manila Metropolitan area in 1970 had less than one third of the country's population, yet accounted for 65 per cent of family income, 79 per cent of all people employed in manufacturing, 81 per cent of total manufacturing production, 63 per cent of transportation vehicles and over 80 per cent of electrical power production and consumption. Average family income in Manila is double that of the Philippines. By 1975 Manila had grown to over 10 times the size of the next two largest cities, and only a little more than a dozen cities in the country had grown in population size to more than 100000. Most of these are commercial-service centres with relatively little productive activity.<sup>4</sup> A similar pattern of concentration appears in rural regions of these developing countries. Again, one or two provincial capitals or regional centres amass most of the services, facilities and productive activities. The overwhelming majority of the population, however, is scattered in small villages or on individual farmsteads, with little or on access to town functions.<sup>5</sup>

International assistance agencies and governments in developing countries have increasingly recognised in the past few years that if they are to ameliorate rural poverty and more equitably distribute the benefits of economic growth they must promote a more spatially balanced pattern of development. This would

require extensive investment in physical infrastructure, services and productive activities in rural regions, located strategically in intermediate size cities, smaller towns and rural market centres. The growth of 'rural service centres', linking towns to rural hinterlands, must also be encouraged to increase the access of the rural poor to basic services and facilities.<sup>6</sup> The investments, moreover, would have to be located in such a way as to create an articulated and integrated national spatial system capable of : (1) expanding markets for increased agricultural production, thereby raising income in rural areas ; (2) extending services such as health, education, family planning and vocational training, the technical inputs needed for increased agricultural production such as new seed varieties, appropriate technology, farm-to-market roads, and electrification, as well as communications and transportation to rural regions ; (3) offering new rural employment opportunities, especially in agro-processing, agribusiness, small-scale manufacturing and cottage industries ; and (4) slowing the rate altering the pattern of rural to urban migration.<sup>7</sup>

The pattern and composition of spatial system and the roles of various types of settlements differ drastically among developing nations and any serious effort to shape spatial system to promote more equitable and widespread development requires extensive analysis. In the past such analysis has been constrained, however, by three major problems : the lack of recognition 'of the importance of integrated spatial planning in national development strategies and policies ; the lack of an operational framework for integrated spatial planning analysis ; and the paucity and unreliability of data in rural regions for formulating development policies.

This paper describes and evaluates a pilot project undertaken in the Bicol River Basin of the Philippines (Fig. 27.1) to address these problems and develop an operational framework for integrated spatial analysis and planning. It describes the background and rationale of the project, outlines the principles for selecting applied research methodologies tested in the Philippines, describes the methods and techniques used the results of the analyses, and evaluates the methodological and behavioural problems of implementing the project.

The Bicol project is of general interest to development planners and policy-makers for three reasons : first, the analyses




FIG. 27.1 : *The Bicol River Basin and the Philippines. The desert to the right shows the location of the study area within the Philippines islands (scale : approx. 1 : 369210)*

- Integrated Development Area (IDA)
  - I Libmanan-Cabusao IDA Project (AID Loan)
  - II Pill IDA
    - A. Bula IDA II Project (AID Loan)
    - B. Other Pill
  - III Rinconada IDA
    - A. Rinconada-Buhí (Prop Aid Loan FY)
    - B. Proposed Lake Bato Storage & Flood Projection
  - IV Naga-Calabanga IDA IV-A and B
  - V Bailway-Sn Vicente IDA

- VI Quinali IDA Project
- VII Agro-Industrial Development Area
- VIII Sipocot-Del Gallego IDA
- IX Partido IDA
  - Sorsogon
  - SIDA I Sarsogon, Bacon, Castillo, Pilar and Donsol
  - SIDA II Irosin, Juban, Magallanes, Bulan, Matnog and Sta Magdalena
  - SIDA III Casiguran, Gubat, Prieto Diaz, Bulusan and Barcelona
  - Multiple IDA Coverage
  - (Camarines Sur & Albay Provines)
  - \* Bicol Secondary & Feeder Road Project (AID Loan)
  - \* Bicol Integrated Health, Nutrition & Population (Proposed AID Loan FY)
  - \* Rural Water Supply Systems

employed in the Philippine project are potentially replicable for integrated spatial development planning in rural regions of other developing nations ; secondly, the problems of designing applied policy analyses in Bicol are quite common in much of the developing world ; and finally, the results of the analysis provide insights into urban-rural relationships and the spatial dimensions of rural poverty, potentially useful in reformulating national investment strategies.

#### CONCEPT AND BACKGROUND OF THE URBAN FUNCTIONS IN RURAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECT

The Bicol River Basin in the Philippines was chosen as the site for the first of three pilot projects to be undertaken by the Urban Development Office of the US Agency for International Development (USAID) in order to 'strengthen urban analysis, activities and functions which are complementary to rural development.'<sup>8</sup> In designing the overall programme, Office of Urban Development analysis contended that the spatial dimensions are crucial to the success of the Agency's 'new directions' in development policy, which is aimed at assisting the 'poor majority' in the Third World primarily through intensified rural development. Moreover, they argued that functions of urban centres are essential to stimulate the growth of rural economies. 'In addition to being the loci of opportunities for off-farm employment, urban centers provide marketing, storage, processing, supply, credit, health, educational and other services to the rural areas they serve. They concluded



that 'rural areas without easy access to such centers and services cannot prosper and those without access to fully functional and efficient [urban] centers are denied their full development potential.<sup>9</sup>

The projects would both gather additional information about the nature of the relationship between urban and rural development and test analytical and planning methodologies. Analysts in the Office of Urban Development pointed out that :

The linkages between rural development and urban centers are clear, and the existing literature identifies and provides considerable insight into the kinds of general services and functions required at the level of the rural market town to support rural development. Less progress has been made in identifying similar facilities and services at other levels of the urban hierarchy—i.e., in the regional and supraregional centers—and little has been written of a comprehensive nature. More understanding is needed of the mix, magnitude and timing (i.e., order of priority) and location of facilities and services at all levels and for different types of agricultural patterns. In addition, practical information is needed on alternative ways of providing the required services and facilities.<sup>10</sup>

The ultimate outputs of the three pilot projects would be a process of analysis and a 'package' of analytical techniques and methods for planning that would assist USAID and developing country planners to design policies and programmes for strengthening the role of urban centres in rural development. The methods tested and proven effective in these three developing countries would be disseminated to USAID missions throughout the world.

### **The Conceptual Framework**

The importance of the spatial dimension to USAID's 'new directions' in development policy was strongly confirmed in preparatory research conducted for the office of Urban Development in 1976.<sup>11</sup> The study found that spatial development in most development countries was not conducive to equitable growth in rural areas. Although metropolitan centres and smaller cities could play

an important role in stimulating rural economies, in most less developed countries (LDCs) they were not well-dispersed, and were often poorly linked to rural hinterlands. In most countries the rural poor lacked access to the services, facilities and productive activities found in urban centres of any size, and as a result the cities did not provide inputs needed to increase agricultural production or meet basic human needs in rural regions.

The report proposed a general framework for analysing rural areas and determining the degree of articulation and integration of the settlement system, and the linkages between urban and rural areas. Functional analysis of settlement systems in developing countries could help determine the types of 'urban' services and facilities needed at each level of the spatial hierarchy and the means of providing better access for the rural poor to those functions. The study pointed out, however, that any analytical framework would have to be modified in application, adapted to local conditions, and tested in a number of developing countries. The scarcity of data and general unreliability of statistics in LDCs, and the need for analytical techniques that could be easily applied by planners and readily understood by policy-makers in rural regions, mandated substantial testing through experimental and pilot projects.

The report suggested that the pilot projects focus on three areas of analysis :

1. *Analysis of Rural Resources and Activities* : including such factors as physical characteristics of the region, land and resource uses, cropping patterns, volume and diversity of agricultural production, population distribution and rural settlement patterns, services and facilities distribution, non-agricultural and commercial activities, and subsistence system characteristics :

2. *Analysis of Central Places* : including the location of market towns, small cities, intermediate or regional centres ; the size, composition and density of towns, the location, concentration and dispersion of central functions, changes in the size and concentration of social and economic activities over time, and the labour force and income distribution characteristics of settlements ; and

3. *Analysis of Regional Spatial Linkages* : including physical, economic, population movement, technological, social service

delivery, political and institutional interaction patterns among settlements within the region, and linkages with external centres.

A number of specific analytical techniques, and the types of information needed to apply them, were delineated. The report emphasised, however, that the pilot projects should be tailored to the needs and constraints found in the region under study. A pre-designed package of methods could not be imposed; methodology should be designed in collaboration with planners and researchers in the country chosen for study only after initial data inventories and surveys of available information were conducted.

#### SELECTION OF THE BICOL RIVER BASIN

The Bicol River Basin, in the Southern Luzon region of the Philippines, consists of two provinces : Camarines Sur and Albay. It has long been an economically depressed area with high levels of poverty, an extremely skewed income distribution, low agricultural productivity, an adverse climate and virtually no significant manufacturing activity. Physical infrastructure is sparse and communication and transport linkages within the region and with other areas of the Philippines are poor. At the same time, the Basin's rich alluvial soil is potentially capable of high levels of agricultural production under proper irrigation and cultivation; the region has important underdeveloped natural and mineral resources; and the national government had already committed itself to an extensive programme of regional development.<sup>12</sup>

The Basin was chosen not only for its relatively high levels of poverty, but also because a regional planning and development agency—the Bicol River Basin Development Program (BRBDP)—was willing to undertake the study, and because of the relatively good data base found in the Philippines. Highly trained local manpower was available and capable of implementing the project successfully. Moreover, the BRDP had a detailed plan of development, had undertaken a number of resources and baseline analyses, and through funding from the US Agency for International Development, the Government of the Philippines and various bilateral and multilateral lending agencies, would be coordinating a substantial amount of investment in the Basin in

the immediate future. The interest of USAID's Philippine Mission and the cooperation of the Philippine government in providing support, were also strong considerations in the selection.

The 16-month project would be designed and implemented by the Center for Policy and Development Studies (CPDS) at the University of the Philippines at Los Banos through a contract with BRBDP. CPDS would maintain a field office in Bicol during the data collection phase of the project and move the staff to Manila and Los Banos for the analysis and planning stages.

Indigenous design and implementation of the project, as opposed to implementation by a USAID contractor, was important for two reasons. First, although the Bicol had relatively good data base, much of the crucial information was not expected to be available in the forms needed, and the knowledge and experience of local planners would be essential in designing realistic surveys and interpreting results. Secondly, the planning process was to be institutionalised in the Bicol River Basin Development Program, requiring that its staff and consultants be intimately involved in the entire study. Project design assistance, technical aid in selecting and adapting methodology, review and evaluation of working papers and the final report and assistance with training would be provided by USAID consultants, who would also monitor the project for the Urban Development Office. The consultants would be available at regular intervals during the project, but would not reside fulltime in the Philippines. Final responsibility for all phases and for completion of the project was vested in the Philippine staff.

#### PRINCIPLES OF ORGANISATION AND METHODOLOGY SELECTION

The project was organised and decision were made about design methodology on the basis of specific principles related to the need for analytical techniques that could easily be applied in rural areas, to the characteristics of policy-makers in rural areas where the project was likely to be replicated and to the availability of data in the Bicol River Basin. Some of the principles were inherent in the design of the overall 'Urban Functions' programme, some were recommended by the USAID consultants and others emerged from experience with the project as it progressed. The project was divided into four phases—first, an

extensive inventorisation of data, information and existing studies to formulate a statistical profile of rural areas, settlements and urban centres in the Basin ; secondly, a functional complexity analysis of the region's settlement system to determine the distribution of services, facilities and productive activities among settlements and to delineate the settlement hierarchy ; thirdly, an analysis of linkages among settlements within the region, and with places outside Bicol ; and finally, an analysis to determine the access of the rural poor to services and facilities located in urban settlements, to evaluate the adequacy of the distribution of urban functions for rural development and to formulate a spatial policy for planning the future development of the Basin.

Among the operating principles used in the project were the following :

1. *Creation of an on-going planning process as well as production of a spatial development plan.* The objective of the project, as noted in the grant agreement between USAID and the Philippine Government was twofold : first, 'to develop a planning process—potentially valid for application elsewhere in the Philippines and in other countries,' and second, to develop 'a plan for strengthening the contribution of urban centres to rural development in the Bicol.'<sup>13</sup> Thus the project was not only to test an analytical and planning procedure but also to institutionalise the process in the Bicol River Basin Development Program so that the analyses could be revised on a continuing basis.

Although the CPDS staff made extensive efforts to fulfill both objectives—primarily through eliciting the participation of technical personnel, BRBDP planners and Philippine consultants in the project's operations, and informing local political leaders through training and workshop sessions—staff time and attention inevitably focused on analysis and plan formulation, often subordinating tasks related to institutionalising the planning process. Workshops held quarterly in Bicol proved to be an effective way of keeping a core of technical personnel and political leaders informed of activities during the first months of the project, but participation fell off as the project progressed. The pressures of time and conflicting commitments for political leaders made their attendance at workshops sporadic. Once staff activities were moved from Bicol to the University of the Philippines at Los Banos it became more difficult to provide

information and elicit participation. Moreover, as pressures began to build on the staff to complete various stages of the project on time, more expedient and less participatory procedures were adopted.

2. *Design of the spatial analysis and development plan to be policy-oriented and adjunctive in nature.* The plan or spatial analyses would be orientated to the decision-making requirements of the Bicol River Basin Development Program, regional offices of national government agencies and provincial and local governments that would be making investment and location decision in the Basin over the next ten years. As the regional director of the Department of Local Government and Community Development expressed it during an early organisational workshop, the outputs of the Urban Functions in Rural Development project should be 'inputs' for the planning efforts of other organisations. The plan would not be a comprehensive regional development scheme *per se*, since the National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA), the major cities, and the BRBDP already had comprehensive development plans. Instead, the Urban Functions report would provide a spatial dimension useful for making locational decisions and for revising comprehensive development plans. Planning would be adjunctive, and the data and analysis could be used to supplement technical criteria used by various organisations in making investments in the area.<sup>14</sup>

3. *Use of applied research methods and analytical techniques easily performed by rural planners and easily understood by policy makers.* The analytical techniques used in the project would have to be appropriate for applied policy analysis and to the planning capacities found in rural areas. The USAID consultants believed that conditions found in most developing nations imposed tight parameters on the complexity of applied policy analysis. Policy plans must be produced quickly and be timely if they are to have an impact on investment decision-making. Thus, policy studies cannot usually depend on time-consuming data collection and highly sophisticated research techniques. They cannot, moreover, use techniques that imposed overly complex, costly or time-consuming requirements on users. They should be relatively easy to apply and not require sophisticated equipment or high levels of technical skill and training, which are not usually found in rural regions. If the methods are to be institutionalised in local

planning and decision-making processes they must be of a type that can be applied manually or with easily acquired and operated equipment such as desk calculators. If they are to be applied by planners and administrators without advanced technical training in spatial analysis, they should involve relatively simple and easily learned operations.

In addition, it was considered crucial that the methods and techniques be understandable to rural policy makers and that the results of the analyses be clearly presentable to local officials who would have limited exposure to or interest in spatial analysis methodologies, and indeed, who might be alienated by complex methodology. The primary audience for the analysis would in most cases be government officials and political leaders with limited education and technical training. The analytical techniques most easily understood by them would be descriptive statistics, analytical mapping, scaling and charting.

Although most participants in the project eventually accepted the general principle, strong tendencies to deviate from it were apparent in the early stages. Some of the staff members (most of whom had masters degrees), the University of the Philippines' professors who acted as consultants and some of the BRBDP planners often showed more interest in relatively sophisticated methodology and often viewed the project as scholarly research rather than as an exercise in applied policy analysis. Staff members worried that the results derived from more simplified descriptive techniques would not carry the 'authority' of those generated by sophisticated statistical methods and computer analysis. However, as the project progressed, and the limitations of available data, the requirements of collecting additional information to fit complex analytical methodologies, the difficulties encountered in explaining more sophisticated techniques to political leaders and technical personnel in government agencies, and the constraints on operationalising computer-based analyses became more apparent, the principle was accepted more readily.

4. *Use of as much existing data as possible ; limit new data collection to areas where significant 'information gaps' appear.* Because a number of studies had been previously conducted in the Bicol and because the Philippines had extensive census and statistical materials, the planning and analysis methodologies

were tailored as much as possible to using existing data, turning to methods requiring additional data collection sparingly and only when crucial information gaps were identified. In any case, limitations of time and money made large-scale data collection and extensive original research impossible. The Urban Functions study would draw as heavily as possible on census materials, previous resources and social survey studies of the Basin and the specialised feasibility and technical studies performed by and for the BRBDP.

Although the Bicol River Basin was relatively 'data rich' for an economically depressed region, it soon became obvious that much of the available data were not collected or reported in forms appropriate for spatial analysis. Among the weaknesses of the existing data base were :

- a. Nearly all socio-economic data were reported at either the province or municipal level and could not be disaggregated to the *barangay* (village) settlement level.
- b. It was often difficult or impossible to make valid distinctions between *poblacions* (town centres) and rural *barangays* with socio-economic data reported at the municipal level.
- c. Much of the data collected by the National Census and Statistic Office (NCSO) were on a sample basis, making it impossible to attribute them to specific settlements or to use original field sheets to aggregate data for settlements.
- d. Some of the data were reported at different units over time, or the unit boundaries changed from one reporting period to the next, making time series or temporal comparisons difficult.
- e. Much of the data available from technical reports, special BRBP studies and national ministries were collected for specific purposes and communities and did not cover the entire Basin. Thus, many aspects of the analysis had to be based on 'sample' studies of sub-areas within the Basin.<sup>15</sup>

Moreover, there were other limitations to the information available. Accurate maps delineating towns and *barangays* did not



exist when the project began, and a good deal of time had to be devoted to locating and mapping settlements. Air Photos were available for only about 10 per cent of the Basin, and neither time nor money was available to complete the photo surveys. Thus, information concerning the location of boundaries of settlements had to be collected through field and key informant surveys. The excellent social surveys conducted by the Social Science Research Unit of Ateneo de Naga University—especially municipal and transport inventories and programme evaluation studies—provided strong insights into various aspects of underdevelopment in the Basin, but they covered only Comarines Sur province. Some of the studies had to be updated or extended in Albay Province in order to obtain complete coverage of the Basin. In addition, the lack of family income and employment data at municipal and barangay levels created serious analytical problems that were never fully overcome. Finally, except for some data found in the transport studies, virtually none of the existing information was useful for linkage analysis; transport linkages, market and social interaction patterns, service linkages and governmental relationships all had to be determined through original studies done on a sample basis by the project staff or its subcontractors.

5. *Use of a combination of analytical methodologies, and reliance on staff knowledge of the area under study.* It became clear early in the project that, given the constraints of time and money and the need to develop a useful policy document quickly, it would not be possible to undertake a comprehensive statistical analysis of the Bicol River Basin. Where comprehensive coverage could not be attained using existing or easily collected data, partial analysis, sample studies, and sub-area analysis were done. Formal statistical analysis was supplemented, where appropriate, with 'softer' methods: case studies, participant observation and interviewing of key informants. The staff was encouraged to be creative in developing analytical methodologies suited to the conditions and needs of the area. To the extent that the output of the project was to be a policy plan rather than a scholarly research study, the staff was urged to use a wide variety of techniques for obtaining information, and to cultivate and use their own knowledge of the region in arriving at judgements and conclusions concerning crucial development issues.

Although a large number of possible analytical techniques were suggested in USAID's initial conceptual report, the project was not designed to test a pre-selected set of methods. Design of the analytical methods and techniques evolved during the project as opportunities and constraints became apparent, and were selected on the basis of criteria outlined earlier. Under any conditions, heavy reliance on multivariate statistical techniques seemed questionable given the types and quality of data available and the purposes of the study.

The staff accepted the necessity of using a variety of formal, and informal, 'hard' and 'soft' analytical methods, and the application of their own judgement to the study, although they were initially sceptical and somewhat uncomfortable without a pre-selected and designed approach. Their initial reaction was that one or two statistical techniques would provide the 'answers' and that conventional regional analysis methods should simply be applied in Bicol. Indeed, in the early stages of the project, statistical methods were often used as 'crutches'. Manipulation of numbers was often substituted for hard thinking and conceptualisation about spatial systems in the Basin. To some extent both reactions were mitigated as the project progressed and the staff saw the limitations inherent in each statistical technique they tested, and the need to use methods of analysis as a way of testing conceptions and preliminary judgements rather than to provide unequivocal 'answers' and irrefutable conclusions.

In retrospect, there was no alternative to managing the project as an experimental venture and to designing the methodologies and techniques to meet the needs and conditions found in the Bicol River conditions in the Basin. No pre-selected package of techniques would have fit the Basin. Many analytical techniques that were thought to be important for analysis at the outset had to be discarded either because of lack of available data or because they yielded inappropriate or useless results. Even simple location quotients could not be calculated, for instance, because of the lack of employment or production statistics; coefficients of segregation and Gini concentration ratios could not be determined for many socio-economic indicators, and distance-accessibility analysis was found to be not very useful in the context of rural underdevelopment in the Basin. Even some standard techniques of analysis such as centrality indexing were

not helpful; computer calculated Guttman scales proved futile given the limited capacity of Philippine computers and lack of trained manpower. In each instance, the staff had to fall back on descriptive and manually-calculated techniques. Overall, however, this provided a strong learning experience for most of the staff; doing short field surveys, hand-calculating results, manually constructing scalograms and testing alternative statistical techniques forced the staff to think seriously about the types of data needed, their real worth, the cost-effectiveness of gathering more, and the meaning of the results in terms of the conditions they observed in the Bicol River Basin.

Moreover, the initial exercise of making an inventory of all existing data prior to designing analytical techniques and collecting additional information—although it required much more time than originally estimated—yielded an important output: the first statistical compendium of social, economic, demographic and physical information, disaggregated to the municipal level, that had been done in the Bicol. It categorised data from myriad sources that heretofore had been scattered in specialised technical reports. This compendium alone would provide an important planning tool for the BRBDP and other government agencies within the Basin, and eventually can be used to assist in making private sector investment and location decision. Finally, the exercise yielded the first comprehensive settlement map of the Bicol River Basin which identified and located barangays. Again, this would provide BRBDP planners with a valuable tool for future planning, and when combined with the analyses of municipalities, functional complexity of settlements and indicators of linkage, can be used to make more informed and effective location decisions.

#### ANALYTICAL METHODS AND PLANNING PROCEDURES

Following the general principles outlined earlier, and considering data availability and the limitations on extensive new data collection, the types of analyses described in the following sub-sections were used in the Bicol project.

**Preparation of a socio-economic, demographic, and physical profile of municipalities within the basin as an inventory, comparative analysis and baseline study**

Data were compiled and disaggregated to provide a comparative profile of social, economic, physical, institutional and demographic characteristics of Bicol's 54 municipalities. Primarily descriptive, this aspect of the study made use of data on population size, density and composition, levels of dependency, literacy, educational attainment, conditions of dwelling units, size of municipal revenues, land area, crop production value of production and experienced work force. Also included were comparative analyses of changes in population sizes of barangays, per cent distribution of population by municipality, number and per cent of households with lighting and toilet facilities, strength of construction of dwelling units, distribution of market receipts by municipality and distribution of agricultural resources. The types, numbers and distribution of productive and commercial establishments were compared by municipality as were the numbers and capacities of hospitals, educational institutions and service establishments.

Changes between 1970 and 1975 were calculated for selected indicators. For some data, location quotients were calculated but lack of data on employment by industry limited the use of location quotients in analysing the economic base of municipalities.

Municipalities then were categorised by level of development based on three derived analyses—ranking by levels of socio-economic and demographic characteristics, ranking by share of establishments and ranking by transportation access. Quartile analyses were done for selected socio-economic indicators and weighted rank calculations were used to cross-check the results with the other analyses in arriving at three 'development' categories municipalities.

The analyses verified although the entire Bicol River Basin is predominantly rural, municipalities differ significantly in their socio-economic characteristics. The distribution of services, facilities, infrastructure and productive and social organisations among municipalities is extremely skewed. If these socio-economic variables are used as indicators of development, municipalities in the Basin can be classified into three major levels:

developing municipalities ; less developed municipalities ; and underdeveloped municipalities.

*Developing municipalities* include the six most 'urbanised', encompassing the two provincial of Naga and Legaspi, the city of Iriga and the town of Tobacco. Services, facilities and productive activities are highly concentrated in these six municipalities, especially in Naga and Legaspi cities. The developing municipalities contain about one-quarter of the population (386 000 people or 22 per cent) but account for more than 40 per cent of the 'urban' population, raise 45 per cent of the Basin's municipal revenues and have significantly higher percentages of households served by piped water and electricity. Most of the Basin's educational and vocational training institutions are concentrated within them as are most of the major health care institutions. The developing municipalities contain nearly a third of all high school and 45 per cent of all college graduates in Bicol. They are the financial centres of the Basin, with nearly half of all financial institutions and more than 85 per cent of deposit and loan assets. More than one third of all corn mills, agricultural warehouses, farm supply stores and farm machine and tool establishments, and nearly half of the cottage industries, and commercial, financial and service establishments are within their boundaries.

*Less Developed Municipalities* are ten that lie at or near the Manila South Road within the central plain of the river basin. They are closer in socio-economic and physical characteristics to the undeveloped municipalities than to the developing ones. But they are distinguished from the former primarily by the fact that their access to the Manila South Road or provincial arteries connecting them to the major cities of Naga and Legaspi has generated some diversification of economic and social activities in their poblacions, and that they contain the potentially rich agricultural land in the Basin. This group of municipalities accounts for slightly more than 26 per cent of population and has concentrations of services, cottage industries, infrastructure and facilities slightly larger than its share of population. The rural areas of these municipalities are largely underdeveloped : less than 20 per cent of households are served by piped water, they have few educational or health institutions, commercial establishments are rare and scattered. Perhaps because of their physical proximity to the major provincial centres, these areas have not become

highly specialised and seem to depend on the larger centres for market and trade.

*Underdeveloped Municipalities* include 38 predominantly rural, subsistence agricultural areas forming the periphery of the Basin. Slightly more than half of the population of the Bicol River Basin lives in these municipalities, which, by all socio-economic characteristics, are the poorest and least developed. These 38 municipalities have a far smaller proportion of facilities, services, educated manpower, financial resources and productive economic activities than their share of population. Their residents are scattered in rather small barangays. Only eight per cent of households receive water and less than six per cent have electrical power. Only five of the 38 municipalities have post-secondary educational or vocational training institutions ; nearly 40 per cent have no markets of any kind and 8 contain no financial institutions. These municipalities collect less than two-fifths of all municipal revenues and, on the average, depend on the national government for nearly a third of their municipal income. Some of the municipalities obtain more than half of their revenues from the national government and have few sources of internal income. The financial institutions in these underdeveloped municipalities have less than 10 per cent of the deposit and loan assets in the Basin. As a group, these municipalities contain less than one-quarter of the manufacturing, commercial, financial and service establishments, only a little more than a third of agro-processing, storage and commercial establishments and one quarter of the health facilities.

Thus, the analyses revealed that a majority of the population in the Bicol River Basin lives in municipalities with few services or facilities needed to meet basic human needs or increase agricultural production and expand non-agricultural employment opportunities. Moreover, they are generally isolated from or have extremely poor access to the municipalities in which services, facilities and markets are most highly concentrated.

#### **Analysis of centrally, functional complexity and hierarchy of settlements**

This component of the analysis aimed at determining the extent and pattern of 'centrality' within the Basin and at delineating the distribution, concentration and ubiquity of central functions and

service.<sup>16</sup> The methodologies included :

- (a) *Functional Scaling of Municipalities.* Guttman scale analysis of the 54 municipalities in Albay and Camarines Sur provinces used 64 items (services, facilities and organisations) in eight functional categories : economic, social services, communications, physical equipment and services, recreational, personal services, community organisations and extension and protectives.<sup>17</sup> The items were those that a municipal inventory of towns and barrios in Camarines Sur province showed existed and the inventory was later checked in field studies for Albay.

While this exercise provided useful information concerning the functional complexity and concentration of various types of services and facilities in municipalities, its most important deficiency was that the municipalities are not discrete settlements, but administrative areas. To get a better indication of the hierarchy and functional complexity of settlements, the staff turned to two other methodologies : a Guttman scale of settlements and weighted centrality indexes.

- (b) *Functional Complexity Analysis of Central Places.* A second scale, of urbanised or 'built-up areas', was prepared to rank settlements by functional complexity and to attempt to delineate a hierarchy of central places. The 'built-up areas' consist of : (1) poblacions and contiguous barangays with approximately the same land use characteristics and the poblacion ; and (2) other barangays within the municipality with a population size of at least 50 per cent of the poblacion.

Neither the municipal nor built-up area scales, however, distinguished barangays as discrete settlements. Indeed during the surveys it became clear that many barangays, like municipalities, were only administrative areas rather than settlements. And since accurate boundaries for many barangays could not be determined, population density criteria had to be eliminated. It was decided, instead, to test the Census definition of settlements :

poblacions and other barrios with at least a population of 1000 in which the occupation of the inhabitants is predominantly non-farming/fishing and which have specified physical characteristic.<sup>18</sup>

All barangays not meeting these minimum population-physical facilities criteria were considered to be non-central rural places and would be treated as a group at the lowest order in a hierarchy of functional complexity. A survey was later done of all barangays, which confirmed the validity of this judgement. A scale was then computed for all settlements.

(c) *Weighted Centrality Indexing for all Settlements.* Another complementary exercise to obtain an indication of centrality was the calculation of weighted centrality indexes for all settlements. The staff devised a method of adapting Marshall's centrality index, assigning weights on the basis of ubiquity of functions. The procedure is as follows :<sup>19</sup>

- (1) Reproduce largest Guttman scale in an inverted form with cases arranged vertically and items horizontally ;
- (2) Total each row and column ;
- (3) Using the assumption that the total number of functional attributes in the entire system has a combined centrality value of 100, determine the weight or 'location coefficient' of the functional attribute by applying the formula :

$$C=t/T$$

where C=the weight of functional attribute t

t=combined centrality value of 100

T=total number of attribute in the system ;

- (4) Add one block to the table and enter the weights computed ;
- (5) Reproduce another table similar to that in step 1 displaying the weights calculated in step 3 and the total centrality values ;
- (6) Sum the weights of each row to produce the indices of centrality.

Tables 27.1 and 27.2 illustrate the calculation of the centrality



TABLE 27.1 : Calculating weights of functions

Places	Functions										Total
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	
A	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	10
B	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	0	8
C	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	6
D	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	8	0	0	7
E	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	5
F	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	4
G	1	1	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3
H	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3
Total Functions	8	8	8	6	5	4	2	2	2	1	46
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	
Centrality Weights	12.5	12.5	12.5	16.6	20.0	25.0	50.0	50.0	50.0	100.0	

TABLE 27.2 : Calculating centrality indexes

Places	Functions										Total
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	
A	12.5	12.5	12.5	16.6	20.0	25.0	50.0	50.0	50.0	100.0	349.1
B	12.5	12.5	12.5	16.6	20.0	25.5	50.0		50.0		199.1
C	12.5	12.5	12.5	16.6	20.0	25.0					99.1
D	12.5	12.5	12.5	16.6	20.0	25.0		50.0			149.1
E	12.5	12.5	12.5	16.6	20.0						74.1
F	12.5	12.5	12.5	16.6							54.1
G	12.5	12.5	12.5								37.5
H	12.5	12.5	12.5								37.5
Total											
Centrality	100	105	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	1000.0*

\*Total does not add due to rounding.

index. The centrality index allowed use of attributes or functions that appear as errors in the Guttman scale based on the assumption that the presence of 'rare' functions in an otherwise lower scale centre does contribute to its centrality.

- (d) *Scalogram Analysis*. Scalogram analysis was also done to supplement the Guttman scales of municipalities and built-up areas. This is primarily a graphic and non-statistical scale that arrays functions by ubiquity and ranks settlements by functional complexity. The Guttman scales calculated by a computer program, presented two major problems for analysis in the Urban Functions project. First, the functions that seemed to be of most interest for rural development—farm equipment repair shops, vocational schools, credit unions, rural banks, farm supply stores, etc.—did not scale and were eliminated in the scale scores by the computer. Secondly, the computer output was difficult to understand and could not be easily presented to show the distribution of functions by place.


The statistical presentation required detailed explanation and interpretation, which technically untrained policymakers—at least those attending the Bicol technical workshops in which the method had been presented—found difficult to understand. Nor did they immediately see its relevance.

A graphic scale used successfully in India and Indonesia was adapted for the Bicol-study. All settlements were included—a total of 1419 built-up areas and barangays. The technique resulted in a graphic presentation illustrated in Table 27.3.<sup>29</sup>

The procedure is as follows :

- (1) On the left side of the worksheet list settlements as rows in descending order of their populations ;
- (2) Across the top as columns list the functions found in the region in order of their decreasing ubiquity ;
- (3) Draw-row and column lines so that the worksheet becomes a matrix in which each cell represents a function that may appear in the settlement ;
- (4) Fill in with a dark colour all cells which represent an institution actually found in a settlement.

TABLE 27.3 : Section of a scalogram for 'built-up area' settlements, bicol river basin



- (5) Recorder the rows and columns so as visually to minimise the light holes appearing in the dark pattern found in the upper left. The scalogram is complete when no shifting of a settlement row or functions column can reduce the number of holes in this pattern ;
- (6) The final order of settlement rows identifies a ranking of settlements which can be interpreted as an ordinal centrality score.

As Fisher notes, 'the scalogram provides a visual description of

the...settlement and institutional hierarchy that is easy to read and useful as a reference in analyzing numerous issues for planning.<sup>21</sup> This observation was confirmed in the presentations at technical workshops, where both technically-trained personnel and local political leaders examined an initial version of the scalogram prepared for the 120 settlements at the 'top' of the hierarchy.

Among the potential uses of the scalogram in regional planning are the following : it can be used to categorize settlements into levels of functional complexity and to determine the types and diversity of services and facilities located in individual places and in various levels of the hierarchy ; the scalogram shows rough associations among services and facilities in specific locations and potential functional linkages among them ; and by reading any particular column one can see the degree of ubiquity of a service or facility and its distribution over places in the region. For particular functions requiring supplementary support services and facilities, one can determine the existence of preconditions by examining the diversity of items present in any particular community. Moreover, in conjunction with a map showing locations of the functions appearing on the scalogram, and with population-service criteria, quick approximations can be made of the adequacy of service and facilities distribution for the region. 'Missing', or unexpectedly present, functions are clearly identified. Rough indicators of threshold for some items can be determined from scalograms showing the population size of settlements. Finally, the scalogram can be used as a general reference in making decisions about locating services and facilities in order to increase potential access for communities within various levels of the hierarchy.

The scalogram has definite advantages over the Guttman scale for application by rural planners in that it is easy to construct and to interpret, requires no sophisticated training or equipment, and can be easily updated and revised using either 'windshield surveys' or more systematic reporting schemes to obtain data on the presence or absence of services and facilities.

### **Threshold Analysis**

In order to obtain approximate indications of population sizes required to support services and facilities in settlements of the

Bicol at the present time, the staff adapted Marshall's approach to threshold analysis.<sup>22</sup>

Marshall argues that 'the threshold is that size of center which divides the ranked list of centers in such a way that the number of centers lacking the function above the division is equal to the number of centers possessing the function below division.' The method is especially appropriate to analysis of rural regions and to the type of data already collected for scalogram analysis, in that it requires only a ranked listing of settlements and the presence or absence of functions. Marshall suggests a modification on the general rule :

'Once a threshold has been determined, this threshold (and the function to which it applies), will subsequently be disregarded unless at least half of all the centers above the threshold size possess the function in question.

The staff adapted a procedure which is illustrated in Table 27.4 :

**TABLE 27.4 : Calculation of threshold levels for central place functions**

Central Place in Descending Order of Rank	Population Size	Function		
		1	2	3
A	10,000	1	1	1
B	8,000	0	1	1
C	6,000	0	1	1
D	5,000	0	0	1
E	3,000	0	0	1
F	2,700	1	1	0
G	1,900	0	1	1
H	1,700	6	0	0

- (1) Construct a table with a rank listing of centres according to population, a corresponding list of population data and the presence (1) or absence (0) of every function in each of the centres listed ;
- (2) Apply Marshall's rule and identify each function's population threshold ; and
- (3) Apply Marshall's supplementary rule and disregard functions eliminated by this process.<sup>23</sup>

There were, however, definite limitations on the use of this technique. Current threshold levels may not realistically represent the potential for settlements of various sizes to support services and may reflect locations decisions not based on the market considerations or on development obstacles that have presented services and facilities from being efficiently located in settlements that do have the required population sizes to support them. The techniques does offer a 'quick and dirty' means of calculating the thresholds for currently available services and facilities, however, and was used in conjunction with other methods of estimation.

The functional complexity and scale analyses showed quite clearly that the Bicol River Basin is a sub-region in which services and facilities necessary for fulfilling basic human needs generating economic development for the rural poor are not only inadequate but also highly concentrated in a few small central places, which are not easily accessible to people living outside of their immediate boundaries. The hierarchical distribution of settlements is strongly skewed and the spatial system is neither well articulated nor tightly integrated. Of the 1419 discrete settlements located in the basin—120 'built up' areas and more than 1200 barangays—little more than *half* contained any of the 64 functions. Nearly 90 per cent of all functions appeared in less than 20 per cent of the settlements. Most of the other functions that appear in more than 20 per cent of the settlements are either highly localised services or social organisations with little or no productive capacity. And even among the built-up areas functions are unevenly distributed. Nearly 60 per cent of all central functions appear in less than 20 per cent of the built up areas, with one-fifth of these places containing no functions at all (see Table 27.5).

Only two central places—the Naga-Camaligan and Legaspi-Daraga urban—areas—contained most of the functions found in the Basin's settlements. These two places represent less than one per cent of all communities and contain about 10 per cent of the Bicol's population (see Table 27.6). At a second level are 11 settlements, which as a group seem to function as local service centres with from 31 to 54 functions. These centres perform a few area-wide and a larger number of local commercial and administrative functions. Most are clustered along the national highway or at a junction of provincial roads. A third level of about 43 settlements, representing 3 per cent of all communities and about 10 per cent

TABLE 27.5 : Distribution of functions among settlements in Bicol River Basin, 1977

Range of Settlements with Functions	Numbers of Functions	Type of Functions (Per cent of Settlements with Function)
80-100%	0	—
60-79%	0	—
40-59%	1	Agro-Processing Facility (41.1)
20-39%	3	Farmers Association (38.9)
		Cottage Industry (26.7)
10-19%	2	Civic Organisation (26.7)
		Sports Association (13.6)
		Paved Basketball Court (13.5)
5-9.9%	3	Piped Waste Supply (12.5)
		High School (7.8)
2-4.9%	18	Agricultural Extension Station (6.1)
		Ministry of Local
		Government Office (4.1)
		Animal Industries Extension
		Office (3.9)
		Auto Repair Shop (4.1)
		Cockfighting Pit (3.6)
		Construction Supply
		Store (3.4)
		Hardware Supply Store (3.1)
		Playground with Facilities
		(2.9)
		Housing Subdivision (2.8)
		Cooperative Organisation (2.2)
		Photo Studios (4.8)
		Professional Organisa-
		tion (4.1)
		Plant Industries Extension
		Office (4.3)
		Private Medical Clinic (3.8)
		Farm Supply-Agro-Chemical
		Store (3.4)
		Regular Public Market (3.2)
		Farm Equipment Repair
		Shop (2.9)
		Rural Bank (2.8)
		Labour Union (2.3)



TABLE 27.5 : (Contd.)

1-1.9%	19	<p>Drugstore (1.8)</p> <p>Restaurant (1.8)</p> <p>Credit Union (1.8)</p> <p>Train Station (1.7)</p> <p>Appliance Store (1.6)</p> <p>Bus Station with Repair Facilities (1.5)</p> <p>Lodging Place (1.3)</p> <p>Telecommunications Station (1.1)</p> <p>College (1.1)</p> <p>Funeral Parlour (1.0)</p>	<p>Police Constabulary Station (1.8)</p> <p>Nightclub or Bar (1.7)</p> <p>Surveyor (1.7)</p> <p>Gymnasium/Auditorium (1.7)</p> <p>Private Hospital (1.5)</p> <p>Vocational School (1.3)</p> <p>Power Plant or Station (1, 2)</p> <p>Bank or Financial Establishment (1.1)</p> <p>Optometry/Optical Shop (1.1)</p>
Less than 1.0%	18	<p>Telephone Exchange (0.9)</p> <p>Cinema with Daily Run (0.8)</p> <p>Operational Government Hospital (0.7)</p> <p>Shopping Centre (0.6)</p> <p>Cemetery (0.6)</p> <p>Radio Station (0.4)</p> <p>Newspaper Publisher (0.3)</p> <p>Red Cross Office (0.2)</p> <p>Airport (0.1)</p>	<p>Xerox Copy Service (0.9)</p> <p>Paluwagen (Welfare Society) (0.7)</p> <p>Fire Station with Trucks (0.7)</p> <p>Cinema with Less than Daily Run (0.7)</p> <p>Port or Pier (0.5)</p> <p>Nursing School (0.4)</p> <p>Security Agency (0.3)</p> <p>Hotel (0.3)</p> <p>Bowling Alley (0.2)</p>

TABLE 27.6 : Functional complexity of levels of settlements in Bicol River Basin, 1977

Level of Hierarchy	Functional Characteristics	Number of Settlements	Settlements	Range of Functions	Per cent of All Settlements	Per cent of Basin population	Average population Size
I	Provincial Service Centres	2	Naga-Calimaligan Lagaspi-Daraga	60-61	0.14	10.6	89,892
II	Local Service Centres	11	Iriga, Tabaco, Goa, Tigaon, Pili, Nabua Bao, Guinobatan, Libmanan, Ligao	31-54	0.77	7.3	11,107
III	Rural Service Centres	43	37 Poblacions 6 Barangays	10-28	3.03	10.5	4,196
IV	Non-Central Places	1,363	2 Poblacions 1,361 Barangays	0-9	96.06	71.6	922

of the Basin's population, act as small rural service centres, in which from 10 to 28 functions appear. But most of these are highly localised activities accessible only to people living in the immediate vicinity of the *barrio*. The overwhelming majority of settlements—over 1300 or about 96 per cent of the total—are residential non-central places. They are villages of a few hundred families engaged in subsistence or near-subsistence agriculture or working as tenants or on small family owned plots. All communities in this category have less than 9 functions; most contain only a few or none at all. The only activities consistently found in these *barrios* are ubiquitous local functions serving a neighbourhood or cluster of houses. Most of the settlements have populations smaller than necessary to support most functions found in the Basin.

#### SPATIAL LINKAGE ANALYSIS

Analysis of linkages, an important part of the study for judging the accessibility of rural people to urban functions, remained partial and descriptive because of the large amount of original research that would have to be done in order to do a complete mapping of physical linkages and thorough investigation of socio-political relationships in the Basin. Yet, through sample surveys and synthesis of socio-economic studies already done in the Basin, the staff made substantial progress on obtaining information that provided useful insights into how activities located in various settlements are related to each other and the interaction patterns among settlements within the basin.

The studies showed that the adverse effects on the rural poor of Bicol's highly skewed distribution of services and facilities are aggravated by extremely weak economic, physical, service and social linkages among settlements. Although some of the functions included in the scale could not be expected to be widely distributed—they are central functions requiring high population threshold—most were basic commercial, administrative or service functions essential to meeting human needs and accelerating rural development. If they are not widely distributed in settlements throughout the Basin, then equity criteria would suggest that those living in rural areas should be least have easy access to places where they are located. But central places within Bicol

are not easily accessible to most rural areas, and the urban and rural settlements are not strongly linked.

### **Transportation and physical linkages**

The staff compiled information on transportation linkages among sub-areas of the Basin by mode, on road networks by conditions of road, and inter-point distances among barangays and between barangays and poblacions. In addition, information on traffic volumes, means of transportation and selected commodity flows was made available through various transportation studies conducted by BRBDP. The staff contracted for a survey of 'informal' transport goods and passengers by railroad 'skates'. Much of the data were mapped and provided a detailed profile of physical linkages among sub-areas within the Basin.

Transport studies showed that more than 70 per cent of all roads in the Basin are of poor quality and need upgarding. Only the national highway cutting through the centre of the Basin, and a few provincial roads, are of all-weather construction and passable during the rainy season. Farm-to-market roads are few and of poor construction. Many rural barrios can only be reached by small boat or on foot. The inadequacy of regular transport linkages is reflected in part by the use of non-motorised vehicles, animal-drawn wagons, use of illegal 'skates' along the railroad tracks and small boats and barges, and in part by the fact that the majority of trips taken within the Bicol River Basin are on foot. The railroad provides a limited service to points outside the Basin and the major centres are linked to Manila by infrequent bus and air services.

Roads are used by 95 per cent of the passengers taking trips within the Bicol River Basin and to transport over 80 per cent of agricultural commodities. But as physical linkages among communities, the roads provide rather poor service. Most of the rural population lives in settlements not easily accessible by road, and transport is difficult and expensive in most of the Basin. The cost of transporting commodities in interior rural areas is up to six times more than in areas connected by roads passable by motorised vehicles. Farmers from rural areas must often walk for hours to the nearest road and carry their produce on their backs or on slow-moving carabao or horses. Even after they reach a provincial road, the waiting times for a jeepney or bus are long

and the costs so high that marginal profits are sometimes completely wiped out. Rural farmers must wait an average of 30 times longer for transportation at secondary roads than at places adjacent to the Manila South road and in some more remote sections of the Basin they may wait as long as three or four hours. Because of the cost of transportation and difficult of travelling, 85 per cent of all trips taken within the Basin are among places within the same municipality and 99 per cent are within the same province. Relatively little travel—for shopping, work, trade, social interaction, or any other purpose—is inter-municipal and there is little interaction on a regular basis between the Basin's two provinces.

### **Economic and market linkages**

The staff completed surveys of six regular and six periodic markets to determine the origin and destination of selected commodities through major markets, to estimate the physical 'reach' of marketing centres for those commodities and to identify spatial and functional linkages among producers, middlemen and buyers. Although the sample surveys were not an adequate substitute for a complete market study, they did provide indications of linkage and raised important questions for further marketing research. In each of the six major markets 100 middlemen and 50 producers were interviewed with prepared questionnaires. Information was obtained on source and destination of commodities, type of seller, place of sale and volume of trading. Similar information was generated from periodic market middlemen. The survey was limited to public markets and did not include private stalls located adjacent to public markets.

Information on each commodity's source, destination and mode of transport was mapped, showing linkages among places within the Basin and between market centres within Bicol and those outside. The studies clearly demonstrated that market linkages, which should form a major network of commercial interaction within and among rural areas, are extremely weak in Bicol. The greatest amount of market interaction occurs through central markets in Naga and Legaspi cities. A significant portion of the Basin's population lives in settlements too small to support even a periodic market, which adversely affects their ability to sell agricultural surpluses, raise their income levels, obtain

household goods or by inputs needed to increase agricultural output.

Analysis of the commodity flows indicate that markets within the Bicol River Basin are primarily local exchange centres serving residents of the places in which they are located ; that they have limited 'reach' or service areas and are not well integrated into a network of area-wide exchange and trade. The survey indicated that a 'nested' hierarchy or articulated network of markets, characteristic of more economically developed regions, does not exist in Bicol. Markets within the Basin are primarily undifferentiated agricultural exchange points trading almost exclusively in six commodities (rice and Palay, coconut, copra, fresh, and dried fish, poultry and livestock) with some larger regular markets also providing limited amounts of household goods. Bicol River Basin markets, even in larger towns, have insignificant external trade linkages and the periodic markets are generally isolated, highly localised and virtually unintegrated collection and exchange points, most of which are barely accessible to rural people beyond 10 or 15 kilometres from the village in which the market is located.

### **Social linkages**

To the extent that the integration of settlements within a region occurs through social interaction among residents—through kinship ties, visiting among kin and friends, inter-village marriages, and for recreation and ritual—social linkages reflect the degree to which people perceive a region as a coherent and unified unit of society. Surveys of selected social interaction show relatively little social linkage among settlements within various sub-areas of the Bicol River Basin. A sample survey of marriage records showed that an average of less than 19 per cent of all spouses were chosen from outside the same municipality during a three year period during the mid-1970s. Over 80 per cent of all men and women in Bicol, during that period, tended to choose spouses from within their own municipality, and in most cases, from within the same or a neighbouring barangay. Since social interaction patterns in the Philippines are shaped strongly by family visiting, marriages among people from different towns and municipalities would be expected to increase social interaction among those places. But the inter-modal transport studies confirm

the indications of marriage pattern studies, that relatively few inter-municipal trips are for social purposes.

#### **Administrative, political and service linkages**

The nature of relationships among levels of government within the Bicol, formal and informal political and administrative decision-making, the linkages among and between government units in the provision of services and facilities, and the characteristics of the network of planning organisations affecting development policy within the Basin were some aspects of administrative, political and governmental linkages explored in a study sub-contracted to the College of Public Administration at the University of the Philippines.

It was found that formal government linkages among levels are dominated by national ministries operating within the Basin and that formal structure is highly centralised. Most local officials are appointed by and responsible to national ministries. Municipal officials generally are not under the authority of the mayors, themselves holdover appointees under martial law, who have few resources to solve local problems. Most municipalities in the Basin are dependent on the national government for part of their revenues and most of their authority. Decisions are often made through highly personalised relationships.

Studies of government structure and services in Bicol indicated that services provided by all levels are highly localised. Health, education, and other public institutions generally extend services only to populations living in the immediate vicinity of their sites or to the few who can afford to travel from rural barangays to obtain them in the larger cities. Even the post-secondary schools in the larger centres primarily only serve the local area. Health, education and agricultural extension services are far below standards set by national ministries.

#### **CONCLUSIONS AND RESULTS**

The Bicol River Basin Urban Functions in Rural Development Projects yielded a number of important outputs in addition to those envisaged in its design. From various functional and spatial analyses, the staff was able to identify a set of appropriate services and institutions, needed at each of three levels of

settlement—rural service centres, market towns and regional urban centres—adequately to meet basic human needs, articulate the settlement system and stimulate regional economic development (see Table 27.7). The functional complexity and scalogram analyses indicated the types of functions each level of settlement could support, as well as functional and spatial 'gaps' in the distribution of services and facilities.

The final report recommended that BRBDP consider developing 'minimum packages' of investments for each type of settlements in order to promote functional specialisation, meet unfulfilled economic and social welfare needs and integrate communities into a more cohesive economic and spatial system. To achieve greater spatial integration the BRBDP would have to plan for the creation of a network of all-weather and farm-to-market roads as a pre-condition for existing services to rural people, locating agro-processing facilities in rural areas, inducing non-farm production in rural villages and providing access to town-based facilities. The paucity of markets and market towns within the Basin would also require the immediate attention of BRBDP policymakers. The staff noted that future investments in services, facilities and infrastructure must be located strategically in existing and incipient rural service centres to stimulate the growth of markets. Without a well-dispersed, integrated and easily accessible network of market centres in rural hinterlands it would be unlikely that farmers could increase production to levels projected by the BRBDP.

Beyond establishing a planning process for spatial analysis and policy recommendations for integrating urban and rural development, the project also generated :

1. The first comprehensive statistical compendium of social economic, demographic, institutional and physical characteristics of municipalities and settlements in the Bicol River Basin that should provide an important statistical base for future analysis and planning ;
2. An inventory of available data sources on various aspects of social, economic and physical development in the Basin.
3. A number of small sample surveys and original research studies on various aspects of interaction and linkage among communities within the Basin, including a survey of selected markets, analysis of transport access, delineations of services



TABLE 27.7 : Services, facilities and infrastructure proposed for each settlement level,  
Bicol River Basin

General Functions	Rural Service Centres	Market Towns and Centres	Regional Urban Centres
Transport and Communi- cations	Surfaced, All-Weather Roads	Asphalted, All-Weather Roads	Concrete Highway to Major Urban Centres
	Farm Access Roads	Bus Terminal	Bus Terminal with Major Repair Facilities
	Bus Stop	Trucking or Bulk-Distributing Services	Auto and Machine Repair Shops
	Regular Bus or Jeepney Service to Rural	Regular Bus or Jeepney Service to Rural	Vehicle & Machine Spare Part Shops
	Service to Rural	Service and Regional Urban Centres	Regional and Interregional Trucking and Bus Services
	Collection Points	Gas and Service Station	Gas and Service Stations
	Gas Station	Auto Spare Parts Retail Store	Railroad, Port and Air Terminals
	Telegraph Service	Telegraph-Radiogram Service	Telegraph, Telegram, Telex Services and Facilities
	Postal Service	Telephone Station	Telephone Exchanges linked to Major Urban Centres and Market Towns
		Postal Services	Postal Distribution Centres
Market, Trade and Shopping	Periodic Market Facilities	Daily Market Facilities	Diversified Daily Market
	Farm Implements and Supply	Retail Outlets for Farm Supplies	Distribution Outlets and Sales Offices for Farm Machine
	Agricultural Shop	Wholesale Outlets for Farm Implements	Farm Supply Wholesalers
	Marketing Cooperative Outlet	Gold Storage and Warehouse Facilities	Cold Storage and Warehousing
		Grocery Shops	Agricultural Commodity Brokers and Distributors Outlets
	Storage Facilities	Household Goods Retail Shops	Diversified Commercial Retail and
		Grading and Bulk Assembly Facilities	

General Store or Sari- Sari Stores Milling Facilities	Wholesale Establishments Retail Outlets for Consumer Goods, Household Goods Consumer Speciality Shops Agro-Industry and Agribusiness Facilities
Industrial and Manufacturing	Commodity Processing and Packaging Rural Goods Production and Distribution Facilities
Small Machine Repair Shops and Metal Shops	Small Tool and Implement Produc- tion Facilities
Rural Bank Credit Cooperative	Development and Commercial Bank Branch Savings and Loan Associations Insurance and Financial Establish- ments
	Urban and Rural Credit Coops Brokerage Firms Chambers of Commerce Small Industry and Business Incentive Programmes
Public Utilities	Electric Supply Grid Piped Water System Sewerage and Drainage System Waste Disposal System
Administration	Provincial Government Offices Municipal Hall and Administrative Offices Regional Planning and Development

TABLE 27.7 : (Contd.)

	Police or PC sub-station	Judicial Facilities	Agency Offices
	Municipal Court Bench	National Ministry Programme District Offices	Municipal and Provincial Court Branch Offices of National Ministries Regional Office Headquarters
	Agricultural Extension Station		
Recreation and Social	Paved Basketball Court	Paved Basketball Court Small Gymnasium/Auditorium Restaurants and Coffee Shops Cinema Playground with Facilities	Paved Basketball Courts Parks and Plazas Cinema with Daily Run Hotel with nightclubs Restaurants Gymnasium/Auditorium
	Multi-purpose Community Centre		Multipurpose Community Centre Diversified Social Activities Primary and Secondary Schools Small Colleges and Technical Schools Specialised Vocational Training Programmes
Education	Primary Schools Vocational Education Facilities	Primary Schools High Schools Vocational Schools Extension and Home Economics Classes Agricultural Demonstration Facilities	Regional Agricultural Research Station General Hospital Public Health Offices Physicians, Dentists, Surgeons Retail Pharmaceutical Outlets
Health	Dispensary Clinic Maternal/Child Care Service	Multi-Purpose Clinic Area Health Office Physicians, Dentists Drugstores	

areas of major centres for various types of social services and facilities, a cultural history of Bicolanos and a cultural analysis of sub-areas within the Basin, a profile of government organisation and the dynamics of political interaction, and an analysis of travel patterns in relationship to economic interaction, and an analysis of travel patterns in relationship to economic interaction among settlements, all of which can be useful to planners in broadening their understanding of the region and its people ;

4. A series of analytical maps and overlays for various developmental variables and linkage indicators that can be used as baseline and comparative analytical tools for planning the location and distribution of services and facilities ;

5. The first comprehensive map identifying and locating settlements below the municipal and poblacion levels, including all barangays within the Bicol River Basin ;

6. Construction of a scalogram of major services, facilities, organisations and infrastructure for all barangays within the Basin that can be used in making allocation and location decision, selecting existing and incipient centres for development, and developing 'minimum packages' of investments for various communities ;

7. A core of trained manpower capable of applying, revising, modifying and updating the spatial analysis methodologies and techniques used in the project for future planning in the Bicol River Basin and for their replication in other regions of the Philippines.

8. Institutional capability within the CPDS of the University of the Philippines—Los Banos to apply spatial analysis for integrated spatial development ;

9. A body of literature, generated by the *Urban Functions in Rural Development* conceptual study, a series of 'spinoff' and working papers on various aspects of integrated urban-rural development, Bicol working papers and staff reports, and a series of statistical studies on the Bicol, much of which has already found its way into training programmes and graduate courses in various programmes within the University of the Philippines, and which will be used in the education and training of Philippine social scientists, planners and administrators for a number of years into the future ; and

10. Increased awareness and sensitivity among BRBDP

planners, USAID Mission staff in the Philippines, technical personnel of national ministries working in Bicol and local political and government leaders, of the importance of taking deliberate action to integrate urban and rural areas in regional development programmes, and the significance of urban functions in rural economic, social and physical development.

The task of institutionalising spatial analysis and planning procedures in the operations of the Bicol River Basin Development Program continues. But the experiences and approaches of the Philippines Urban Functions in Rural Development Program will be further tested and defined in other economically depressed regions in the search for applied policy analysis process that are appropriate and useful for integrated regional development planning in Third World nations seeking economic growth with greater social equity.

#### NOTES AND REFERENCES

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  13. US Agency for International Development, Office of Urban Development, 'Project Agreement: Bicol River Basin Urban Functions in Rural Development Project', Washington, USAID, 1976, mimeographed.
  14. The concept is explained in Rondinelli, Dennis A., 'Adjunctive Planning and Urban Development Policy', *Urban Affairs Quarterly*, Vol. 7, No. 1 (September 1971), pp. 13-39.
  15. USAID, *Bicol River Basin Urban Functions in Rural Development Project: Summary and Evaluation*, *op. cit.*, p. 38.
  16. 'Central place functions' are those services, facilities, economic activities or institutions that are located in urban centres and that serve and supply their hinterlands. In the Bicol survey some 'residential functions' such as piped water supply, paved sports and recreation facilities and housing sub-divisions that are indicators of 'levels of development' in the Philippines were included as functional complexity measures.
  17. The existence of these functions in Bicol municipalities had been determined through a municipal inventory of Camarines Sur Province in 1974; See Social Science Research Unit, *SSRU Municipal Inventory*, Naga City, Bicol River Basin Development Program, 1975.
  18. The physical characteristics include: (a) street pattern, i.e., network of streets in either parallel or right angle orientation; (b) at least 6 establishments (commercial, manufacturing, recreational and/or personal services); and (c) at least three of the following: (1) a town hall, church or chapel with religious services at least once a month, (2) a public plaza, park or cemetery, (3) a market place or

building where trading activities are carried on at least once a week, and (4) a public building like a school, hospital, puericulture and health center or library.' See Republic of the Philippines, National Census and Statistics Office, *Philippines 1970 Census of Population and Housing*, National Summary, Vol. II, Manila, NCSO, 1974, p. xiii.

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## INTEGRATED URBAN AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT

### The Emerging Spatial Strategy of Development Policy

THE increasing concern of developing nations and international assistance agencies with social as well as economic dimensions of development, with more equitably distributing income and wealth, with generating employment and improving the quality of life in rural areas, has given a new focus to spatial strategies in national development policy. Underlying recent development plans and assistance programmes is an attempt to integrate urban and rural development, both to overcome the adversities of concentrated investment in primate cities and to reap the benefits of urbanization by creating a national system or network of urban and rural production centers. This article outlines the motivation for and thrust of integrated urban-rural development policy, describes the emerging role of spatial planning in development strategy, and identifies major administrative problems likely to arise in policy formulation and implementation.

The scope of the new directions in development policy, the complexity of the problem and the variety of attempts to cope with it, can best be described through specific illustrations from selected plans of developing nations, ranging in diversity from Nepal to Brazil, and from the policies of major international assistance agencies.

#### **The problem of spatial development—Two Cases**

Nepal and Brazil are two very different countries. In a sense they are at opposite ends of the spectrum of developing nations. With

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a per capita gross domestic product of less than seventy dollars, Nepal is one of the world's poorest countries. The landlocked, mountainous kingdom plagued with poor soil and vast stretches of inaccessible terrain survives on a subsistence agricultural economy that accounts for more than 65 per cent of national income and absorbs 90 per cent of the labour force. More than three-fourths of Nepal's twelve million people are illiterate; life expectancy is less than 35 years. During the late 1960s and early 1970s the economic growth rate hovered around a nearly stagnant 2.5 per cent a year and non-agricultural sectors of the economy, composed almost entirely of small crafts, cottage and processing industries, failed to develop in part because of the lack of adequate infrastructure, poor communications and limited markets. Those people not engaged in agriculture or in seminal industries work in the national capital. Parts of the country are still on a barter rather than a monetary exchange system. Large numbers of people from remote hill areas migrate each year to India in search of work as farm labourers or to join other migrants in already overcrowded Indian cities. Nearly two-fifths of Nepal's population is below the age of 15.

Like other primitive economies, Nepal must devote a substantial portion of internal resource and external assistance simply to building basic productive capacity and to maintaining existing capacity at subsistence levels. Land and other natural resources are either of low potential or of marginal use: much of the potentially productive land remains unexploited. Lack of agricultural surpluses limits accumulation of investment capital. Nor does the country earn significant amounts through exports: ninety per cent of Nepal's limited trade is with one country, India. Traditional work methods and social customs are passed down unchanged from one generation to another. Agriculture absorbs the attention of the entire family, with animal power rather than machines supplementing manual labour. The ability of the government to collect taxes is limited and mass communications are only slowly reaching beyond the capital city. Only about three per cent of the widely dispersed population live in urban areas.

Because of its limited productive and administrative capacity, change in Nepal is slow and its effects marginal. Nearly all pressures for change come from external sources, through foreign technical advisors, from a small number of Nepalis educated

abroad, and through trade contacts with India.<sup>1</sup> Significant changes from tradition generally cannot take place without the support of the King and his closest advisors or without sanction from the traditional elite in positions of political and administrative authority. Dependent on foreign aid for more than sixty per cent of its development expenditures, even the assistance Nepal receives has limited impact, since its absorptive capacity—reflected in the lack of technical manpower, poor physical infrastructure and inadequate administrative capability—is minimal.

Brazil, in contrast, is a dynamic and rapidly growing society. The pace of economic progress, accelerated in the mid-1960s, has been sustained for a decade. Between 1966 and 1969 expansion of infrastructure averaged over nine per cent a year, as did the growth of mineral extraction and processing industries. Construction grew at 11 per cent and services by nearly eight per cent annually. National economic growth rates have consistently averaged more than nine per cent a year since 1970. Even more impressive is Brazil's performance in the external sector, with increases of nearly 40 per cent in exports and 30 per cent in imports. Nearly every major component of the national economy agriculture, manufacturing, construction, basic services, commerce and finance—has grown at substantial rates.<sup>2</sup>

As with other nations in transition from "underdeveloped" to modern, Brazil has created the capacity to sustain economic growth over a substantial period of time through maintenance and expansion of a complex and diversified internal production system. Expanding industrial output of the modern metropolitan areas of Sao Paulo and Rio de Janeiro provides. Brazilian society with higher incomes in urban areas, steadily increasing investment opportunities, diversification and expansion of social and economic activities, and new institutions to organize and coordinate productive and social functions.

Despite their vast differences, Nepal and Brazil share a fundamental problem: both are searching for ways to generate and spread social and economic progress throughout the country through a system of integrated spatial development. Both countries face overwhelming problems in attempting to plan for and control the spatial pattern and distribution of growth. Both have formulated national plans that give high priority to integra-

tion of diversified geographical areas and are experimenting with regional development schemes designed to link urban and rural places. Both, in their national policies, call for development that promotes social equity, expands employment, increases agricultural production, reduces regional income disparities, and provides educational, health and social services to all segments of the population. And both countries recognize the critical role of integrated spatial development in achieving those goals.

### **The spatial context of development plans**

The conditions, needs, constraints and dimensions of the problem are, and will remain, vastly different for the two countries, and so too, are their basic strategies. The problem in Brazil arises from the intensive concentration of investment and productive capacity in the modern, sprawling metropolitan region encompassing Sao Paulo, Rio and Belo Horizonte in the south central portion of the country. At the same time, vast regions of North eastern Brazil and the Amazon rival rural Nepal for primitive social and economic conditions. Brazilians, comparing their economic center with other regions in the country refer to Sao Paulo as an "engine pulling twelve empty boxcars." Social and economic disparities create underlying tensions that sporadically erupt into serious political problems.

Brazil's first national development plan for 1972-1974 not only recognized the adversities of growth concentrated in a single metropolitan area but proposed a massive strategy for spreading development to lagging regions. A primary component of the plan was "implementation of a Regional Strategy aimed at bringing about national integration." The Government sought to create "one of the largest regional development programmes in the world," by transferring nearly \$800 million in federal funds to the North east and Amazonia. Brazil's allocation for regional development exceeds the total net financial assistance provided to all of Latin America by international financial institutions at the end of the 1960s.<sup>3</sup> While noting the strategic benefits of urban industrialization and metropolitan modernization to national development, the plan also describes the constraints of highly concentrated growth :

By virtue of the income level already reached, the Centre-

South region will face in the seventies the typical problems of a modern society ; explosive growth of urban agglomerates, such as "Grande Sao Pauly" and "Grande Rio", having each a population already in the order of 8 million people, which is comparable to that of the largest human concentrations in developed areas ; pollution already critical in innumerable urban centers ; technological revolution, with its effects on economic and social activity. . . <sup>4</sup>

The plan proposes a multi-faceted strategy that includes construction of a network of roads and trans-continental highways, industrial investment incentives in smaller cities and towns, land reform and agricultural assistance, rural development programmes, extension of education, health and social services to rural areas, and selection of regional growth poles for incentives public and private investment.

The problem in Nepal, is not so much one of de-concentrating growth, as of creating a spatially integrated system that will generate and sustain social and economic progress. Nepal's fourth national development plan for 1970-1975 sought to create a base for economic development by maximizing agricultural and small-scale industrial production, building physical infrastructure, and expanding the numbers of skilled labour and trained administrators. At the same time, the government expressed a strong concern for generating development that 'strikes at the very root of poverty' "for creating a society in which all segments of the population share in benefits of growth, and which is dedicated to broadening the base of social justice." Like the Brazilians, Nepali planners saw balanced spatial development as a key to achieving those policy objectives. "Any development strategy for stimulating growth should take full cognizance of the *spatial dimension* the plan declares. "Development is highly competitive in its locational policies and calls for a conscious regional strategy that promotes redistribution of resources while maximizing economic growth and national welfare."<sup>5</sup> Thus, national development policy, set in regional development framework, attempts to disaggregate national plans and sectoral investment programmes and to integrate development activities at the local level. Nepal uses regional planning as a link between micro-analysis of local needs and macro-analysis of national develop-

ment requirements.

Nepal's development policy also addresses regional disparities in land area and productivity, natural resource endowments, industrial growth, transportation facilities and social services by formulating individual strategies for remote rural regions, the primate city of Kathmandu, and depressed problem areas. The spatial framework is used to allocate investments and resources and to locate development projects. Location of development activities is given particular emphasis in project planning :

The elimination of imbalances between various projects depends largely on the scheduling and implementation of independent projects within a geographical location. Lack of locational considerations in coordinating sectoral activities in Nepal's past planning efforts is exemplified by the numerous instances of overcapacity and under-utilization of projects, e.g. overburdened canals, underused hydro-power, roads with minimum vehicular traffic, and intensive projects without a road link . . . Regional planning, by providing a horizontal spatial dimension to the vertical dimension of the sectoral programmes, would focus on the complementarity among and between projects.<sup>6</sup>

Developing countries falling between Nepal and Brazil on the spectrum of social and economic progress face essentially the same problems. The development policy of the Philippines represents a new genre of national development strategies. "No longer is maximum economic growth the singular apex of goals," declares the most recent four-year plan. "Equally desired are maximum employment, promotion of social development and more equitable distribution of income and wealth."<sup>7</sup> Rural modernization is given priority equal to urban industrialization. Spatially balanced development is also the primary objective of Kenya's economic policies. "The government believes that balanced economic development can be achieved," the Kanyan plan argues, "that the necessary growth of employment opportunities can be generated and that the people as a whole can participate in the development process."<sup>8</sup> The Government proposes strategies for creating a system of urban and rural development centres, selecting major cities and towns for inten-

sive growth, creating a network of smaller towns and villages as social and economic centers to provide for local needs of rural people, development of road, rail, air, power and communications networks, and establishing "action areas" for agricultural and resource development. Indeed, the same problem is shared in many respects with modern economies. The United States and Western European nations have struggled for two decades with problems of economically depressed regions, experimenting with policies designed to influence the spatial location of growth-inducing facilities and services.

### **The emerging role of spatial planning in development strategy**

Location of social and economic activities lies at the very core of development strategy. A substantial number of studies confirm the close relationship between the location pattern of industry, commerce and services and the distribution and concentration of population.<sup>9</sup> Geographical areas, even within relatively small and homogeneous countries, differ in their suitability for and attractiveness as locations for public and private investment projects. Current locational advantages in large part depend on previous location decisions—on the quantity and quality of facilities available for directly productive activity and on the quality of social overhead capital (infrastructure). Natural resources—land, water and mineral endowments—must be available in appropriate amounts and types. The quality of the transportation network—rail, air and water channels, and linkages with major highways—influence the cost of moving raw materials and finished goods from supply sources to points of production, and from production points to distributors and final markets.

Public investment in water supply, waste disposal, and power generating facilities, as well as in maintenance of existing infrastructure, facilitate production in the private sector. Social overhead capital includes "software" as well as brick and mortar projects—educational programmes, health services, vocational training, and other programmes that increase the quality of human resources and contribute to productivity of the local labour force. The size and location of past physical investments, moreover, determine local competitive advantage: the structure of transport, input and production costs and economies of

agglomeration—primary variables differentiating regions as desirable locations for investment—and the geographical concentration of investment create economies of scale and contribute to central place advantage.<sup>10</sup>

Concentration of economic activities in a central location provides spillover benefits for surrounding areas. Regional planners note that urban centres organize the economy of their peripheries through creation of supply, market and administrative systems ; transmit innovations to and increase information exchange over their surrounding regions. Large concentrations of social and economic activity attract “creative or innovative personalities into the enclaves of accelerated change by encouraging the formulation of new values, attitudes and behavior traits consistent with innovation ; by fomenting a social environment favourable to innovative activity : and by bringing into existence further innovations.”

Location decisions also influence the degree of specialization that a geographical area attains in the performance of social and economic functions. The pattern and intensity of past investment shape the occupational mix of an area's labour force by specifying the types of employment opportunities available as well as the degree of diversity and level of productivity of its economic activities. Returns from previous investment decision provide a substantial portion of the capital available for future investment and the financial resources used to create new assets. In turn, the level of past investments—the accumulated stock of capital assets—determines the physical quality of an area as a competitive location and creates opportunities for future investment through “inducement effects”. Investment in public infrastructure lowers the cost of production in the private sector and induces investment in directly productive activities. Investment in directly productive activities, in turn, increase pressures for expansion and extension of social overhead capital facilities. The spatial patterns of investment, moreover, can generate “complementary effects” : investment in a particular local creates a market for new production inputs—raw materials and semi-finished goods—and creates external economies for other producers ; economies-of-scale and savings from location near complementary activities. Through backward and lateral linkages opportunities for further investment in new or existing produc-

tive enterprises lead to higher levels of development within the area.

National development plans have generally given attention to the location of individual projects, but only recently have national governments and international assistance agencies become concerned with the spatial relationships among development activities, and their impact on the pace and direction of economic and social growth. For developing countries proper spatial location of facilities and services is especially important. With scarce resources, limited administrative capability, increasingly urgent needs to expand the production of food, manufactured goods and social services, projects must be evaluated not only on the basis of their internal efficiency and effectiveness, but also on their "multiplier effects." Within a spatial context projects contribute to development to the degree that they induce and promote opportunities for further investment. The impact of a project must also be measured by its contribution to scale economies and to increased productivity of related activities. Location in space affects the costs of production and distribution and ultimately helps determine both the price and availability of goods and services for large segments of the population. The spatial distribution of development activities, moreover, is a crucial factor not only to economic growth, but to social equity and the general quality of life in developing nations. Location of development projects affects employment, levels of income, and the productivity of agriculture. The distribution of social services and facilities determines opportunities for education and training, and availability of health and medical services, and influences population migration patterns. Indeed, regional disparities in economic and social well-being are measured primarily in terms of the number and diversity of productive and social activities located within a particular geographic area. The growing gap between the richest and poorest groups within developing nations is attributable in large part to inequitable access to productive and social facilities and services.

In brief, the spatial pattern of development imposes constraints and creates opportunities for further development. The size, distribution, and relationship among urban places in developing nations is a fundamental determinant of productivity and investment potential. The pattern of economic and social



interaction among cities and towns of various sizes and between urban and rural areas influences opportunities for spreading the benefits of development to larger numbers of the population.

### **Spatial development and social problems**

As governments of developing nations begin to realize the crucial role of the spatial system in social and economic development, they are confronted within increasing frustration in planning and implementing spatial development strategies. Theories and principles of spatial planning are often elusive, abstract and inconclusive. As in other field of development administration, many prescriptions for spatial planning derive from the experience of modern industrialized nations. Some of the prescriptions are simply not transferable ; others must be carefully adopted to unique needs and constraints. And as with other development activities, spatial planning has been the subject of fads, experiments and short-lived policies. Growth pole strategy, for instance, eagerly accepted a decade ago as a primary generator of accelerated spatial development, was tried and found wanting. National and regional development plans based on creation of growth poles are now loudly repudiated or quietly revised in Latin America and Asia.<sup>12</sup>

Many problems of transferability are due to the fact that spatial patterns of most developing nations are substantially different from those of North America and Western Europe. The overwhelming influence of primate cities on developing societies has created a spatial system that encouraged, if not required, location of the most important change-inducing investments in a single geographical area. Development theorists have argued for more than a quarter of a century over whether large cities are "catalysts or cancers" in the growth of emerging nations. One advocate of concentrated development contends that primate cities "are the most important centers of cultural change, especially in those fields which vitally affect economic development : advanced education, new forms of business organization, new administrative practices, and last but not least, new technologies can find a fertile soil in them,"<sup>13</sup> He argues that "if economic development is associated with modernization, the mediation of new 'more modern' forms of social action through the primate cities," is an indispensable part of the process.

While primate cities inevitably play a dominant role in the progress of most developing nations, they also produce visible and severe adversities. The cities, it is argued, draw unskilled and uneducated migrants from the rural areas to live in over crowded slums and squatter settlements. There, unemployed and without adequate housing, medical care, education or social services they become burdens on society. Migration often breaks up families, destroys traditional culturalities, and adds to crime and social deviance in the metropolis. Overcrowding in the major city leads to physical deterioration, the spread of slums, overburdening of inadequate facilities, and traffic congestion. "What needs emphasis," one analyst notes, "is the fact that the growth of the urban population in the underdeveloped world appears to be occurring at a much faster rate than the growth of urban population in their comparable period of European growth."<sup>14</sup> The costs of maintaining the metropolis absorbs social resources and economic surpluses and prevents growth in other areas of the country. The adversities of dominant metropolitan areas on the spread of development in emerging nations have generated a backlash against further growth of primate cities. Recent national development plans give priority to projects and large-scale social programmes located in intermediate size cities, provincial capitals or rural areas. Many countries have enacted legislation aimed at controlling or restricting the growth of primate cities.

Spatial factors are gaining increased attention in development strategies, moreover, because of rapid and pervasive social-political changes affecting both developing nations and more advanced economies. Severe food shortages, natural resources scarcities, and rising prices of oil and petroleum products inhibit growth, but also underline the inextricable interdependence between advanced and developing nations in a global economy. The spread of communications technology and mass media, moreover, even to rural regions of the least developed nations, has had a two-fold effect. First, the plight of the poorest segments of emerging societies has become visible. Famines, droughts, floods and other natural disasters—which often devastate subsistence-economies—become regular features on evening television news reports. The uneven spread and halting progress of development, at a time when many nations have devoted substantial resources to growth

policies and when international assistance agencies have vastly expanded and intensified their aid efforts, dramatizes the gap between planned targets and actual achievements. A second, and perhaps more critical effect, is on the poorest groups within developing countries. Newspaper, radio and television, available even in remote villages and hamlets, make visible the inequities of "dual economies." Rural populations see and hear of opportunities for employment and education, availability of consumer goods, and the amenities of city living within their own nation. The ability to compare the opportunities offered in advanced, modernized urban enclaves with the stagnations of primitive rural areas leads to social alienation and political unrest. The growing social and economic gap between the urban and rural areas of developing nations creates frustrations that heavily contribute to political instability. Concern for social and economic equity pervades even the most traditional political systems; the increasing willingness to experiment with new forms of social organization and to adopt socialist political systems testifies to the underlying frustration with the pace and pattern of capitalist development.

Even a cursory examination of the past decade's development plans reveals startling changes in both rhetoric and strategy. A decade ago national development policy emphasized increasing export production and heavy manufacturing, and creation of "showpieces" of modernization in major metropolitan areas. The new goals—as the plans of Nepal, Brazil, Kenya and the Philippines indicate—aim at increased agricultural production, expansion of employment, reduction of income inequality, a lessening of regional disparities, expanded labour-intensive investment, and the spread of social services to rural regions. The national development plan of the Philippines echoes a fundamental policy shift in most emerging nations: economic growth alone is no longer the aim of development strategy. Improvement in living conditions—in all its dimensions, and for a large majority of the population—imbues the policies of current development plans. Political leaders of developing nations—regardless of ideology—are coming to realize that stability can be achieved only by fulfilling the hopes for economic and social progress of larger segments of the population. With the overwhelming majority of people in less developed nations living

in rural areas and earning their living in agriculture and food production, the true test of successful development policy has become the ability of government to deliver the benefits of economic growth and social modernization to the rural poor.

### **Integrated urban-rural development**

One of the primary means of attaining the goals of the new strategy is through integrated spatial development. Large cities, as the plans of Brazil and Nepal both recognize, play an undeniably critical role in generating growth, change and modernization. Indeed, urbanization is an inevitable concomitant of development. Lampard notes the inextricable relationship between urbanization and economic growth. "Specialization of functions makes inevitable for specialization of areas: it promotes a territorial division of labour between town and country and differentiates town from town," he contends. "City growth is simply the concentration of differentiated but functionally-integrated specialisms in rational locales. The modern city is a mode of social organization which furthers efficiency in economic activity."<sup>15</sup> Negative attributes of urbanization in developing nations are often overstated. Rural to urban migration, one of the most frequently mentioned evils of city growth, is not in itself necessarily bad. Studies of migration show that movement of population from rural areas to cities can be a positive indicator of economic change. As agricultural production increases and becomes more efficient, greater surpluses can be produced by less labour. Excess agricultural workers often migrate to cities and towns in search of employment, but the "push" forces from rural areas are often supplemented by "pull" factors in cities; urban areas often attract the most ambitious elements of population in search of better opportunities. While it is true that rural outmigration may also reflect dissatisfaction with the stagnation and backwardness of agricultural areas, the point is that some substantial level of rural to urban migration is inevitable in a growing economy.

Nor is migration always the major cause of urban population growth in developing nations. "A common assumption is that the rapid growth of towns and cities in the underdeveloped countries is due exclusively to rural-urban migration. Thinking of sprawling and spreading districts of squatters in cities throughout the

underdeveloped world, one automatically attributes the ballooning of these cities to a mass influx of people from the countryside," notes demographer Kingsley Davis. "(But) it is clear that close to half the growth in the urban population of the underdeveloped countries is due to overall population growth, not to migration."<sup>16</sup> Indeed, Davis notes that the proportion of total population of underdeveloped countries concentrated in cities is only one-third that of the developed countries. While the rate of change in the urban proportion of underdeveloped countries almost doubled that of advanced nations between 1950 and 1970, the percentage gain in city populations over the two decades is only a little more than half that of modern societies. During the same period rural population growth in developing nations far exceeded the increase in urban population.

The problem is not, as those enthralled with the mystique of rural culture assert, that cities are destroying the social and economic traditions of developing nations. Urbanization transforms culture and tradition to adapt to demands of modernization. Nor is the problem, as other theorists contend, that less developed countries are over-urbanized. Rather, it will be argued here, *less developed countries are not urbanized enough*. The problem is not the size of urban populations, or even the pace of city growth, but rather, the pattern of spatial development. The concentration of people and investments in a single primate city or metropolitan area limits development potential and constraints the spread of its benefits to rural areas. What is needed is a pattern of spatial development that de-concentrates urbanization, that encourages the creation of a *system of cities* and towns, that integrates rural and urban functions in a balanced and mutually reinforcing system of development centers. As E.A.J. Johnson argues "the underdeveloped countries cannot create tolerably satisfactory market economies without a spatially dispersed hierarchy of rural growth centers, market towns, small cities, and other central places that collectively can counterbalance the pull of their voracious metropolitan centers."<sup>17</sup>

And similarly, the pattern of migration rather than its volume burdens developing nations. Without a system of intermediate and small-size cities reasonably dispersed, rural migrants loosened from their ties to the land by increased agricultural productivity, have nowhere to flock but to the already overcrowded primate

city. The inability of the primate city to absorb large numbers of unskilled labour creates many of the physical, social and economic problems associated with Third World capitals. The existence of a system of cities of various sizes would allow migrants to make a progression of moves, perhaps over two or three generations, from smaller towns to intermediate cities as employment opportunities expanded. Indeed, the existence of cities of varying sizes might stem the tide of migration to the dominant metropolis by permanently absorbing a large proportion of rural migrants.

Recent development strategies such as those of Nepal and Brazil seek just such a balanced spatial system. Urban and rural areas are seen as mutually dependent; both performing essential functions in the national economy. A hierarchy of cities and towns functionally linked together and with rural and agricultural production areas provides a decentralized network of growth-generating development centers that can increase access of large segments of the population to economic, social and political opportunities as well as to urban services and facilities. Urban functions and services can thus complement the wide range of technical inputs required to increase agricultural productivity in rural areas.

Integrated urban-rural development is increasingly promoted as a vehicle for ameliorating some of the most intransigent problems of global concern. Both development theorists and practitioners have called attention in the past few years to the role of spatial planning in increasing food production, relieving energy scarcities, and promoting employment and social welfare. The Pearson Commission clearly recognized the importance of creating a balanced urban network to support agricultural development. "Planning strategy in developing countries must emphasize the growth of small and intermediate regional centers," its report advised, "to offer market, service and storage facilities, and light labour-intensive industries processing local materials. The construction of such new centers could offer a considerable measure of employment for unskilled labour."<sup>18</sup> After an intensive review of development assistance practices, Edgar Owens and Robert Shaw urged a redirection of strategy toward vertically and horizontally integrated spatial development. "A national economy requires the organization of space, the concentration of development activities in the urban centers of the different sized spatial

units, a system of infrastructure within and between spaces, and the integration of agricultural and industrial development." they contend. "Each level of urban center would contain the activities appropriate to its size. This would overcome the current gross imbalance between investment in the large cities and the rest of the country."<sup>19</sup> In a series of seminars on employment problems sponsored by the Ford Foundation participating government officials and development scholars concluded that balanced spatial development is critical to solving the complex social and economic difficulties of less developed nations :

We are firmly persuaded that the most fundamental and promising attack on employment problems in developing countries is in efforts to redress the present urban bias in development strategies and the consequent need to disperse economic activity much more widely than heretofore. This shift in development strategy seems to be central to the widespread creation of employment opportunities and to more effective use of the limited capital available in developing countries. Moreover, the interest in developing countries in the dispersion of economic activity has grown rapidly and widely over the last decade. The problem, however, is not simply one of generating activity in rural areas but rather of balancing development between rural and urban sectors. The two sectors are intimately related in their economic activities and any diversion of national development efforts to rural areas will require careful reassessment of urban priorities.<sup>20</sup>

Development practitioners and developing country officials arrived at these conclusions at the same time that international assistance agencies were substantially shifting their lending priorities in a similar direction.

#### **Emerging trends in development assistance policy**

Integrated urban-rural development underlies the emerging strategies of international assistance agencies. Since the late 1960s the World Bank Group, the U.S. Agency of International Development, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), and regional development banks, as well as foreign bilateral

assistance organizations, have struggled with the complex problem of how to achieve greater development impact with limited financial resources. Recent trends in the policies of international assistance agencies indicate that all are attempting to concentrate aid on the poorest segments of developing societies—what the U.S. Congress, in its mandate to USAID, calls the “poor majority” in rural and urban areas. Recent policies place increasing emphasis on social sector projects that combine capital and technical assistance within “packages” of multi-purpose, multi-component projects that attempt to deal with the complex problems of poverty in developing nations on a comprehensive, rather than a piecemeal, basis.

These changing trends in international assistance strategy are reflected in USAID's Congressional mandate to concentrate assistance in sectors with the greatest impact on the poorest groups in developing nations. The targets include agriculture, nutrition, population, health, education and human resources, and on selected development problems such as transportation, urban and regional planning and technology transfer. Within this mandate USAID has fashioned a strategy aimed at increasing the levels of income and quality of life in rural areas. The strategy seeks to strengthen local institutions to involve the poorest majority in development planning, to increase and diversify agricultural production, and to integrate agricultural, industrial and commercial projects. The spatial dimension has become a critical variable in design, appraisal and evaluation of project loans and grants. The importance of stimulating development through creation of an integrated system of urban and rural places is clearly reflected in USAID policy statements :

One method of stimulating rural development and slowing rural-urban migration is the creation of market areas and market towns complete with services and amenities designed to make rural life productive and satisfying. This is a new field for A.I.D. as well as for most developing countries and other foreign aid agencies. Programmes are needed to assure the location in market towns and cities of certain activities which are needed to involve farmers in a high-productivity agricultural system, such as private banks and/or financial cooperatives, agricultural extension, warehouses, and market and



transport facilities. In addition, it is necessary to integrate agricultural, industrial and commercial development including agro-industries, and to encourage the presence of a variety of consumer goods, personal service and construction businesses to provide the goods and services people need and want as their incomes rise. Finally, these market towns and small cities need utilities, schools and medical clinics.<sup>21</sup>

World Bank policies attempt to integrate functionally a wide variety of services and inputs required to increase agricultural productivity in selected rural regions. "A regionally oriented development scheme consists of a package of integrated projects which cut across different economic sectors. . .," notes one World Bank official :

Integrated regional development usually focuses on agricultural projects which rely heavily on extension services, supplemented by agro-industries, marketing services and credit cooperatives. However, some intensive regional development projects do focus on industrial estates for small-scale labour intensive industries. Others are based on forestry and wood processing, mining, or fishery projects, or on tourist centers. In order to make the combination of projects in different sectors effective, the regional development will often require the construction of basic infrastructure facilities for example, feeder roads, communication networks, and small power plants. In addition, an important role is often given to education, family planning and other health projects.<sup>22</sup>

But whether developing nations choose USAID's approach emphasizing creation of a spatial network integrating urban functions and services with rural development activities, or the World Bank's approach emphasizing the integration of diverse sectoral activities at selected rural locations, both national governments and international assistance agencies must cope with and resolve a myriad of theoretical and practical problems in order to operationalize the strategy.

### **Administrative implications of spatial development policy**

The strong commitment of international assistance agencies and developing countries to functionally and spatially integrated rural development policies raises a number of complex planning and administrative issues. Although the goals of integrated rural development are clearly stated in policy papers of the funding agencies and the plans of developing nations, well-defined strategies for implementation are more difficult to discern. Basic theoretical and operational problems—essential to successful design and execution of rural development projects—remain unresolved.

First, while extensive experiments in rural development have been conducted in developing nations for more than two decades, neither the international assistance agencies nor many developing nations have the depth of experience needed to plan and execute the types of integrated rural development projects and regionally-based spatial development plans currently proposed. Although "A.I.D. does not have experience in organizing local market areas and market towns," the Agency admits in its annual budget report to Congress, "there is a sound theoretical base (from several academic disciplines of which regional planning is the most important) plus solid, practical experience in a small number of countries, principally Israel, Egypt, Yugoslavia and Taiwan, upon which policies can be built."<sup>23</sup> Yet, it is not clear how the theoretical base will be translated into operational guidelines. Definition of such terms as "regional development", "integrated spatial planning", "growth centers", and "market towns", used repeatedly in policy statements and development plans will be a complex task since developing nations and aid agencies have varying conceptions and give different meanings to the terms. Once basic concepts are defined they must be translated into design and implementation standards that delineate alternative means of focusing resources, appropriate mixes of public and private investment in proposed projects, and the most effective sequence of development activities in areas where all components cannot be pursued simultaneously.

Second, while strongly advocating an integrated approach to development, the Ford Foundation seminars on employment problems in developing nations identified fundamental issues requiring extensive research. "Unfortunately, the concentration

of planners and central government policy makers on macro-economic considerations and on large projects which might attract foreign aid has meant," participants noted, that the basic homework necessary to define practical strategies for balanced rural-urban development has been seriously neglected.<sup>24</sup> Among the questions requiring attention are those of determining how non-agricultural work opportunities can be generated in rural areas ; the costs of creating jobs in rural areas as compared with cities ; the comparative costs of providing infrastructure and social services in cities and rural hinterlands ; and the potential impacts of alternative spatial structures on rural to urban migration patterns.

Nor is it clear, moreover, that developing countries with the most critical problems of rural poverty have the capability to design an integrated spatial system, or that the massive infusion of technical assistance will create that capacity. Strategy design would involve the complex theoretical problem of delineating an optimum hierarchy of urban centres, intermediate cities, market towns and rural processing centres, based on analysis of social differentiation, natural and human resource potential and economic specialization. From that analysis the potential for creating comparative economic advantages in each development center would be determined and functions assigned to each center in a national system of production and exchange. Regional growth centers would then be designated for the location of export industries, public infrastructure investment, expansion of import substitution industries and creation of commercial trade markets. Smaller urban places serving as processing and market points for agricultural areas would have to be identified. Construction of a massive network of inter-urban transportation, communication and power facilities linking urban areas together and providing interchange between urban centers of various sizes and rural hinterlands would be needed to fashion dispersed development centers into a national spatial system.

Finally, both assistance agencies and governments of developing countries will have to discover the means of quickly expanding the organizational capacity of nations with severe scarcities of trained professionals and efficient operating ministries to deliver a complex set of functional, programmatic and support inputs to dispersed spatial locations. Where

integrated rural development has been tried and evaluated, the lessons for effective implementation are clear. Success depends on the government's ability to provide a combination of related inputs that include : <sup>25</sup>

a. *Administrative arrangements for resource mobilization and coordination* : means must be found for mobilizing high-level political support and external funding and technical assistance, for creating effective channels of vertical and horizontal communication and for coordinating the semi-independent functions of contributing agencies in the project area. Realistic project designs, responding to the immediate needs of intended beneficiaries, assigned to organizations with a large degree of administrative and financial independence and manned by capable and committed managers and staff for implementation and operation, are prerequisites to success. The studies also found that the project must be carefully located, providing access to clientele ; that a minimum package of social and economic facilities and services must be provided to induce change ; and that linkages with rural and town market centers must be established quickly.

b. *Continuing administrative support* : provision and maintenance of a well-developed staff training programme, strong back-up assistance from central government ministries, recruitment of a steady supply of professional and technical cadre, and creation of a system of continuous appraisal, evaluation and monitoring are needed to maintain the pace and direction of rural development.

c. *Local commitment and participation in programme activities* : responsiveness to local needs depends on the ability to identify immediate and medium range problems, on the level of staff commitment to local participation in planning ; on the support of, or minimization of opposition by, local government officials ; and on the development of motivation in local residents to accept social and economic change.

d. *Organizational, functional and technical input delivery to spatially dispersed project sites* : studies indicate that successful projects require the creation of cooperative or other mutual benefit organizations to assist local residents to obtain and use improved agricultural methods and techniques and to market agricultural products ; establishment of credit institutions ; construction of storage and processing facilities ; maintenance of an

effective extension service ; creation of an equitable and productive land tenure system ; and diffusion of basic health, education and training services.

In brief, international assistance agencies and development theorists in advocating integrated rural-urban development strategies, are pursuing a policy that both reason and experience indicate are of critical importance to social and economic progress in emerging nations, but one that requires mobilization of resources from nearly every sector of society. The administrative implications for executing such a policy are profound and pervasive. Plans and policy statements yield little evidence, however, that the implications have been carefully considered or that complex problems have been clearly formulated and resolved. A careful application of policy analysis and selective use of pilot and demonstration projects should precede full-scale pursuit of spatial development strategy.

#### FOOTNOTES

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20. See Edgar O., Edwards, "Employment in Developing Countries," in E.O. Edwards (ed.), *Employment in Developing Nations : Report on a Ford Foundation Study* (New York : Columbia University Press, 1974), pp. 1-46 ; quote at p. 34. Emphasis added.
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22. Hans-Joachim Lell, "Integrated Regional Development," *Finance and Development*, Vol. 10, No. 2 (June 1973), pp. 23-25, 38 ; quote at p. 23.
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24. Edwards, op. cit., p. 31.
25. See especially, Robert Chambers and Deryke Belseaw, *Managing Rural Development : Lessons and Methods from Eastern Africa*, (Brighton : University of Sussex, 1973), Institute of Development Studies Discussion Paper No. 15 ; Uma Lele, *The Design of Rural Development, Lessons from Africa*, Baltimore : Johns Hopkins University Press, 1975 ; Harvey M. Choldin, "An Organizational Analysis of Rural Development Projects at Comilla, East Pakistan," *Economic Development and Cultural Change* (July 1972) ; Bennet Harrison, "Rural Growth Centers : A Strategy for Development of Low Income Countries," (Washington : U.S. Agency for International Development 1967), mimeographed ; Francine Frankel, India's

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## URBAN INDUCED MODERNIZATION AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS A Case Study

### INTRODUCTION

IN INDIA, the process of urbanisation has loosened the hold some traditional forces and has brought in its fold the phenomenon of modernity. The impact of this is felt through changes in physical, economic, social, cultural and political aspects of rural scene. Needless to say, its spatial spread is not even. The impact of centres inducing modernisation seems to differ in as much as the centres themselves differ. There is spatial imbalance even within precincts of a particular urban agglomeration. The present paper addresses itself to those issue of modernization as prevalent in the newly developing Neyveli Townshp of Tamil Nadu and examines the policy implications of the frame of modernization relative to its environs.

#### Concept of modernization

By modernization we mean a process of long range social and cultural change, leading to a progressive development of society. It is multifaceted, arising from and/or leading to the process of urbanization or industrialization which, in turn, resulting in migration and secularization of ideas (Sethi 1976).

The modernization takes place through a combined process of change—social, economic, spatial political and economic, although each differs in its magnitude. One process initiating this change is the diffusion of innovations. The clustering of



innovation, in space and time, further induces the take-off and spread of modernization. Also, this process triggers off a chain of processes such as rationalization of thought and thus accelerates modernization.

The clustering of innovations, in fact, has hardly left any society unaffected. India is no exception. Modernization is indeed very complex and in its function helps man control nature and creates an efficient human organization. It ushers in a fundamental change in the old institutions : a change of value regardless of social stratification (Srinivas 1966). Rationality of thought, universality of secular ideology, impersonal social relationship of a secondary nature, preference for utilitarianism rather than altruism, tendency toward individual behaviourism are some functional expressions of modernity and modern society (Singh 1965). Thus it not only affects the structure of society but drastically alters the social relationship and social value of life.

#### **Modernization process—An overview**

Modernization has attracted much attention from scholars. Some have studied modernization of the individual (Inkeles 1969) and others such as Lerner (1958), Eisenstadt (1966), Smith (1965), Lery (1966), Srinivas (1966) and Singer (1966) have analysed modernization from religious, political, economic and educational view points. Bisbee (1956) has studied family structure as affected by modernization and Gusfield (1967) relationship between modernity and tradition.

Shils (1966) reiterates that modernization can be achieved by extension of education while Abadan (1967) and Ross (1961) relate modernity to attitudes, and changing status of women. Sethi (1976) shows how attitudinal modernity is associated with socio-demographic characteristics. Rao (1970) identifies, on the other hand, different situations in which urbanization exerts influence on modernity in rural villages. Sovani (1961) concludes that nuclear family system is a hindrance to adoption of modern social attitudes.

Robert (1954) conclusively proves cities do induce new ideas and influences. Dube (1958) Sen and Roy (1966) and Park and Tinker (1959) indicate an overall secularizing trend operating in villages as a consequence of urbanization and intensive developmental efforts.

These studies, however, are less concerned with policy implications of modernization induced by centres. But they provide a theoretical background useful for studies of similar nature.

### **Constraints of modernization**

Modernization, in India has several constraints : Extence of slothful, colonial bureaucracy in the take-off period, meterialism, racial prejudice, degenerate family ties, and emphasis upon leisure. Apart from these, traditional characteristics rooted in the Hindu way of life, such as fatalism, caste system, desperate historic and traditional feeling of regionalism, groupism, classism, and complex social structure also hinder effective and deep penetration of modernity as time proceeds.

Being 'modern' in India means an intellectual status and an enlightened framework of mind. The idea of being modern is intrinsically lodged in the minds of people but nevertheless systematically affects the entire spectrum of life : social, economic and political. It is also freedom of thought and action with emphasis on initiative and accomplishment and technological sophistication as in the west (Dutt and Noble 1977).

### **Modernization and development in India**

Modernization in India began with the advent of British rule and through cultural captivity, industrialization, commercial penetration, and consolidation of political and economic gains by Britishers. (Panchanadikar and Panchanadikar 1978). The impact of this was more pronounced during the nineteenth century. It was in this period, urban population began to increase, caste gave way to class in urban and educated communities, and employment opportunities extended to all levels of society. Consequently, social values gradually changed, and traditional customs were severely criticized. This process got further strengthened after independence, through constitution of a sovereign republic and its treatment of society in a secular frame. And social stratification stood prohibited by directive principles of the constitution.

Modernization, urbanization and diffusion of innovations generally go hand in hand. Yet, in India, there exist insolated pockets of areas and groups of people untouched by them. But

as urbanization proceeds in space and time, the urban area gets changed and a shifting of occupational structure is often experienced. Side by side, rural-urban migration takes place on a scale that is felt even in villages, even though they are physically isolated from the towns.

### **Measuring modernity**

The zone of interaction between Neyveli and its environs is delineated with the help of Roillis Law (Reilly 1953). This zone consists of nearly 44 villages falling within the sphere of influence of Neyveli (Fig. 29.1). Investigations in this regard have been carried out in 5 villages, which have been selected on the basis of their locational characteristics (Table 29.1) as given below :

1. Village adjoining to the township (Vadakkuthu).
2. Village away from the township (Melkangaiyankuppam).
3. Village near the mining centre (Therkumelur).
4. Village located at transportation node (U. Mangalam).
5. Village located away from the road (Uyyakondaravi).

### **Neyveli township and its development**

The Neyveli Township which is selected as the urban centre for present analysis is one among the hundred New towns built in the country since Independence. It has been established to settle mostly the mining population.

The Neyveli Lignite Corporation was started in the year 1956. To meet the immediate requirements of housing, 1,500 quarters were constructed to the South of the present township, as a temporary measure. The construction of Neyveli Township was started in the year 1958 and completed in the year 1965. With 7,500 houses, it has initially been planned as a garden town. The 34 km<sup>2</sup> area is now divided into 31 rectangular blocks of which 19 blocks have been fully developed and 3 blocks are partially developed. All the developed blocks are self sufficient. Infrastructural services are centrally located. There is for instance, a well-equipped 200 bed hospital on the north-west edge of the township. The Neyveli Lignite Corporation operates limited bus transport in the project area.

According to 1971 census, the township had a population of 58,285 as against 10,295 in 1961. In other words, the township




FIG. 29.1 : *Neyveli and its environs*

registered a remarkable population increase (368%) in the decade 1961-71. The township had a working force of 15,781 (27.1%) in 1971. The number of literates in the township is 33,967 (58.3%) which is quite significant from the demographic point of view. According to 1971 census, the population of the township lived in 12,616 residential units.

Of the total area of 3,395 hectares, 1,460 hectares (43%)

TABLE 29.1 : Sample villages in the environs of Neyveli

S. No.	Name of the Village	No. of houses interviewed
1.	Vedakkuthu	17
2.	Melkangayankuppam	22
3.	U. Mangalam	23
4.	Uyyakondarai	17
5.	Therkumelur	78
Total		157

have been allotted for residential development, 984 hectares (29%) are under roads, 526 hectares (15.5%) for public and semi-public services, 336 hectares (9.9 %) for parks and play grounds and 89 hectares (2.5 %) for commercial uses.

Neyveli is a single enterprise town and hence the corporation authority controls all the physical properties. The mining area comprises of sight sections in all. In between the first mining area and the township in the north-west of it is the industrial complex. This consists of clay washing plant, fertilizer plant, briquetting and carbonizing plant and thermal power station (Fig. 29.2).

#### **Policies of the corporation**

The establishment of an industry has an inevitable impact on the pattern of growth of town and its environs. The planning and growth of such town cover a full range of aspects like community economy, in general and its people, its landuse transportation, utilities and services, in particular. The regional implication has to be studied before hand and it must be taken care of to have a balanced, economic development to attain a balanced modernization. Being new and, therefore, free from traditional form of government, the new town could be expected to function as an experimental laboratory to reevaluate existing forms and systems and reform them. However, it may be noted the balancing regional development policies are forgotten in the planning of this town. It is because of this, that a set of problems has emerged, resulting in a restricted functioning of the town, which reflects an unbalanced regional growth.




FIG. 29.2: Landuse

The important features of the policies are :

1. Ownership of the land by private persons is strictly restricted.
2. No provisions are made for constructing a residential complex except by the corporation for workers employed in mining and industry.
3. Provisions for establishment of shopping centres are given only to few agents. In this regard, the location of shopping centres with size, number and layout were clearly outlined. The agents operate the shopping centres in tune with the stipulation framed by the corporation.
4. The establishment of infrastructural facilities is mostly controlled and owned by the corporation. Only few facilities, such as banking, are operated by other agencies.
5. Transportation facilities are provided and operated by the Corporation. The area of operation is strictly confined to the Corporation boundary.
6. Hospital facilities are provided and controlled by the Corporation. Preference for medical facilities is given only to the Corporation employees than other individuals.
7. Recreational centres such as theatres, clubs are also owned and controlled by the Corporation. Membership to these associations is restricted to the employees.
8. Other services such as hotels, tailoring, etc. are assigned to private people temporarily licensed.

#### **Modernization in the environs of Neyveli**

The areas of the environs, excluding the township, is 272 km<sup>2</sup>. The villages, 44 in all, belong to Cuddalore and Vridhachalam taluks of South Arcot District of Tamil Nadu (Fig 29.3).

The total population is about 85,000. The density per km<sup>2</sup> is 313. Of this total, 31.2 per cent constitutes the work force (Fig. 29.3). The primary, secondary and tertiary sector workers are 83.7, 7.2, 9.1 per cent respectively. The total number of literates is 29,237 which is 33.8 per cent of the total population (Fig. 29.4).

Background characteristics such as improved roads, bus




FIG. 29.3 : Occupational structure

facilities, protected water supply, community wells, high schools, primary health centres, electricity, family planning and maternity centres, private clinics, banks, cinema and post-offices exhibit a considerable deviation in sample points from needed proportion of existence. For instance, there is not even half the adequate standard length of improved roads in the environs (Appendix-I). Only 39.5 per cent of the total area is served by bus facilities. Only 33.8 per cent of the sample area is provided with protected water supply and only a few community





wells are in existence. This shows the absence of a vital facility (drinking water) over a large area.

The higher educational institutions (high schools and higher secondary schools) are completely absent. Primary Health Centres, Family Planning Centres and Private Clinics are of low proportions (5.7 per cent, 11.5 per cent and 17.8 per cent respectively). There are no banks and cinema theatres. However, the area has electrification to a considerable extent (71.9 per cent). All the villages have postal facilities. This shows that there is some stagnation of growth.

With this area of the environs of Neyveli is characterised by such basic background characteristics, Neyveli is highly contrasting in this respect. It presupposes that although there is a physical consistency of the system of Neyveli and its environs, there is some obstacle for free interaction. Otherwise, the environs might have experienced more or less the same intensity of modernization as did Neyveli. Explanation of this obstacle is possible only through an understanding of the impact of this urban centre on its environs.

### **Measurement of modernity**

Modernity is an outcome of interplay of intricate and complex number of factors. Education, occupation and income are included as independent variables and elements of modernity, which form the constructive elements as dependent variables. Measuring modernity necessitates as evaluation of existing facilities or background character.

A comparative analysis of changes as evidenced in existing facilities, inter-relationships among them and changing structural pattern of facilities will point towards the presence or absence of the process. And delineating the existing pattern to the propounded policy frame helps to assess the degree of modernization.

### **The Existence of elements of modernity**

The analysis requires as a first step the identification of existing elements of modernity although there may be possible chances of restricted influence for free interaction. The investigation identifies the following proportions of their existence.

The indicators of the different sectors of economy such as commercialization of crops (22.3 per cent) adoption of new

methods of agriculture (13.4 per cent) possessions of radio (35.1 per cent) are some with very low proportions in relation to population (Table 29.2). There are however a few exceptions.

**TABLE 29.2 : Presence of modernizing elements**

S. No.	Modernizing element	Percentage to the total (157) households
1.	Introduction of commercial crops	22.29
2.	Adoption of new methods in agriculture	13.38
3.	Household possessions : Radio	39.49
4.	Household possessions : Fan	19.10
5.	Household possessions : Cycle	48.15
6.	Household possessions : Motorcycle	5.09
7.	Contacts with the neighbours	20.38
8.	Intermingling between castes	7.64
9.	Participation in community and social functions	21.65
10.	Formation of association and clubs	1.27
11.	Political groups	11.46
12.	Children's higher education	36.94
13.	Adoption of family planning methods	27.34
14.	Newspaper reading	40.13
15.	Women's participation	36.94

The social indicators such as degree of contact with neighbours, intermingling between castes, participation in community and social functions, formation of association and clubs, political groups are negligible in quantum terms (20.4, 7.6, 21.6, 1.3, 11.5 per cent respectively). This indicates a slow progress of social change rather than an immobilization of social structure.

The exceptions such as newspaper reading (40.1 per cent), higher education children (36.9 per cent), family planning (27.3 per cent), women participation (36.9 per cent), show a relatively higher proportion.

It is now clear that the elements of modernization are found in very negligible proportions, which expresses in form the fact of the existence of social disjunction between Neyveli and its environs and also possible existence of obstacles for rapid spread of the elements.

### **Pattern of interaction**

The elements of modernity in the environs may be operationally explained by tracing out possible and probable types of interaction. This may even be a cause for contrasting situations.

The interviews with persons from the environs of Neyveli interaction with the Neyveli Township for different purposes express the following types and magnitude of interaction. Interaction in terms of fulfilling selected purposes such as getting groceries vegetables, fuel, stationaries, footwear, electrical goods, utensil, furnitures, jewels, radios, building materials, pump sets and fertilisers is at a very low ebb. It is evident from the magnitude of interaction, accounting for less than 30 per cent of the samples.

Services such as repairs, post offices, police station and banking facilities are also at a very low ebb, about 20 per cent (Appendix-II).

Only services, such as medical and recreational are accounted for by a considerable proportion. The reason for this state of affairs is obvious. Thus, the extent of interaction points strongly toward the presence of restriction for free interaction.

### **Policy implications**

From the analysis above it is clear that there exist some elements of modernity. But 'why this is so and how is that modernization exists at such a level? Does it have, any connection to the policy frame or what else operates?' are certain basic questions to be answered in the context of policy implications.

The investigation as pointed out earlier is centered on :

1. The presence of elements of modernity such as commercialization of crops, adoption of modern methods in agriculture, use of chemical fertilizers, power sprayers and high yielding variety of seeds and household possessions such as cycle, fan, radio, and motorcycle.
2. Social elements such as intermingling between castes, public participation, formation of clubs, adoption of family planning methods, children's higher education, women's participation, and habit of newspaper reading.
3. Political grouping and
4. Physical elements such as improved road network, bus

facilities, expansion and extension of bus facilities, electricity network, protected water facilities, etc.

Through employing correlation technique, a deeper analysis has been carried out. For convenience, persons interviewed have been classified on the basis of income level (Table 29.3). For this

**TABLE 29.3 : Distribution of respondents according to income category**

S. No.	Income of the Respondent	Fre
1.	—1500	15
2.	1500—3000	39
3.	3000—6000	42
4.	6000—12000	47
5.	12000—	14
Total		157

purpose, stepwise multiple correlations have been used for both independent and dependent variables for modernity.

The values of correlation provide an understanding of the process of modernization by bringing to light shadowed factors controlling the process. The values show, that there is a significant correlation of 0.5 between the variables of income level and the elements of modernity such as household possessions, cycles, radio, fan and power sprayers, newspaper reading (Table 29.4).

This also indicates a possible positive relation with the acquisition of these elements. This tendency is obvious in that people with higher income are capable of acquiring elements associated with modernity. Fewer people of this higher income group have nothing to bother with policy restrictions. Policy frame controls only those with low income in the environs. While interpreting the correlation values between income and variables such as commercialization of crops, motorcycles, contacts, intermingling between castes, formation of clubs, bus facilities, electricity and adoptions of innovations, we seem to enter into a highly contrasting new situation. The correlation values are insignificant (i.e. less than 0.2). The value relating to intermingling of castes is at minus value. This indicates near immobilization

TABLE 29.4 : Correlation of different items of modernization

S. No.	Item	Coefficient of correlation (N=157)
1.	Commercialization of crops	0.30
2.	Adoption of modern methods in agriculture : Power sprayers	0.58
3.	Adoption of modern methods in agriculture : Chemical fertilizers	0.38
4.	Adoption of modern methods in agriculture : High yielding variety	0.40
5.	Household possessions : Cycle	0.55
6.	Household possessions : Fan	0.21
7.	Household possessions : Radio	0.57
8.	Household possessions : Motorcycles	0.30
9.	Contacts with neighbours	0.26
10.	Intermingling between castes	-0.08
11.	Participation in community and social functions	0.44
12.	Formation of associations/clubs	0.21
13.	Adoption of family planning methods	0.44
14.	Habit of newspaper reading	0.53
15.	Children's higher education	0.43
16.	Women's participation	0.42
17.	Political groups	0.39
18.	Bus facilities	0.02
19.	Electricity	0.32
20.	Protected water	0.08

of social elements and perpetuation of traditional caste structure, uneven distribution, economic opportunities, segregation of physical structure and inadequacy of socio-political changes.

The values between income level and city visit rates, higher education, family planning, women participation, use of high yielding varieties are also quite insignificant and this substantiates again the contention above.

From this analysis, it is evident that the presence of a negligible proportion of elements of modernity is because of the fact that a majority of people constitutes the poorer sections of population or because of inadequacy of interaction.

Now for specific policies enacted by the Neyveli Lignite Corporation and their importance in relation to aspects of free

interaction. The policy structure of the Neyveli Lignite Corporation does not allow for the utilization of facilities installed by the people of the environs and thus does not lead to a self-contained development. This policy controls and restricts every aspect of modernization within the spatial bounds of the Corporation area and the flow of benefits between Neyveli and its environs is absent. Thus, disjunctive spatial interaction between Neyveli and its environs is due to the policy frame and absence of usual linkages. Hence the developmental impact is highly polarised.

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*APPENDIX—I*

**SERVICES AVAILABLE IN SAMPLE VILLAGES**

S. No.	Service	Percentage to the total (157) household
1.	Improved roads/Metal roads	49.68
2.	Bus facilities	39.49
3.	Protected water supply	33.76
4.	Community wells	2.55
5.	High schools	—
6.	Primary health centres	5.73
7.	Electricity	71.97
8.	Family planning/Maternity centres	11.46
9.	Private clinics	17.83
10.	Banks	—
11.	Cinema theatres	—



*APPENDIX—II*

**PERSONS COMING FOR SHOPPING/SERVICES TO  
NEYVELI TOWNSHIP FROM ITS ENVIRONS**

S. No.	Shopping/Services	Percentage to the total (157) household
1.	Provisions	18.47
2.	Vegetables	17.83
3.	Fuel/Kerosene	21.02
4.	Stationaries/Books	39.51
5.	Footwear	32.19
6.	Electrical goods	34.62
7.	Utensils	26.39
8.	Furniture	31.67
9.	Jewels	21.69
10.	Radio/Transistor	19.04
11.	Building materials	17.20
12.	Pumpsets	14.02
13.	Fertilizers	29.41
14.	Repairs	22.41
15.	Medical	57.32
16.	Post Office	29.05
17.	Police station	22.41
18.	Bank	17.70
19.	Cinema	75.16

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